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A common argument against privatization is that private provid-
ers, motivated by self-interest, will advocate changes in substantive 
policy.  In this Article, Professor Volokh evaluates this argument, us-
ing, as a case study, the argument against prison privatization based 
on the possibility that the private prison industry will distort the crimi-
nal law by advocating incarceration. 
This “political influence” argument applies at least as well to pub-
lic provision:  Government agencies, too, lobby for changes in substan-
tive law.  In the prison industry, for instance, it is unclear whether pri-
vate firms advocate incarceration to any significant extent, but public 
guard unions are known to do so actively. 
Moreover, adding the “extra voice” of the private sector will not 
necessarily increase either the amount of pro-incarceration advocacy 
or its effectiveness.  Prison privatization may well reduce the political 
power of the pro-incarceration forces:  Because advocacy is a “public 
good” for the industry, as the number of independent actors increases, 
the largest actor’s advocacy decreases (since it no longer captures the 
full benefit of its advocacy) and the smaller actors free-ride off the 
largest actor’s contribution.  Under some plausible assumptions, priva-
tization decreases advocacy, and under different plausible assump-
tions, the net effect of privatization on advocacy is ambiguous. 
The argument that prison privatization distorts criminal law by 
fostering pro-incarceration advocacy is thus unconvincing without a 
fuller explanation of the mechanics of advocacy.  The use of the politi-
cal influence argument in other privatization contexts may also be 
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theoretically unsound, to the extent it does not consider whether priva-
tization reduces preexisting levels of public sector advocacy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over 90 years ago, opponents of World War I alleged that “muni-
tions manufacturers frighten the popular mind with the fear of imaginary 
external enemies and inflame it with murderous patriotism.”1 According 
 
1 In re Billings, 298 P. 1071, 1094 (Cal. 1930) (quoting a 1916 article by an “odious anar-
chist”); see also, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE 
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 141 (2004) (“Socialists maintained that war was 
a capitalist tool contrived by industrialists to boost armament sales”); id. at 180 & 598 n.80 (Post-
master General announced in 1917 that newspapers could not say “that this Government is the tool 
of . . . munitions makers”); NIALL FERGUSON, THE PITY OF WAR 32–33 (1999) (arms industry would 
benefit from war, and Alfred Hugenberg, director of the Krupp armaments company, made a pro-
war statement). 
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to Stefan Zweig, the war began only when “newspapers in the pay of the 
arms manufacturers began to whip up sentiment against Serbia.”2 After 
the war, that accusation morphed into the charge that arms makers were 
self-interestedly obstructing peace efforts.3 Today, an opponent of U.S. 
military policy characterizes defense contractor CACI International Inc,4
whose chairman speaks publicly of the “heinous[ness],” “fanatical hor-
ror,” and “barbarism” of terrorism,5 as “one of the most unabashed cor-
porate backers of Bush’s foreign policy and a key supporter of the mili-
tary campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.”6
This theme—that private contractors use their influence to advocate 
not just privatization but also, insidiously, changes in the substantive 
law—sweeps more broadly than defense contractors. 
• Private prison firms are often accused of lobbying for incarcera-
tion because, like a hotel, they have “a strong economic incen-
tive to book every available room and encourage every guest to 
stay as long as possible.”7
• Business improvement districts—coalitions of business and 
property owners, many of which have their own private security 
forces—have lobbied municipalities for, among other things, ag-
gressive panhandling ordinances.8
2 Andrew Cockburn, The Great War, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2000.  But see FERGUSON,
supra note 1, at 215–16 (European press opinion, in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Britain, was 
not particularly pro-war when the war began). 
3 See Report of the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry, Senate, 74th 
Cong., 2d Sess., at 4–10 (Feb. 24, 1936) (the Nye Commission report, charging that the munitions 
industry opposes peace and disarmament efforts); cf. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and 
Television Address to the American People, in 1960–1961 PUB. PAPERS ¶421, at 1035, 1038 (Jan. 
17, 1961) (“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted 
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.  The potential for the 
disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”). 
4 See CACI Int’l Inc, CACI: Ever Vigilant, http://www.caci.com (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). 
5 Speech by Dr. J.P. (Jack) London, Chairman, President, and CEO of CACI International Inc, 
on accepting the AUSA John W. Dixon Medal, Washington, D.C., Oct. 8, 2003, http://www.caci.
com/speeches/jpl_AUSA_10-8-03_speech.shtml (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). 
6 Tim Shorrock, CACI and Its Friends, NATION, June 21, 2004, at 6; see also ROBERT 
MANDEL, ARMIES WITHOUT STATES: THE PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY 86–88 (2002) (“private 
military companies could have an interest in seeing violence and turmoil perpetuated to drum up 
business for their services”); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Polic-
ing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 952 (2004); NORMAN SOLOMON,
WAR MADE EASY: HOW PRESIDENTS AND PUNDITS KEEP SPINNING US TO DEATH 113–15 (2005) 
(linking government-friendly coverage of Iraq war with media ownership by weapons manufactur-
ers).  For a view from the very far left, see Anthony Arnove, Pro-War Propaganda Machine, SO-
CIALIST WORKER, Mar. 21, 2003, at 6. 
7 Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATL. MONTHLY, Dec. 1998, at 51, 64; see 
also text accompanying notes 16–24 infra and sources cited in note 23 infra.
8 See Franck Vindevogel, Private Security and Urban Crime Mitigation: A Bid for BIDs, 5
CRIM. JUST. 233, 244–45 (2005). 
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• A toll road developer in Colorado has lobbied for statutory 
changes to preempt county authority to set toll rates,9 and a pri-
vate road construction firm has been accused of contributing to 
Texas Supreme Court justices’ campaign chests to influence a 
potential eminent domain suit related to a toll road in the state.10
• Private redevelopment corporations, which have the power to 
condemn private property for purposes of “urban renewal,” have 
opposed reform of eminent domain laws in the wake of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Kelo v. New London.11 
• And some environmental groups,12 which benefit from fines 
available under environmental citizen suit provisions,13 fight for 
the continued vitality of those same statutes.14 
In this Article, I examine this “political influence” argument against 
privatization using the case study of private prisons.  I conclude that, in 
the prison context, there is at present no particular reason to credit the 
argument.  At worst, the political influence argument is exactly back-
wards, by which I mean that privatization will decrease prison providers’ 
pro-incarceration influence; and at best, it is dubious, by which I mean 
that whether it is true or false depends on facts that proponents of the 
argument have not developed. 
 Private prisons are a useful case study:  First, because they are a 
growth industry, having progressed from humble beginnings in the late 
’70s and early ’80s to now house about one in sixteen inmates nation-
wide;15 and second, because the political influence argument against 
prison privatization is fairly common.16 
9 See Colleen Slevin, Senate Panel Kills Bill for “Super Slab” Toll Road, AP ALERT—
POLITICAL, Mar. 23, 2005. 
10 See Dan Genz, Texas Court Nominee Challenges Possible TTC Builder’s Campaign Contri-
butions, WACO TRIB., Oct. 3, 2006. 
11 545 U.S. 469 (2005); New London Dev. Corp., A Review and Analysis of Eminent Domain,
http://www.nldc.org/documents/NLDC-EMINENTDOMAINWP.pdf (July 28, 2005) (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2006) (justifying the practice of eminent domain, post-Kelo, to the Connecticut General 
Assembly’s Planning and Development Committee, see http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/PDdata/chr/
2005PD-00728-R001400-CHR.htm). 
12 See, e.g., As You Sow, As You Sow: Planting Seeds for Social Change, http://www.
asyousow.org/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2006). 
13 See Off. of the Att’y Gen., State of Cal., Dep’t of Just., Proposition 65 Settlement Report 
2005, http://caag.state.ca.us/prop65/pdfs/Alpert_Report2005a.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2006) (listing 
As You Sow as a major recipient of Prop. 65 settlement monies); see generally Michael S. Greve, 
The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339, 351–54 (1990); id. at 356 
(describing typical settlements of citizen suits, which include “above-cost attorneys’ fees” and pay-
ment for environmental projects by the defendant). 
14 See As You Sow, Proposition 65 and State Rights Under Attack, SEEDS OF CHANGE—E-
NEWS, Summer 2006, http://www.asyousow.org/news/AYS_enews06Q3.html (last visited Oct. 9, 
2006). 
15 On the humble beginnings, see DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., ABT ASSOCS. INC., PRIVATE 
PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE 4–5 (1998).  On the cur-
(continued next page) 
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 Sharon Dolovich writes, in a recent Duke Law Journal article, that 
“the legitimacy of punishment” is threatened “whenever parties with a 
financial interest in increased incarceration are in a position to exert in-
fluence over the nature and extent of criminal sentencing.  If this concern 
is real”17—and she suggests that it may well be18—prisons should not be 
privatized because “the state ought not to foster yet another potentially 
influential industry that could seek to compromise further the possibility 
of legitimate punishment to promote that industry’s own financial inter-
ests.”19
David Shichor, a prominent contributor to the prison privatization 
literature, opposes prison privatization20 in part because: 
Through political lobbying, PACs, campaign contributions, and the provi-
sion of perks to politicians (as industrial and business corporations do), cor-
porations are likely to continue to support and even accelerate incapacita-
tion-oriented legislation and policies by which more people will spend 
longer periods of time in correctional institutions.  Conversely, this trend 
may diminish the emphasis on alternative programs and will result in the 
pursuance of the “Hilton Inn mentality,” that is, trying to maintain high oc-
cupancy rates for profit purposes.21
And Brigette Sarabi and Edwin Bender’s thesis is clear from the title 
of their report, The Prison Payoff: The Role of Politics and Private Pris-
ons in the Incarceration Boom, in which they argue that prison privatiza-
tion should be resisted in part because private prison firms have a “vested 
 
rent extent, see BUR. OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2004, at 6 
tbl.7. 
16 In focusing on this argument, I do not cover arguments based on cost and quality compari-
sons, arguments based on accountability concerns, or any other arguments in the debate.  For argu-
ments about cost and quality, see, e.g., BUR. OF JUST. ASSIST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EMERGING IS-
SUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 38 (2001) (“no data” or “definitive research evidence” supports the 
hypotheses of significant cost and quality differences between public and private prisons); Develop-
ments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1875–79 (2002) (private prisons 
do well in cost and quality comparisons); Judith Greene, Bailing Out Private Jails, AM. PROSPECT,
Sept. 10, 2001, at 23 (sharply criticizing the performance of private prisons); Oliver Hart et al., The 
Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1147–54 
(1997) (private prisons may perform poorly).  For arguments about accountability, see, e.g., Alfred 
C. Aman, Jr., Privatization, Prisons, Democracy, and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the Prov-
ince of Administrative Law, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 511, 533–41 (2005); Developments,
supra note 16, at 1879–86; Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1319, 1343 (2003); Nicole B. Cásarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle 
in Privatized Federal Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 249 (1995); Note, David N. Wecht, Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial Review of 
Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 815 (1987). 
17 Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 542 (2005). 
18 Dolovich, supra note 17, at 523–30. 
19 Dolovich, supra note 17, at 542–43. 
20 DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 256 
(1995). 
21 SHICHOR, supra note 20, at 236. 
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financial interest[] in increasing rates of imprisonment.”22 This is only a 
small sample of the literature.23 For a sample of the art, see Figure 1.24 
I assume, for purposes of this Article, that the foundation of this cri-
tique is correct, and that economically self-interested pro-incarceration 
advocacy is undesirable.25 However, it is unclear how this critique sup-
ports an argument against privatization. 
 First, the public sector—chiefly in the form of public prison guards’ 
unions—is already a major self-interested pro-incarceration political 
force.  The most active prison guards’ union, the California Correctional 
Peace Officers Association, has contributed massively in support of 
tough-on-crime positions on voter initiatives and has given money to 
crime victims’ groups, and public prison guards’ unions in other states 
have endorsed candidates for their tough-on-crime positions.  Private 
firms would thus enter, and partly displace some of the actors in, a heav-
ily populated field.26 
22 BRIGETTE SARABI & EDWIN BENDER, THE PRISON PAYOFF: THE ROLE OF POLITICS AND PRI-
VATE PRISONS IN THE INCARCERATION BOOM vii, 21 (W. States Ctr. & W. Prison Project, 2000). 
23 In addition to the sources cited in notes 7, 17, 20, and 22 supra, see MICHAEL A. HALLETT,
PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA 141 (2006); BYRON EUGENE PRICE, MERCHANDIZING PRISONERS:
WHO REALLY PAYS FOR PRISON PRIVATIZATION? 74–75, 131–36 (2006); DAVID GARLAND, THE 
CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 204 (2001); 
KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLI-
TICS 101 (1997) (referring to influence on policy abroad); THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 87–88, 92–93 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996); 
MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
51 (1993); CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 159 (1990); CHARLES R. RING,
CONTRACTING FOR THE OPERATION OF PRIVATE PRISONS: PROS AND CONS 12 (1987); Gilbert Geis, 
The Privatization of Prisons: Panacea or Placebo?, in PRIVATE MEANS—PUBLIC ENDS: PRIVATE 
BUSINESS IN SOCIAL SERVICE DELIVERY 76, 94 (Barry J. Carroll et al. eds., 1987), cited in SELLERS,
supra, at 51 & 116 n.5; REPORT RELATIVE TO PRISONS FOR PROFIT 9, 56–58 (Comm. of Mass., Leg. 
Res. Council, House No. 6225, July 31, 1986); Rachel E. Barkow, Our Federal System of Sentenc-
ing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 119, 125 (2005); Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV.
715, 729 (2005); Geiza Vargas-Vargas, White Investment in Black Bondage, 27 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 41, 75 n.209 (2005); Freeman, supra note 16, at 1349 n.249; Daniel L. Low, Nonprofit Private 
Prisons: The Next Generation of Prison Management, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINE-
MENT 1, 45 (2003); Michael Janus, Bars on the Iron Triangle: Public Policy Issues in the Privatiza-
tion of Corrections, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 73, 83 (Gary W. Bowman, 
Simon Hakim & Paul Seidenstat eds., 1993); Amanda George, The State Tries an Escape, LEGAL 
SERV. BULL., Apr. 1989, at 53, 54, 57 (Australia); E.S. Savas, Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 889, 898 (1987); Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 69 JUDI-
CATURE 325, 331 (1986); Harmon L. Wray, Jr., Cells for Sale, S. CHANGES, Sept. 8, 1986, at 3, 6; 
Edward Sagarin & Jess Maghan, Should States Opt for Private Prisons?: No, HARTFORD COURANT,
Jan. 12, 1986, at E1; Patrick Anderson et al., Private Corrections: Feast or Fiasco?, PRISON J., 
Autumn-Winter 1985, at 35; Kenneth F. Schoen, Private Prison Operators, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 
1985, at A31. 
24 Matt Wuerker, in Prisons and Sentencing (by Group One Artists), http://www.newsart.com/
zz/zz16.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006); Dolovich, supra note 17, at 529 n.363. 
25 But see text accompanying notes 122–131 infra.
26 There are actors other than public or private prisons that could be in favor of incarceration 
for self-interested motives.  Prosecutors are known to be a strong pro-incarceration lobby, but other 
conceivable actors include rural communities that could be sites for prisons, see Dolovich, supra 
note 17, at 536–42; Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 23, at 729; Drake Bennett & Robert 
(continued next page) 
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FIGURE 1
Second, there is little reason to believe that reducing privatization, or 
eliminating it altogether, would reduce the amount of self-interested pro-
incarceration advocacy.  In fact, it is even possible that reducing privati-
zation would increase such advocacy.  The intuition for this perhaps sur-
prising result27 comes from the economic theory of public goods and col-
lective action. 
 
Kuttner, Crime and Redemption, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 2003, at 36 (“reverse NIMBY-ism” of com-
munities surrounding prisons), and providers of goods and services to prisons, see J. Robert Lilly & 
Paul Knepper, An International Perspective on the Privatisation of Corrections, 31 HOW. J. 174, 
174, 177 (1992).  I focus mostly on prison system actors because privatization potentially displaces 
public sector prison provision, while its effect, if any, on prosecutors or rural communities is un-
clear. 
27 As far as I can tell, this argument has never been made before in the privatization literature, 
except for two instances of speculation that, in the prison context, “[c]ompetition within the industry 
can serve to dilute, rather than concentrate, this political power.”  LOGAN, supra note 23, at 158; see 
also Developments, supra note 16, at 1873. 
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 The political benefits that flow from prison providers’ pro-
incarceration advocacy are what economists call a “public good,” be-
cause any prison provider’s advocacy, to the extent it is effective, helps 
every other prison provider.28 When individual actors capture less of the 
benefit of their expenditures on a public good, they spend less on that 
good; and the “smaller” actors, who benefit the least from the public 
good, free-ride off the expenditures of the “largest” actor. 
 In today’s world, the largest actor—that is, the actor that profits the 
most from the system—tends to be the public sector union, which still 
provides the lion’s share of prison services and whose members benefit 
from wages significantly higher than those of their private-sector coun-
terparts; the smaller actors are the private prison firms, which not only 
have small shares of the industry but also do not make abnormally high 
profits. 
 Privatization, by breaking up the government’s monopoly of prison 
provision and awarding part of the industry to private firms, can thus re-
duce the industry’s advocacy by exacerbating its collective action prob-
lem.  The public sector unions will spend less because under privatiza-
tion they experience less of the benefits of their advocacy, while the pri-
vate firms will tend to free-ride off the public sector’s advocacy.  This 
collective action problem is unfortunate for the prison industry, but for-
tunate for the critics of self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy—a 
happy, usually unintended side effect of privatization.  To coin a phrase, 
prison providers under privatization are led by an invisible hand to pro-
mote an end which was no part of their intention. 
 Of course, there is more than one type of advocacy:  Prison providers 
are interested not only in incarceration policy but also in privatization 
policy (the private sector wants more, the public sector wants less), and 
privatization-related expenditures are not pure public goods.  Some 
forms of advocacy may be precisely targeted—a contribution to the 
Three Strikes initiative is unambiguously pro-incarceration.  But other 
forms are ambiguous—a contribution to a legislator’s reelection cam-
paign does not come with reasons attached.  Contributors may thus be 
 
28 It may seem funny to use the term “public good” in this context, since I have just assumed 
that such advocacy is bad for the public. Nonetheless, that’s the terminology.  The universe of 
prison providers, while fairly narrow, is the relevant “public” for purposes of public goods analysis.  
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 15 (1965) (“[T]he achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of any common 
interest means that a public or collective good has been provided for that group. The very fact that 
a goal or purpose is common to a group means that no one in the group is excluded from the benefit 
or satisfaction brought about by its achievement.”  (footnote omitted)); id. at 15 n.22 (“There is no 
necessity that a public good to one group in a society is necessarily in the interest of the society as a 
whole.”).  A private prison firm’s pro-incarceration advocacy helps every other private prison firm; 
private firms’ pro-incarceration advocacy helps the public prison guard unions; and the unions’ pro-
incarceration advocacy helps the private firms. 
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paying for access, which, once their candidate is elected, they use to ad-
vocate the policies of their choice.  This story I tell here is consistent 
with that framework:  The collective action problem is merely delayed 
until after the election, when favors are demanded.  Once the candidate is 
elected and his contributors can come into his office and ask for favors, 
why should they spend any political capital asking for a vote on Three 
Strikes (a public good) when they can spend it instead trying to get (or 
kill) a prison contract? 
 The net effect of privatization on political advocacy doesn’t have to 
be negative.  I present a model below where privatization does decrease 
political advocacy; but I also present other models where the effect is 
ambiguous—for instance, where privatization might increase private sec-
tor advocacy but decrease public sector advocacy.  If those models are 
closer to the truth, then total advocacy may rise—but it may also fall, 
depending on which effect dominates.  We cannot determine the net ef-
fect a priori. 
 There is thus no reason to believe an argument against prison privati-
zation based on the possibility of self-interested pro-incarceration advo-
cacy—unless the argument takes a position on how lobbying, political 
contributions, and advocacy work, and why (for instance) increases in 
private sector advocacy would outweigh the decrease in public sector 
advocacy.  Either this argument against prison privatization is false, or it 
is correct but under-theorized. 
 The analysis here provides a roadmap for analyzing the military and 
other contexts:  Because privatization can affect the incentives of both 
the private and public sectors to wield political influence, one shouldn’t 
conclude that privatization distorts substantive policy unless one can tell 
a story, based on a plausible view of government agents’ behavior, that 
privatization doesn’t decrease public sector advocacy in an offsetting 
way.  In the end each industry has its own somewhat idiosyncratic twists, 
so I do not make a strong claim about the use of the argument outside of 
prisons.  But, at the very least, the use of the political influence argument 
is often theoretically unsound to the extent it ignores this comparative 
analysis. 
 Part II gives a factual overview of pro-incarceration advocacy among 
prison providers.  Part III sets forth a public goods model where privati-
zation decreases pro-incarceration advocacy.  Part IV discusses how pri-
vatization may have an ambiguous effect on pro-incarceration advocacy.  
Part V concludes.  The casual reader may skip sections II.A to II.B and 
III.D to III.F. 
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II. POLITICAL ADVOCACY IN THE PRISON INDUSTRY 
I use the term “advocate” broadly to include any use of political in-
fluence, licit or illicit, including endorsements, political contributions, 
lobbying, and bribes.  And I use the term “incarceration” as a shorthand 
to include the criminalization of a greater range of behavior, more active 
enforcement, greater reliance on imprisonment, longer sentences, and 
less parole; thus, endorsing a politician for being “tough on crime,” do-
nating money to a “Three Strikes” initiative,29 or testifying in favor of a 
“truth in sentencing” law30 all count as advocating incarceration. 
 This Part summarizes what we know about prison industry advocacy.  
In brief, there is hard evidence of public prison guard union pro-
incarceration advocacy (though a small part of prison guard union advo-
cacy also cuts the other way).  There is also hard evidence that most De-
partments of Corrections advocate the other way—in favor of alterna-
tives to incarceration.  But there is virtually no hard evidence of private 
sector pro-incarceration advocacy—maybe they do it, maybe they don’t.  
To sort out whether they do or not, we need to know whether we should 
expect such behavior of the private sector; and for that, we need theory.  
That theory comes in the next Part.  The reader who is familiar with the 
empirics may skip sections A and B of this Part. 
 
A. The Public Sector 
1. Employees:  The Corrections Officers’ Unions 
 In 1987, E.S. Savas, a supporter of privatization, dismissed the claim 
that private firms advocate incarceration by noting that “[i]f this argu-
ment was sound . . . prison officials, guards, and their unions presumably 
would act in the same manner for the same reasons.  This, however, is 
not the case.”31 
Whether this was true even back then is questionable.  At one time, 
corrections officials were politically aligned with liberal groups,32 but by 
the 1970s correctional unions were already advocating incarceration: 
 
29 Three Strikes laws are types of sentence-enhancing laws.  California’s, for instance, man-
dates life imprisonment for convicted felons who were twice previously convicted of two or more 
“serious” or “violent” felonies.  California’s scheme is described in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 
11, 14–17 (2003). 
30 “Truth in sentencing laws” require that persons convicted of violent crimes serve at least 
85% of their sentence.  See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 §20102, Pub. 
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. 
31 Savas, supra note 23, at 898. 
32 See RICHARD BERK ET AL., A MEASURE OF JUSTICE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CHANGES IN 
THE CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE, 1955–1971, at 158 (1977) (“[C]orrections officials (prison personnel, 
administrators, and the Adult Authority) are difficult to place in a single camp.  In the 1950s, the 
(continued next page) 
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In Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and other jurisdic-
tions, employee organization lobbying, publicity, lawsuits, and job actions 
pertaining to safety and security have often been attempts to counteract pro-
gressive correctional programs such as community-based facilities and to 
reestablish an emphasis on custody.  Another feature of this campaign is 
that correctional unions have advocated longer prison terms and more strin-
gent parole policies—for example, an increase in the minimum term an in-
mate must serve before he can become eligible for parole.33 
This activism continues today.  The most active public prison 
guards’ union in advocating incarceration is the California Correctional 
Peace Officers Association (CCPOA).34 It gives twice as much in politi-
cal contributions as the California Teachers Association, though it’s only 
one-tenth the size;35 only the California Medical Association gives more 
in the state.36 CCPOA spends over $7.5 million per year on political ac-
tivities.37 It contributes to political parties, political events, and debates; 
it gives money directly to candidates; it hires lobbyists, public relations 
firms, and polling groups.38 Through its PACs, it contributed at least 
$100,000 to the California Democratic Party in 1998, $175,000 to the 
California Republican Party in 1998, and $946,400 to Gray Davis’s 1998 
gubernatorial campaign.39 These contributions are impossible to trace 
back to any particular agenda item:  Since the union also opposes privati-
zation, favors higher wages, and has positions on other issues, it’s just as 
plausible that the contributions were made for those other purposes. 
 But many of its contributions are directly pro-incarceration.  It gave 
over $100,000 to California’s Three Strikes initiative, Proposition 184 in 
 
California correctional system was the darling of liberal reformers.  By the late 1960s it had become 
a favorite whipping boy.  Further, when in the late 1960s corrections officials tried to align with the 
law enforcement lobby, their earlier liberal ties caused uneasiness among potential allies.  Even 
many conservative legislators could not be effectively recruited, since the corrections system ap-
palled the fiscally orthodox by combining enormous budgets with demonstrated ineffectiveness.”). 
33 JOHN M. WYNNE, JR., PRISON EMPLOYEE UNIONISM: THE IMPACT ON CORRECTIONAL AD-
MINISTRATION AND PROGRAMS 217 (Nat’l Inst. of Law Enforcement & Crim. Just., Jan. 1978). 
34 See ADRIAN T. MOORE, PRIVATE PRISONS: QUALITY CORRECTIONS AT A LOWER COST 33–
34 (Reason Pub. Pol’y Inst., Pol’y Study No. 240, 1998) (comparing correctional officers’ $1.5 
million donations to Pete Wilson alone during his 1990 and 1994 California gubernatorial bids with 
private prison companies’ $150,000 total political contributions nationwide in 1995–96); James 
Bovard, Pork Barrel Prisons: Who Profits from the War on Drugs?, PLAYBOY, Feb. 1, 2002, at 48; 
Marx Arax & Mark Gladstone, State Thwarted Brutality Probe at Corcoran Prison, Investigators 
Say, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 1998, at A1 (“[State investigators] had watched the [prison guard] union 
under president Novey ride the prison construction wave, growing from a kind of social club into 
one of the more powerful forces in the state, with a rank-and-file 27,000 strong.”). 
35 See Dan Pens, The California Prison Guards’ Union: A Potent Political Interest Group, in 
THE CELLING OF AMERICA: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE U.S. PRISON INDUSTRY 134, 135 (Daniel Bur-
ton-Rose with Dan Pens & Paul Wright eds., 1998). 
36 See Pens, supra note 35, at 135. 
37 See Ctr. on Juv. & Crim. Just., Political Power of the CCPOA, http://www.cjcj.org/cpp/
political_power.php (last visited Sept. 15, 2006). 
38 See CJCJ, supra note 35. 
39 See CJCJ, supra note 35. 
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1994, making it the second-largest contributor.40 It gave at least $75,000 
to the opponents of Proposition 36, the 2000 initiative that replaced in-
carceration with substance abuse treatment for certain nonviolent offend-
ers.41 From 1998 to 2000 it gave over $120,000 to crime victims’ 
groups, who present a more sympathetic face to the public in their pro-
incarceration advocacy.42 And it spent over $1 million to help defeat 
Proposition 66, the 2004 initiative that would have limited the crimes the 
triggered a life sentence under the Three Strikes law.43 And in 2005, it 
killed Gov. Schwarzenegger’s plan to “reduce the prison population by 
as much as 20,000, mainly through a program that diverted parole viola-
tors into rehabilitation efforts: drug programs, halfway houses and home 
detention.”44 
Some union members explicitly recognize their self-interested mo-
tives.  Dan Pens quoted CCPOA member Lt. Kevin Peters as saying: 
You can get a job anywhere.  This is a career.  And with the upward mobil-
ity and rapid expansion of the department, there are opportunities for the 
people who are [already] correction staff, and opportunities for the general 
public to become correctional officers.  We’ve gone from 12 institutions to 
28 in 12 years, and with “Three Strikes” and the overcrowding we’re going 
to experience with that, we’re going to need to build at least three prisons a 
year for the next five years.  Each one of those institutions will take ap-
proximately 1,000 employees.45
Note, though, that the CCPOA is not uniformly pro-incarceration in 
all cases.  In May 2006, to “‘give the system a breather’” in the face of 
severe overcrowding, it endorsed a plan to allow “a select group of in-
mates convicted of nonviolent crimes who had behaved while behind 
bars” to get out of prison 30 days early.46 
This isn’t just a story about California.  Though corrections officers’ 
unions outside of California are nowhere near as active as the CCPOA,47 
40 See Pens, supra note 35, at 137; CJCJ, supra note 37. 
41 CJCJ, supra note 37; Drug Pol’y Alliance, California Proposition 36: The Substance Abuse 
and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, http://www.prop36.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2006). 
42 See CJCJ, supra note 37; Crime Victims United of Cal., CVUC, http://www.crimevictims
united.com/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2006); Doris Tate Crime Victims Bur., http://www.doristate.com 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2006). 
43 See Jenifer Warren, Guards Union Is Giving Prisons Chief Hard Time, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2004, at 1; Inst. of Govt’l Stud., Proposition 36: Limitation on “Three-Strikes” Law, http://www.igs.
berkeley.edu/library/htThreeStrikesProp66.htm (Dec. 2004) (last visited Nov. 3, 2006). 
44 Ed Mendel, Governor May Act on Crisis in Prisons, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 2, 2006, 
at A1 (ads against this initiative funded by prison guard union). 
45 Pens, supra note 35, at 137. 
46 Mark Martin, Call for New Prisons, Shorter Sentences to Ease Crowding, S.F. CHRON., May 
24, 2006, at A1 (“give the system a breather” is a quote from CCPOA executive Chuck Alexander). 
47 Cf. Schlosser, supra note 7, at 55 (“in California . . . the correctional trends of the past two 
decades have converged and reached extremes”). 
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many of them do advocate incarceration.48 (As I note below, private 
prison firms spend money on advocacy nationwide, though they also 
spend more in California.49) The correctional wing of Florida’s police-
and-corrections union, the Police Benevolent Association,50 has endorsed 
gubernatorial candidates for being tough on crime.51 The Michigan cor-
rections officers’ union has opposed boot camp proposals.52 The New 
York City corrections officers’ union endorsed Gov. Pataki because he 
ended parole for violent felons.53 The New York State corrections offi-
cers’ union is said to have stymied efforts to overhaul mandatory mini-
mum sentences.54 And the Rhode Island corrections officers’ union en-
dorsed a senatorial candidate for his prosecutorial record and position in 
favor of tougher criminal penalties.55 (I am not considering the more 
usual demands for tougher penalties for criminals who commit crimes 
while in prison—a particularly salient issue for prison guards, who are 
often victims of such crimes.56)
Some correctional officers’ unions are combined with police unions, 
for instance in Florida57 or New Jersey.58 So except where (as in Flor-
 
48 See LOGAN, supra note 23, at 157; WYNNE, supra note 33, at 186, 195, 227; Bennett & 
Kuttner, supra note 26, at 36. 
49 Cf. text accompanying note 93 infra (private prison contributions also much higher in Cali-
fornia). 
50 See Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc., Florida PBA Chapters: State Correctional Officers,
http://www.flpba.org/chapters/sco.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
51 See Aaron Deslatte, Crist Courts Voters with Positive Focus, FLA. TODAY, Aug. 16, 2006, at 
A1 (“The Florida PBA endorsed [attorney general and gubernatorial candidate Charlie] Crist last 
year, and the attorney general has been specific about one proposal they like: Crist’s ‘anti-murder’ 
bill that would put violent criminals who violate probation back in jail until a judge determines 
whether they pose a threat.”); Letter from Charlie Crist to Jim Baiardi, President, State Correctional 
Officers Chapter, Mar. 15, 2006, reprinted in Letters, FLA. PBA CORRECTIONS REV., Apr. 2006, at 
7, http://www.flpba.org/pdf/corrections%20review/Corrections%20Review%2004-2006.pdf (“As 
you are well aware, it . . . has been a priority during my term to keep violent offenders off our streets 
and to support legislation to get tough on probation violators in order to protect and defend our 
communities.”); David Wasson, Bush Lands Police Union Support, TAMPA TRIB., July 12, 2002, at 
9 (PBA endorsed Gov. Jeb Bush, crediting him “with spearheading legislative efforts to crack down 
on violent crime with tough new laws requiring enhanced prison sentences for repeat offenders”). 
52 See Rob Gurwitt, The Growing Clout of Prison Guards, GOVERNING, Dec. 1991, at 37. 
53 Kathleen Murphy, Labor Helps Patakis Re-election Battle, STATELINE.ORG, May 20, 2002, 
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&contentId=14817 (last visited Sept. 
21, 2006). 
54 See Julie Falk, Fiscal Lockdown Part II: Will State Budget Cuts Weaken the Prison-
Industrial Complex—Or Strengthen It?, DOLLARS & SENSE, Nov. 1, 2003, at 32. 
55 Whitehouse ’06, Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers Endorses Whitehouse,
press release, Aug. 25, 2006 (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
56 See, e.g., Gregg M. Miliote, Correction Officers Back Sutter, HERALD NEWS (Fall River, 
Mass.), Aug. 23, 2006, http://www.heraldnews.com/site/index.cfm?newsid=17097791 (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2006). 
57 See Fla. PBA, supra note 51. 
58 See N.J. State Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n, We Walk NJ’s Toughest Beat!: New Jersey 
State P.B.A. Corrections Officers’ Committee, http://www.njspba.com/co.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 
2006); Michael Pollak, New Jersey Daily Briefing: Police Back Whitman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997 
(president of NJSPBA praised Gov. Whitman for, among other things, signing a Three Strikes law). 
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ida59) the corrections officers’ wing of the union has been politically in-
volved in its own right, any of these unions’ pro-incarceration advocacy 
can’t be traced directly to public prison guards. 
 In some states, corrections officers are also affiliated with AFSCME, 
the general public employees’ union;60 AFSCME Corrections United 
represents 60,000 corrections officers and 23,000 corrections employees 
nationwide.61 The evidence that AFSCME has advocated incarceration 
is weak;62 in fact, it has advocated alternatives to incarceration,63 and the 
national organization recently came out in favor of legalizing medical 
marijuana.64 The Oklahoma union has also advocated alternatives to in-
carceration.65 
59 See note 51 supra.
60 These states include Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Texas, and Wisconsin.  AFSCME also represents Corrections Health Services medical per-
sonnel in Florida.  See Am. Fed. of State, County & Muni. Employees, Jobs We Do: ACU Local 
Web Sites, http://www.afscme.org/workers/5846.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2006). 
61 See Am. Fed. of State, County & Muni. Employees, Jobs We Do: Corrections, http://www.
afscme.org/workers/67.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2006). 
62 Wynne argues that AFSCME has explicitly opposed deinstitutionalization and community-
based programs in the past, see WYNNE, supra note 33, at 228, but the evidence for this is an argu-
ment against deinstitutionalization of patients from mental hospitals, not regular criminals from 
prisons, see HENRY SANTIESTEVAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: OUT OF THEIR BEDS AND INTO THE 
STREETS 5–12 (AFSCME, Feb. 1975).  More recently, AFSCME lobbied in favor of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.  See Am. 
Fed. of State, County & Muni. Employees, AFSCME Corrections United: 10 Years of Federal Leg-
islative Advocacy, http://www.afscme.org/workers/6590.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).  The Act 
includes new bans on the manufacture, possession, and transfer of certain guns and by certain cate-
gories of people, e.g., §§ 110102–110103, 110201, 110401; new white-collar crime categories, in-
cluding telemarketing fraud, e.g., § 250002; enhanced penalties for certain drug crimes, e.g.,
§ 90102, sex crimes, e.g., §§ 40111, 160001, gun crimes, e.g., §§ 110501, immigration crimes, 
§ 130001, violent and drug trafficking crimes committed by gang members, § 150001, and other 
crimes, e.g., §§ 320101–320106; a federal Three Strikes provision, § 70001; victims’ rights provi-
sions, § 230101; and grants for states that adopt “truth-in-sentencing” laws, § 20102.  Though civil 
libertarians at the time opposed it because of its emphasis on incarceration, see, e.g., Laura Murphy 
Lee, The Senate’s Misconceived Crime Bill, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1994, at A19 (position of 
ACLU), the Act is so wide-ranging that AFSCME’s support is not a clean case of union pro-
incarceration lobbying.  AFSCME attributes its support in part to the Act’s grants for correctional 
facilities, § 20101, correctional officer training provisions, § 20418, and enhanced penalties for 
offenses against correctional officers, e.g., § 60015.  See AFSCME, supra.
63 See Connecticut Hires Firm to Teach Nonviolent Offenders, CORRECTIONAL EDUC. BULL., 
Jan. 19, 2004 (“Officials with the union that represents the state’s corrections officers said they agree 
with the need for more alternative-to-incarceration, drug treatment and vocational training programs 
for inmates, but they believe the centers should be in the communities where offenders live.  ‘When 
you’re trying to help people make the transition to a more stable life, it’s probably best not to put 
them on prison grounds,’ said [an AFSCME spokesman].”); Dwight F. Blint, Union Faults Sending 
More Inmates out of State, HARTFORD COURANT, May 31, 2003, at B5 (Connecticut prison guard 
union advocates drug treatment, mental health programs, and alternative incarceration for minor 
offenders). 
64 See Am. Fed. of State, County & Muni. Employees, Supporting the Legalization of Medical 
Marijuana, Res. No. 93, 37th Annual Int’l Convention, Aug. 7–11, 2006, http://www.afscme.org/
members/11367.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).  AFSCME is also involved with the National Coun-
cil of State Legislatures, see Nat’l Council of State Legis., NCSL Foundation for State Legislatures: 
Board of Directors 2006–2007, http://www.ncsl.org/public/FSL/FSLBoard.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 
(continued next page) 
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2. Employers:  The Departments of Corrections 
 The interests of Departments of Corrections are not always aligned 
with those of corrections officers and their unions.66 DOCs advocate 
incarceration a lot less than corrections officers’ unions (Florida is one 
exception67), and in fact it’s common to see Departments of Corrections 
officials advocate alternatives to incarceration.68 
The Alabama DOC commissioner has advocated sentencing reform, 
community correction programs, and other measures to “reverse the 
prison population growth trend.”69 The head of the Illinois DOC advo-
cates reentry programs that would lower the prison population by coun-
tering “the awful, vicious cycle” by which recidivist parolees are re-
incarcerated “before the ink is dry on their parole papers.”70 The Michi-
gan DOC director concerns herself with measures to reduce the prison 
population and thus delay the day the state runs out of funded capacity 
for prison beds.71 The Montana DOC director candidly tells crowds that 
“[p]rison isn’t working,” and his department considers measures to re-
 
2006), which does not take a notably pro-incarceration line.  See, e.g., Nat’l Council of State Legis., 
2006–2007 Policies for the Jurisdiction of the: Law and Criminal Justice Committee,
http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/LAWANDJ.HTM (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (critiquing the “competi-
tion to escalate punishments and build more prisons” resulting from “Federal jurisdiction over 
crimes also covered under state law”). 
65 Ray Carter, Union Leader Says State Prisons Understaffed, J. RECORD LEGIS. REPORT, Aug. 
7, 2003 (executive director of public employees union in Oklahoma called for reductions in inmate 
population if additional funding couldn’t be provided to prisons). 
66 See, e.g., Richard Ferruccio, Presidents Message, http://www.ri-brotherhood.com/pdfs/
MessageFromThePresident.pdf (n.d.) (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (Rhode Island union president calls 
the DOC and the State “our enemies” in the context of labor-related disputes); Richard Ferruccio, 
Presidents Message, http://www.ri-brotherhood.com/pdfs/MessageFromThePresident2.pdf (n.d.) 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (same). 
67 Florida is one exception.  See Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, Governor’s Budget Recommenda-
tions Help Department of Corrections Fight Crime, press release, Jan. 16, 2001, http://www.dc.state.
fl.us/secretary/press/2001/budget5.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006) (praising Gov. Jeb Bush for 
“support[ing] Florida’s tough-on-crime public protection initiatives” like the “10-20-Life” law and 
the “Three Strikes Felony Offender Act”). 
68 See, e.g., WYNNE, supra note 33, at 194–95 (“While the administration is likely to lobby for 
increased funding for community programs, employee organizations are likely to lobby against 
community programs . . . .”); Bennett & Kuttner, supra note 26, at 36 (many states are exploring 
alternatives to incarceration due to budget problems, and Marc Mauer of The Sentencing Project 
says “corrections people” aren’t “advocating dramatically stepped-up punishment policy”); see also 
Jeanne S. Woodford, Hard Time: Why I Quit the Prison System, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, at M1 
(former acting head of California corrections department advocates rehabilitation, criticizes “tough-
on-crime bromides,” and accuses prison guards’ union of stymieing reform). 
69 Richard F. Allen, Inflow of Inmates Must Be Slowed, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, July 17, 
2006, at 5. 
70 Rex W. Huppke, Rehabilitation or Recycling?, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 2006, at 1. 
71 See Memo from Patricia L. Caruso, director of the Michigan DOC, to Sen. Alan L. Cropsey 
& Rep. Jack Brandenberg, Feb. 1, 2006, http://www.michigan.gov/documents/02-01-06_-_Section_
401_149197_7.pdf, at 2. 
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duce the prison population and increase community corrections.72 The 
New Mexico Corrections Department is focusing on using early parole to 
control its prison population.73 The North Carolina DOC advocates redi-
recting non-trafficking drug users from prison to “intermediate pro-
grams.”74 Ohio corrections officials complain about the high costs of 
mandatory minimum sentences.75 The Pennsylvania DOC is implement-
ing programs “aimed at diverting less serious offenders from prison” to 
“free-up prison space needed for more serious offenders.”76 The Wash-
ington DOC secretary “is a big believer in work-release programs.”77
And the Wisconsin DOC secretary advocates focusing on “prevention 
and treatment in addition to effective law enforcement.”78 
B. The Private Sector 
Private firms are generally thought to act in their self-interest.79 Pri-
vate prison firms depend, for their livelihood, on two policies: privatiza-
tion and incarceration.  Indeed, they admit as much to the world, in their 
annual reports filed with the SEC.  As to privatization, The GEO Group, 
the second largest private prison firm, sensibly explains, under the head-
ing “Risks related to our business and industry,” that “[p]ublic resistance 
 
72 Ted Sullivan, Bozeman’s Re-Entry Center Dedicated, BOZEMAN CHRON., reprinted in COR-
RECTIONAL SIGNPOST (Mont. Dep’t of Corrections), Spring 2006, http://www.cor.state.mt.us/News/
Newsletters/Spring2006.pdf, at 3 (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) (“[‘]Prison isn’t working,’ [Montana 
DOC director Bill] Slaughter told the crowd.  ‘This re-entry program is what we’re all about.’”); see 
Bob Anez, Advisory Council Studies Array of Offender Services, CORRECTIONAL SIGNPOST, supra,
at 9 (Montana DOC Communications Director writes that “[t]he goal of the study [of community 
services available for offenders] is to affect the prison population by reducing the number of offend-
ers entering prison and the number of offenders returning to prison by providing more individualized 
community-based programs and services for offenders.”); Kelly Speer, Community Corrections 
Grows to Meet Demand, CORRECTIONAL SIGNPOST, Winter 2006, http://www.cor.state.mt.us/News/
Newsletters/Winter2006Signpost.pdf, at 7 (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) (Corrections Manager dis-
cusses how, “[i]n response to the increase of offenders over the past two years and to help relieve 
prison overcrowding, the Community Corrections Division will increase program capacity by 278 
beds over the next biennium”).  
73 N.M. Legis. Council Serv., Information Bulletin No. 6, http://legis.state.nm.us/LCS/lcsdocs/
148229.pdf (Aug. 25, 2003) (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). 
74 Robert Lee Guy, N.C. Dep’t of Correction, Evolution of Community Corrections (2d ed. Oct. 
2003), a PowerPoint presentation available at http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dcc/index.htm (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2006) (“Fact: Re-directing non-violent (property offenders) and high need (non-trafficking 
drug users) to intermediate programs reserves expensive prison beds for violent non-conforming 
offenders!”  (gratuitous capitalization and emphasis removed)).  
75 See Debra Jasper, Prison Expenses Straining Budget, CINC. ENQ., May 28, 2001, at 1A. 
76 Jeffrey A. Beard, Admissions, Population, & Releases, http://www.cor.state.pa.us/stats/lib/
stats/population.pdf, at 5 (Pa. Dep’t of Corrections, Feb. 2006). 
77 Prison Officials Want to Expand Work-Release, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006. 
78 Gov. Doyle Announces $616,000 for Alcohol and Drug Treatment, Diversion, US STATE 
NEWS, Sept. 19, 2006; see also Falk, supra note 54, at 32 (Bill Clausius of the Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Corrections attributes focus on alternative sentencing to budget pressure on state agencies). 
79 I apologize below for my sloppy treatment of firms.  See note 156 infra.
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to privatization of correctional and detention facilities could result in our 
inability to obtain new contracts or the loss of existing contracts, which 
could have a material adverse effect on our business.”80 As to incarcera-
tion, GEO candidly remarks: 
[A]ny changes with respect to the decriminalization of drugs and controlled 
substances or a loosening of immigration laws could affect the number of 
persons arrested, convicted, sentenced and incarcerated, thereby potentially 
reducing demand for correctional facilities to house them.  Similarly, reduc-
tions in crime rates could lead to reductions in arrests, convictions and sen-
tences requiring incarceration at correctional facilities.81
Or, in the words of the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the 
largest private prison firm: 
Further [revenue] growth is expected to come from increased focus and re-
sources by the Department of Homeland Security dedicated to illegal immi-
gration, stricter sentencing guidelines, longer prison sentences and prison 
terms for juvenile offenders, as well as the growing demographic of the 18 
to 24 year-old at-risk population.  Males between 18 and 24 years of age 
have demonstrated the highest propensity for criminal behavior and the 
highest rates of arrest, conviction, and incarceration.82 
Similarly, from GEO: 
The demand for our facilities and services could be adversely affected by 
the relaxation of criminal enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction and 
sentencing practices, or through the decriminalization of certain activities 
that are currently proscribed by criminal laws.83 
Since private prison firms recognize the value to them of privatiza-
tion and incarceration, it is natural to suspect that they may advocate 
these policies in the public square.  No one denies that private prison 
firms engage in active political advocacy.84 Their advocacy mainly takes 
the forms of contributions to politicians and participation in the Ameri-
 
80 GEO Group, Inc., Form 10-K at 23 (Mar. 10, 2004). 
81 GEO Group, supra note 80, at 22. 
82 Vargas-Vargas, supra note 23, at 76 (quoting Corrections Corp. of Am., Form 10-K at 16 
(Mar. 12, 2004)). 
83 GEO Group, Inc., Form S-4 at 28 (Nov. 10, 2003); see also Vargas-Vargas, supra note 23, at 
76 n.210 (citing Wackenhut Corrections Corp., Form S-3 at 12 (Jan. 20, 2004)).  A CCA executive 
also said the 1994 federal crime bill was “very favorable to us,” see Paulette Thomas, Making Crime 
Pay: Triangle of Interests Creates Infrastructure to Fight Lawlessness, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1994, 
at A1 (CCA’s CFO said the federal crime bill is “very favorable to us”), but this is ambiguous evi-
dence that private prison firms support incarceration—AFSCME, which represents prison guards in 
many states, actually lobbied in favor of that crime bill, but it attributed its support to the bill’s 
grants for correctional facilities, correctional officer training provisions, and enhanced penalties for 
offenses against correctional officers.  See note 60 infra.
84 See, e.g., SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 7–18 (giving examples of private firms’ ex-
penditures on lobbyists, and counting 645 campaign contributions to 361 candidates (both Democ-
ratic and Republican) in 25 states totaling over $540,000 in 1998 (comparable to NRA state-level 
giving), mostly in California). 
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can Legislative Exchange Council,85 though they also testify before Con-
gress and present arguments in the popular press.  And no one denies that 
they advocate privatization.86 That they advocate incarceration to any 
significant extent, though, is less clear. 
 Most of the evidence of advocacy specifically in favor of incarcera-
tion has been fairly speculative.87 Some writers state that it doesn’t hap-
pen,88 while others who are concerned about the prospect hedge their 
statements with terms like “may” or “are likely to.”89 (Several authors 
draw a connection between supposed private prison pro-incarceration 
advocacy today and manipulation of incarceration to provide a steady 
supply of workers under the convict leasing system in the 19th century.90 
85 See Am. Legis. Exch. Council, American Legislative Exchange Council, http://www.alec.
org. 
86 See, e.g., JOEL DYER, THE PERPETUAL PRISON MACHINE: HOW AMERICA PROFITS FROM 
CRIME 147–48 (2000) (Tennessee); SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 7 (Tennessee); id. at 13–14 
(Alaska); Greene, supra note 16, at 23 (warden of CCA’s Tulsa Jail directed addiction-treatment 
manager “to make a ‘sales pitch’ to local judges, urging them to sentence offenders to a treatment 
program in the jail even though the program had been eviscerated in order to cut operating ex-
penses”); Shaheen Borna, Free Enterprise Goes to Prison, 26 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 321, 332 
(1986). 
87 Dolovich, supra note 17, at 524, 529; Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sov-
ereignty: The Private Prison in Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 142 (2001). 
88 See RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 94–97 (1997); 
Aman, supra note 16, at 544; Douglas C. McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private Means, 34 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 29, 43 (1994). 
89 See, e.g., HALLETT, supra note 23, at 141 (“some fear that this new incentive for incarcera-
tion puts the traditional criminological goal of reducing crime in danger”); SHICHOR, supra note 20, 
at 235–36 (“[i]t is feasible” that private prison firms will lobby, and these firms “are likely to” sup-
port greater imprisonment); Dolovich, supra note 17, at 525 (analogy of U.S. defense industry sug-
gests that “even if private prison providers have had no need as yet to pressure state legislators . . . 
these conditions are subject to change”); Low, supra note 23, at 45 (“Detractors fear that the next 
logical step for private prison firms is to lobby for harsher laws and longer sentences.”); White, 
supra note 87, at 142 (“there is certainly structural potential for this type of conduct—but given 
current rates of growth in incarceration, such lobbying is for the moment quite unnecessary any-
way”); Savas, supra note 23, at 898 (“opponents . . . claim that private prison firms will be inclined 
to lobby for more and longer prison sentences”); Schoen, supra note 23, at A31 (“Private operators 
whose growth depends upon an expanding prison population may push for ever harsher sentences.”).  
But not all commentators hedge their statements.  See Barkow, Our Federal System, supra note 23, 
at 125 (“[P]rivate prison companies . . . often lobby for longer terms because they stand to benefit 
from the construction of additional prisons.”); Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 23, at 729 
(similar); Vargas-Vargas, supra note 23, at 75 n.209 (“[t]he private prison lobby is . . . powerful . . . 
in influencing draconian social policies”); George, supra note 23, at 54, 57 (“Th[e] company’s 
vested financial interest in law and order issues will make them a lobby group for increased sen-
tences as both ‘victims’ and a profit-seeking business. . . . Private prisons will and have tried to 
impact on government policy through lobbying just as any business concern does.”).  Freeman, 
supra note 16, at 1349 n.249, cites Developments, supra note 16, at 1872, for the proposition that 
“the private prison industry . . . lobb[ies] for stiffer criminal penalties,” but in fact Developments 
only states that private prisons “may” do so and that the claim that they do is “plausible.” 
90 See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 11; Beverly A. Smith & Frank T. Morn, The His-
tory of Privatization in Criminal Justice, in PRIVATIZATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE 3, 17 (David Shichor & Michael J. Gilbert eds., 2001); White, supra note 87, at 128–
29; Wray, supra note 23, at 5.  For the 19th-century history, see DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE 
THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 40 (1996); MATTHEW 
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But this colorful historical example is no substitute for actual evidence of 
contemporary pro-incarceration advocacy.91)
As with the corrections officers’ unions’ contributions above,92 some 
commentators note private prison firms’ advocacy but don’t distinguish 
between pro-privatization and pro-incarceration advocacy.  For instance, 
a key piece of evidence in Sarabi and Bender’s argument that private 
prison firms fuel the “incarceration boom” is the total amount of their 
contributions to state candidates:  In 1998, these totaled $285,996 in 
California, between $10,000 and $50,275 in eight other states, between 
$1000 and $10,000 in 11 other states, and under $1000 in five other 
states.93 
This blanket approach is a mistake, unless one is attacking all politi-
cal involvement by private prison firms.  Generalized contributions to 
candidates, unlike contributions to single-issue voter initiative campaigns 
(or contributions to single-issue groups, or public statements in support 
of particular targeted policies or bills, or endorsements of public officials 
that explain why that official is worth supporting), are mute.  Some of 
the industry’s contributions to politicians may be multi-purpose, for pri-
vatization as well as for incarceration.  Merely advocating increased pri-
vatization raises quite different concerns than advocating changes in the 
criminal law itself,94 and certainly does not implicate the same sorts of 
“legitimacy” values.95 
MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER 24, 41 (1996); ALRUTHEUS AMBUSH TAYLOR, THE NEGRO IN 
TENNESSEE, 1865–1880, at 43 (1941); 2 GEORGE WASHINGTON WILLIAMS, HISTORY OF THE NEGRO 
RACE IN AMERICA 415–16 (photo. reprint 1968) (1883); William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servi-
tude in the South, 1865–1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J. S. HIST. 31, 50–51 (1976). 
91 How much 19th-century convict leasing tells us about present-day privatization is disputed.  
See LOGAN, supra note 23, at 216 (“most of this took place at a time when corruption was also much 
more prevalent in government-run prisons and in the criminal justice system generally”); id. at 217–
18 (most historical comparisons fail to compare private prisons to public prisons of the same period, 
and even if they did, “it is questionable whether such differences would still apply in the socially, 
politically, and (most important) legally different world that exists today”); Dolovich, supra note 17, 
at 454 (historical experience, predating modern protections, isn’t directly applicable, but “intro-
duce[s] certain themes . . . that are still relevant today”); Rosky, supra note 6, at 912–13 (analogies 
to convict leasing ignore “the rise of modern, liberal administrative states”); Alexis M. Durham III, 
The Future of Correctional Privatization: Lessons from the Past, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 23, at 33, 45–48 (“some of the problems experienced in nineteenth-
century initiatives were the product of unique historical circumstances” and “most of the important 
court cases establishing inmate rights were decided only in the last thirty years,” but nonetheless “it 
seems likely that at least some of the errors committed [then] will recur in modern efforts”); see also 
LOGAN, supra, at 215 (state-run prisons also leased convicts, so the association of convict leasing 
abuses with privatization is erroneous). 
92 See notes 35–39 supra.
93 See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 10. 
94 Even mere pro-privatization advocacy may raise some concerns.  See Hart et al., supra note 
16, at 1144–47 (corruption and patronage may skew the decision whether to privatize in a pro- or 
anti-privatization direction).  
95 See Rosky, supra note 6, at 955 (decisions to use government force “are some of the most 
elemental decisions of equality, freedom, and justice”); Dolovich, supra note 17, at 523–24 (“The 
(continued next page) 
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 Since the industry’s public statements virtually all relate to favoring 
privatization, there is little hard evidence on the basis of which to attrib-
ute part of their political contributions to a pro-incarceration motive.  
Indeed, the Association of Private Correctional and Treatment Organiza-
tions (APCTO), the industry’s trade group, speaking for its member 
firms, denies that the industry lobbies for increased penalties: 
Individually and as an Association, we do not lobby in favor of longer sen-
tences, so-called “three-strikes” laws, or other legislation which could result 
in an increase in the jail or prison population.  To the contrary, the Associa-
tion and its member companies encourage the use of appropriate alterna-
tives to incarceration; provide inmates with treatment, education and reha-
bilitative services designed to positively impact and reduce recidivism rates; 
and encourage effective transitional programs for offenders upon release.96 
APCTO frequently endorses alternatives to incarceration, treatment 
programs, and other measures to reduce recidivism.  Its executive direc-
tor recently suggested in the Denver Post that to alleviate prison over-
crowding, Colorado should “[l]ook to alternatives to incarceration that 
can provide treatment and rehabilitative programs to first-time, nonvio-
lent drug and alcohol offenders,” “[r]educe recidivism by investing in the 
treatment, education and rehabilitation that offenders need to be success-
ful when they leave prison,” and “[i]ncrease the likelihood that released 
inmates will not re-offend by providing substantive transitional programs 
to help released inmates adjust to the community outside the walls of 
prison.”97 (He made similar recommendations to Ohio in the Cincinnati 
Post.98) He also suggested in the Fort Pierce Tribune and the Palm 
Beach Post that Florida should invest more in juvenile justice services in 
order to reduce the adult prison population in the long run.99 (He noted 
 
private prison industry, to increase the demand for its services, exerts whatever pressure it can to 
encourage state legislators to privatize state prisons.  This effort does not necessarily suggest a par-
simony concern, for the fact of privatization alone need not affect the number of individuals who are 
actually incarcerated or the length of prison sentences.”).  The “parsimony” reference is to the “prin-
ciple of parsimony,” a basic condition of “liberal legitimacy” according to Dolovich, supra note 17, 
at 465–69.  Some commentators’ failure to draw the distinction that Dolovich draws between pro-
privatization and pro-incarceration advocacy (and to draw the similar distinction between pro-
funding and pro-incarceration lobbying) leads to some interesting blindnesses.  See note 121 infra.
96 Personal communication, Paul Doucette, Executive Director, Ass’n of Private Correctional 
& Treatment Orgs., Oct. 13, 2006.  Doucette continues: “Our members’ financial success is driven 
not by the number of detainees or inmates they confine, but rather by the superior service and sav-
ings they provide to their contracted clients.”  See also Paul Doucette, More Reader Views: On Il-
legals, Aviation Fees, Private Prisons, WSU Gesture, WICHITA EAGLE, Apr. 1, 2006, at A2 (letter to 
the editor). 
97 The Open Forum—Letters to the Editor, DENVER POST, Oct. 2, 2006, at B7 (letter of Paul 
Doucette).  
98 See Paul Doucette, Ohio Prisons Are Full, CINC. POST, Aug. 8, 2006, at A9. 
99 See Letters to the Editor, FT. PIERCE TRIB., May 10, 2006, at A6 (letter to the editor) (“Our 
organization believes that most juvenile offenders are best served in the juvenile justice system, and 
that it is essential for Florida to invest the funds necessary to ensure that these young people receive 
the treatment, education, and rehabilitative services needed to get them off the road to adult 
(continued next page) 
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that APCTO’s member companies mostly provide adult incarceration 
services, though some would like to expand their juvenile programs.100)
Even if one ignores the industry association’s official statement as 
self-serving and dismisses their anti-incarceration positions as PR, at 
most political contributions are “soft evidence” of pro-incarceration ad-
vocacy.  The most we can say empirically based on such evidence is that 
maybe pro-incarceration lobbying happens and maybe it doesn’t.  Per-
haps the hard evidence is missing because the industry covers its tracks; 
or perhaps the hard evidence is missing because there is no there there.  
To decide which of these scenarios is more plausible, we need a theory 
that would explain whether or not we would expect the industry to lobby 
for incarceration. 
 In addition to contributing to politicians, private prison firms partici-
pate in the American Legislative Exchange Council, an influential con-
servative organization that drafts model legislation.101 Both CCA and the 
former Wackenhut Corp. (now called the GEO Group102) have been 
members of ALEC (and they and Sodexho Marriott, a major CCA stock-
holder, are prominent corporate funders of ALEC103), and, over the years, 
at least CCA has participated in (and two of its executives have chaired) 
ALEC’s Criminal Justice Task Force,104 which drafted, among other 
things, a “Truth in Sentencing Act” and a “Habitual Violent Offender 
Incarceration Act.”105 
prison.”); Paul Doucette, Private Providers Agree: Bolster Juvenile Spending, PALM BEACH POST,
Apr. 25, 2006, at 15A (same); Paul Doucette, In Juvenile Justice, Florida Gets Just What It Pays for,
PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 1, 2006, at 4E (“if Florida doesn't invest in trying to help these youngsters, 
it soon will need to build more adult prisons”). 
100 See Letters to the Editor, supra note 99, at A6 (“The bulk of our membership is made up of 
companies that provide adult incarceration services”); Doucette, In Juvenile Justice, supra note 99, 
at 4E (“Several members of the Association of Private Correctional and Treatment Organizations 
provide juvenile justice services in Florida, and several more would like to, but the state's budget for 
juvenile justice discourages additional competitors.”). 
101 See PRICE, supra note 23, at 74–75, 131–36; Dolovich, supra note 17, at 526–29; Silja J.A. 
Talvi, Follow the Prison Money Trail, IN THESE TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006. 
102 Wackenhut Corrections Corp. changed its name to The GEO Group, Inc. in November 2003 
under the terms of a share purchase agreement with another company.  See GEO Group, Inc., Mile-
stones, http://www.thegeogroupinc.com/milestones.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2006). 
103 See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 4 (citing Inside ALEC newsletter, vol. 1, no. 5, 
Sept. 1999). 
104 See Am. Legis. Exch. Council, Criminal Justice Task Force, http://www.alec.org/task-
forces/criminal-justice (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) (Brad Wiggins of CCA presented at the Dec. 14, 
2002 Task Force meeting); SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 4; Karen Olsson, Ghostwriting the 
Law, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 2002, at 17.  Dolovich cites Olsson as stating that CCA participated 
in “that session which produced ALEC’s model truth-in-sentencing bill,” see Dolovich, supra note 
17, at 528 & n.360.  But Olsson states only that CCA was “[o]ne of the members of the task force 
that drafted the bill.”  (The task force that drafted the bill is the Criminal Justice Task Force.  See 
ALEC, supra; Am. Legis. Exch. Council, Criminal Justice Model Legislation, http://www.alec.org/
6/criminal-justice.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2006).)  This can be read as merely stating that CCA 
was a participant in that Task Force, not that it had any role in that particular bill. 
105 See ALEC, Criminal Justice Model Legislation, supra note 104. 
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 The inner workings of ALEC are hazy,106 and indeed, some com-
mentators argue that the private prison industry expressly seeks out 
channels that are “conveniently out of public view” and “behind closed 
doors” to promote its pro-incarceration agenda.107 One presumes that 
private prison firms work within ALEC on privatization issues: ALEC’s 
Criminal Justice Task Force reports that prison privatization is one of its 
“major issues,”108 the Task Force has a Subcommittee on Private Pris-
ons109 and has a model “Housing Out-of-State Prisoners in a Private 
Prison Act,”110 and CCA is known to have talked to the Task Force on 
the subject.111 But here, too, there is no hard evidence that they also 
work on sentencing or incarceration issues—participation in a multi-
purpose organization is as “soft” evidence as generalized contributions to 
politicians.  Indeed, CCA asserts that it has not participated in, voted on, 
or endorsed any stand on model legislation for sentencing or crime poli-
cies within ALEC.112 According to CCA,113 the only CCA official to 
have ever publicly taken a stand on sentencing policies is J. Michael 
Quinlan, formerly Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and now a 
Senior Vice President of CCA,114 who, after he joined CCA in 1993,115 
told a House subcommittee that mandatory minimum sentences “are un-
necessary for non-violent, non-serious offenses” and “pose[] a severe 
threat to prison discipline and management.”116 
So far, I have found a single piece of evidence of arguable pro-
incarceration advocacy by a private firm.  In 1995, Wackenhut chairman 
Timothy P. Cole testified in favor of certain amendments to the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.117 The main point of 
his testimony was to propose additional provisions (1) making clear that 
 
106 For instance, ALEC doesn’t disclose the current membership of its Task Forces.  See Scott 
Blake, CCA Dominates Prison Privatization, FLA. TODAY, June 13, 2004, at 8. 
107 Dolovich, supra note 17, at 529; see also Olsson, supra note 104.  
108 See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 4. 
109 See ALEC, Criminal Justice Task Force, supra note 104 (Dec. 11, 2003 Task Force meet-
ing). 
110 See ALEC, Criminal Justice Model Legislation, supra note 104. 
111 See ALEC, Criminal Justice Task Force, supra note 104 (Brad Wiggins of CCA presented 
Developments, supra note 16, at the Dec. 14, 2002 Task Force meeting). 
112 Personal communication, Louise Gilchrist, Vice President of Marketing and Communica-
tions, Corrections Corp. of Am., Sept. 15, 2006 (see Corrections Corp. of Am., About CCA, http://
www.correctionscorp.com/officers.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2006)); see also Corrections Corp. of 
Am., The Corrections Industry: Myths vs. Reality in Private Corrections: The Truth Behind the 
Criticism, http://www.correctionscorp.com/myths.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2006). 
113 Gilchrist interview, supra note 112. 
114 See Corrections Corp. of Am., Why Do Business with CCA, http://www.correctionscorp.com
/salesteam.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2006). 
115 See CCA, supra note 114. 
116 Testimony of Michael Quinlan before the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, 
House Judiciary Committee, Feb. 22, 1994, 1994 WL 214215 (F.D.C.H.). 
117 Testimony of Timothy P. Cole, Chairman, Wackenhut Corrections Corp., before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1995, 1995 WL 449225 (F.D.C.H.). 
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prison grants under the 1994 Act would “help pay for the entire range of 
correctional services states can provide in-house or under contract” (not 
merely for “alternative correctional facilities”), (2) requiring states to 
“show that they have all the necessary legislative authority to embark 
upon a comprehensive, integrated program and that they will employ the 
best technology at the lowest cost” (presumably to boost privatization), 
(3) directing the Attorney General to “give top priority to the construc-
tion of larger, ‘harder’ [i.e., higher-level security] facilities,” and (4) di-
recting the Attorney General to give priority to states with “an executive 
body dedicated to the review and consideration of privatization.”118 Dur-
ing this testimony, he said the following: 
• “Our proposed amendment . . . would help to assure that these 
grants will help the states incarcerate more violent criminals and 
not make the state governments more dependent on federal tax 
dollars in the long term.” 
• “By passing ‘truth-in-sentencing’ laws, states have begun to re-
store a fundamental sense of justice and fairness to our system of 
crime and punishment.” 
• “The new grant program [under the 1994 Act, without the pro-
posed amendments] is available for ‘alternative correctional fa-
cilities’ and does not recognize the urgent need for more cells in 
secure facilities.”119 
• “Current law encourages billions to be spent on new or retrofit-
ted facilities that are not large enough, secure enough or efficient 
enough to keep the maximum number of violent criminals in 
prison for the least cost.”120 
This isn’t great evidence—Cole was really only advocating funding 
priorities and privatization-friendly decisionmaking.  Cole’s request to 
divert money from alternative facilities, his kind words for truth-in-
sentencing laws, and his positive attitude toward locking up violent 
criminals are hardly a pro-incarceration smoking gun.  But this is the best 
I’ve found.  Private prison firms may have made other statements and 
taken other public positions that are arguably pro-incarceration, but I ha-
ven’t found any, and to my knowledge, privatization critics have not 
brought them to light.121 
118 Cole testimony, supra note 117. 
119 Cole testimony, supra note 117. 
120 Cole testimony, supra note 117, at Attachment 1. 
121 Interestingly, the source from which I learned about the Cole testimony characterized it 
fairly innocuously, as testimony in favor of amendments “that authorized the expenditure of $10 
billion to construct and repair state prisons”—only focusing on the generalized desire for funding.  
Ken Silverstein, America’s Private Gulag, in THE CELLING OF AMERICA, supra note 40, at 156, 159. 
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 In short, based on the evidence we have, the most we can say about 
whether private prison firms advocate increased incarceration to any sig-
nificant extent is that maybe they do and maybe they don’t. 
 
C. Is Pro-Incarceration Advocacy Bad? 
 Of course, members of an industry, whether public or private, who 
advocate a policy that benefits them are not necessarily motivated by 
self-interest, even unconsciously.  When Don Novey, the president of the 
CCPOA, says he just wants to lock up scumbags,122 perhaps we should 
take him at his word.  The same goes when a Department of Justice offi-
cial speaks of the need to fight “the scourge of child pornography,”123 
when CACI says terrorism is “heinous,”124 when a leading environmental 
citizen-suit litigator argues against weakening the environmental laws 
whose monetary penalties fund its operations,125 or when doctors who 
perform abortions oppose abortion restrictions.126
People who advocate a policy that benefits them or their industry 
may be acting out of naked self-interest; they may be deluded into be-
lieving their particular interest is the general interest; their participation 
in an industry may lead them to rightly appreciate the overlap between 
their industry’s interest and the public interest; they may have joined the 
industry because they were sympathetic to its interests; or maybe they 
just coincidentally believe that the policy is right.127 
122 See Dan Morain, California’s Profusion of Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1994, at 1 
(“Novey said his organization donates money ‘to change the system’ so career criminals are locked 
up for life, not to increase the number of guards.  ‘There are scumbags out there,’ Novey said.”); 
Jenifer Warren, When He Speaks, They Listen, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2000, at 1 (similar). 
123 Testimony of Daniel P. Collins, Associate Deputy Attorney General, before the Subcommit-
tee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, House Judiciary Committee, Mar. 11, 2003, 2003 
WL 1079511 (F.D.C.H.). 
124 See text accompanying notes 4–6 supra.
125 See text accompanying notes 12–14 supra.
126 See Nat’l Abortion Fed., About NAF, http://www.prochoice.org/about_naf/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2006) (“The National Abortion Federation (NAF) is the professional association of 
abortion providers in the United States and Canada.  We believe that women should be trusted to 
make private medical decisions in consultation with their health care providers.”).  For an accusation 
of self-interestedness, see Paul M. Weyrich, Memos Might Reveal Profit Motive in Senate, INSIGHT 
ON THE NEWS, Mar. 15, 2004, at 52 (“The abortion-rights lobby is just a front for something worse, 
which is the abortion-clinic lobby, represented by the National Abortion Federation. . . . [O]n aver-
age abortion clinics make $1,000 for every abortion they perform.”). 
127 On affiliation bias, see PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 311–13 (2000).  The ques-
tion of how to interpret behavior that serves the interests of a class is featured, for instance, in histo-
rians’ debates over the social influences of the early 19th-century British antislavery movement.  
Each of the above rationales for why British elites opposed slavery (except for the self-selection 
hypothesis) has its defenders.  For an argument that abolitionism served the naked self-interest of 
British capitalists, see ERIC WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY 169 (reprint 1994) (1944) (aboli-
tionism served to destroy the West Indian monopoly).  For an argument that British capitalists were 
deluded into thinking that their abolitionism was moral, when in fact it served to legitimize “wage 
slavery,” see David Brion Davis, AHR Forum: Reflections on Abolitionism and Ideological Hegem-
(continued next page) 
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 Nor is even nakedly self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy an 
obvious evil:  From a procedural perspective, some argue that optimal 
criminal law should reflect all interests, including the benefit to the 
criminal of committing the crime;128 and if this is right, prison providers’ 
self-interest is also relevant.  Moreover, some see lobbying as a means by 
which groups provide their views to decisionmakers and the public and 
thus enrich democratic debate.129 Others may find it illegitimate, on de-
mocratic grounds, to even consider the substance of people’s future po-
litical advocacy in deciding whether to privatize.130 
ony, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 797, 802 (1987) (British capitalists were deceiving themselves); see also 
John Ashworth, AHR Forum: The Relationship Between Capitalism and Humanitarianism, 92 AM.
HIST. REV. 813, 815 (1987) (“false consciousness” is a better theory than “self-deception,” since the 
capitalists may have been deceived by society, not by themselves).  For an argument that the market 
discipline imposed by capitalism nurtured humanitarianism and abolitionism, see Thomas L. Has-
kell, AHR Forum: Convention and Hegemonic Interest in the Debate over Antislavery: A Reply to 
Davis and Ashworth, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 829, 852–53 (1987).  And for an argument that British 
capitalists’ self-interest and their interest in abolitionism were coincidental—that is, that the middle 
classes were really just motivated by humanitarianism—see G.M. TREVELYAN, ENGLISH SOCIAL 
HISTORY 495–97 (1942); Ashworth, supra, at 813 (Whig historians believed “waves of humanitarian 
sentiment came lapping onto the shores of Britain . . . as part of the divinely ordained scheme of 
things”); Howard Temperley, Capitalism, Slavery and Ideology, 75 PAST & PRESENT 94, 98 (1977) 
(citing REGINALD COUPLAND, THE BRITISH ANTI-SLAVERY MOVEMENT 111, 250–51 (1933). 
Or take a somewhat different context:  There is a class of strategic games (similar to that in the 
model presented later in this Article) where, according to standard economic theory, the “best” strat-
egy is to free-ride off other players.  Though several laboratory experiments suggest that people 
consistently act more cooperatively than predicted by economic theory, see sources cited infra note 
135, one set of researchers finds that economists are an exception to this pattern.  Perhaps econo-
mists are the only group to act according to naked self-interest.  Or, the researchers suggest, self-
selection or false consciousness may play a role:  “Economists may be selected for their work by 
virtue of their preoccupation with the ‘rational’ allocation of money and goods.  Or they may start 
behaving according to the general tenets of the theories they study.”  Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. 
Ames, Economists Free-Ride, Does Anyone Else?: Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods,
15 J. PUB. ECON. 295, 309 (1981). 
128 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUB-
LIC ECONOMICS 1661, 1748 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002); A. Mitchell Polinsky 
& Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45, 48 & 
n.12 (2000) (it is “conventional in the literature on enforcement” to include all people’s utility in 
social welfare, including the criminal’s).  But see George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of 
Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970) (illicit utility shouldn’t count); Dolovich, supra note 17, at 
515–16 (profit-making shouldn’t count in determining optimal criminal law). 
129 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19–23 (1976) (importance of political expenditures 
for free expression); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 411 (2000) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting); E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961); LOGAN,
supra note 23, at 159 (“We cannot prevent ‘lobbying’ (though it may not always be called that) by 
nonprofit organizations, government agencies, public employee unions, or commercial companies, 
any of whose agenda may or may not coincide with the public interest.  However, allowing these 
groups to compete, both in the provision of a service and in the public formulation of policy for the 
provision of that service, is a better method of protecting the public interest than is granting a mo-
nopoly to one particular service provider.  ‘Pluralism’ is what we call the condition in which the 
‘public interest’ must be sorted out from among competing definitions and claims.”); REPORT RELA-
TIVE TO PRISONS FOR PROFIT, supra note 23, at 57 (lobbying is legitimate and “often promotes better 
informed decisions”). 
130 I have defined “advocacy” broadly, so that it even includes, at one extreme, bribery.  See 
text accompanying notes 29–30 supra. The arguments in the paragraph above, of course, may apply 
(continued next page) 
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 And from a substantive perspective, if criminal policy should be 
judged by a substantive external standard—for instance, whether sen-
tences are too long in an objective sense—one cannot object to pro-
incarceration advocacy on criminal-law-specific grounds without first 
establishing that such advocacy would move criminal law in a substan-
tively undesirable direction.131 
Nonetheless, I will assume, for purposes of this Article, that eco-
nomically self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy is undesirable.  The 
interesting question, therefore, is what policies would reduce the amount, 
or effectiveness, of such advocacy. 
 
III. ADVOCACY AS A PUBLIC GOOD: ONE MODEL 
In this Part and the next, I present a few models of how different ac-
tors in the prison system may react to privatization.  (The technical ver-
sion of these stories appears in Appendix A and the other appendices 
referenced there.)  These models share the following features: 
• First, pro-incarceration advocacy is a public good.  Privatizing 
part of the prison industry therefore introduces a collective ac-
tion problem:  Unless everyone in the industry cooperates with 
each other, they will spend less on pro-incarceration advocacy 
because part of their expenditures will benefit their competitors. 
• Second, I argue, private prison firms extract less benefit from the 
system than public prison guards’ unions; therefore, even if all 
actors cooperate with each other, the total profit in the system is 
less than it would be under monopoly government provision.  
For these two reasons, the total amount of pro-incarceration ad-
vocacy may well decrease with privatization. 
 My models differ, though, in the following ways: 
• In this Part, I also assume that the effectiveness of advocacy only 
depends on its total amount, regardless of who contributed the 
money.  This assumption implies, as I will show, that the largest 
actor does all the advocacy and the smaller actors do none at all, 
instead free-riding totally off the largest actor’s contributions. 
 
more naturally to the more licit, non-bribery, forms of advocacy.  Even bribery has its defenders, 
though it is unclear how much relevance the arguments for bribery have for incarceration policy.  
See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 69 (1968) (“In terms 
of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest 
bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, honest bureaucracy.”); Francis T. Lui, An Equilib-
rium Queueing Model of Bribery, 93 J. POL. ECON. 760, 761 (1985) (“It is often argued that bribes 
serve as ‘lubricants’ in an otherwise sluggishi economy and improve its efficiency.”).  
131 See, e.g., LOGAN, supra note 23, at 154 (industry lobbying for longer sentences isn’t neces-
sarily negative because the public favors stiffer penalties). 
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• In the next Part, I present a model where I relax that assumption 
and allow the different sectors to have independent effects on the 
probability that pro-incarceration reforms are adopted.  Under 
this more relaxed assumption, privatization does increase the 
private sector’s pro-incarceration advocacy, but it also decreases 
the public sector’s pro-incarceration advocacy.  Whether the 
former effect outweighs the latter is unknown unless we can say 
something empirical about how effective at advocacy the differ-
ent sectors are.  I also discuss the effect of privatization when 
one takes into account that states that privatize are likely to have 
weaker unions; here, too, the effect of privatization is ambigu-
ous.  I dub these the “anything goes” models. 
 In these models, the common assumption that prison privatization 
will actually increase pro-incarceration advocacy turns out to be either 
false, or true but under-theorized. 
 In section A, I describe intuitively, with a few easy graphs, the col-
lective action problem as it applies to the funding of public goods.  In 
section B, I explore how the model might apply to the prison industry, 
with the help of a bit of data and some back-of-the-envelope calculations.  
Then I make some ancillary points:  In section C, I discuss whether the 
model is realistic.  In section D, I explain why I am focusing on private 
prison firms and public prison guards’ unions—rather than private 
guards or public agencies—as the players in this game.  In section E—
since the precise effect of privatization depends on whether different ac-
tors in the prison system are acting independently or cooperating with 
each other—I discuss which form of cooperation is the most plausible.  
In section F, I explain how the model applies not only to advocacy that 
influences the probability that a given change in the law will occur but 
also to lobbying that affects the substance of the change in the law.  In 
the next Part, I present the “anything goes” models. 
 
A. An Illustration of Free Riding 
When a good is private, everyone pays for, and enjoys, only his own 
consumption of the good.  By contrast, in the classic model of public 
goods, everyone benefits from the total amount of the public good,132 and 
 
132 Compare William H. Oakland, Theory of Public Goods, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECO-
NOMICS 487 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987) (inequality 1a, expressing that, for a 
private good, the sum of all consumptions must not exceed total production), with id. at 486 (ine-
quality 1, expressing that for a public good, no individual’s consumption may exceed total produc-
tion). 
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this amount is determined by the total amount of contribution.133 If we 
benefit from our national defense, we benefit from the full amount, not 
from any chunk we may have paid for; we cannot be excluded from that 
full benefit, no matter how little we paid; and the total amount of national 
defense is just determined by how much money Congress allocated to 
national defense from the Treasury.  A tax-funded program that improves 
air quality benefits everyone who breathes the relevant air, whether or 
not they contributed to the program; and the total improvement is just 
determined by the amount of resources directed toward that goal.  Simi-
larly, contributing to a candidate’s campaign benefits everyone who 
wants that candidate to win; and it is not too implausible to say, as an 
approximation, that his probability of winning just depends on how much 
money he raises and spends. 
 Suppose you are, as economists say, a rational, risk-neutral expected 
utility maximizer.134 The validity of this assumption is disputed,135 but 
suppose it is a reasonably good approximation of your behavior.  You are 
faced with the choice of whether or not to spend a dollar on political ad-
vocacy—donating to the campaign of a politician or voter initiative, con-
tributing to your trade association’s lobbying expenses, or running an 
ad—in favor of some reform that could increase the size of your market.  
We may assume that this dollar has some influence in the world, whether 
appropriate or inappropriate—it could corrupt a legislator, raise the 
chance of his election, contribute to the passage of the initiative, or 
change popular opinion.136
The benefit of this dollar is the value of the increased probability of 
getting your desired policy change.137 It is reasonable to think that 
 
133 See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 361 (1995); HAL R. 
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 418 (3d ed. 1992); Oakland, supra note 132, at 488; Paul A. 
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387 (1954). 
134 See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 168–94; VARIAN, supra note 133, at 172–81. 
135 The stylized assumptions of expected utility theory do not always hold.  See MAS-COLELL 
ET AL., supra note 133, at 179–81 (discussing the Allais and Machina’s paradoxes, examples of real-
life behavior that violate expected utility theory); VARIAN, supra note 133, at 192–94 (discussing the 
Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, which violate expected utility theory); Mark J. Machina, Choice 
Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1987, at 121.  The 
assumption of (materialistic) rational utility maximization has also come in for some criticism, in 
particular as it relates to the prediction below that actors will free-ride.  See James Andreoni, Why 
Free-Ride?: Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 291 (1988); 
Robert Sugden, On the Economics of Philanthropy, 92 ECON. J. 341 (1982); Marwell & Ames, supra 
note 127 (the title says it all: Economists Free-Ride, Does Anyone Else?). 
136 Some have questioned the assumption in the public choice literature that political choices 
are self-interested.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Democracy and Disgust: Reflections on Public 
Choice, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161, 162 (1989); Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 
167 (1988).  This model, however, only assumes that self-interested lobbying has some effect on 
outcomes. 
137 I assume here that the incarceration-policy game is the only game these actors are playing.  
This is not entirely realistic.  For instance, the California prison guards’ union gave massively to 
Proposition 184, the Three Strikes initiative in 1994, even though the proponents outspent the oppo-
(continued next page) 
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spending money on advocacy is subject to decreasing marginal returns, 
so each additional dollar gets you less and less benefit.138 The cost of a 
dollar, on the other hand, is and remains $1, no matter how many of them 
you spend.  As long as the benefit of an advocacy dollar is greater than 
$1, you continue spending; and you stop as soon as that benefit reaches 
$1.  You have now settled on the optimal139 total amount of advocacy 
spending—say $1 million.140
Figure 2 below illustrates the situation graphically.  The expected 
benefit—that is, the probability of success times the benefit—is repre-
sented by the curved line below:  The more you spend, the greater the 
probability of success, but the less you get for each extra dollar; and be-
cause a probability can’t get any higher than 1, the curve is bounded 
above by the dashed line representing the total benefit of the policy.  The 
 
nents by a factor of 48 and won with 72% of the vote.  See Mike Davis, Hell Factories in the Field: 
A Prison-Industrial Complex, NATION, Feb. 20, 1995, at 229; Tobacco Industry Power May Go Up 
in Smoke, Foes Say, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at 3.  The union may have been trying not merely to 
secure the passage of the initiative but also to flex its political muscle for other political battles, like 
fighting against privatization or in favor of wage increases.  Similarly, private prison firms may shy 
away from advocacy in favor of incarceration for fear of a public backlash that could endanger 
prison privatization itself.  (Public sector unions may not fear such a backlash because public provi-
sion is still considered the default mode of provision.) 
138 It is possible that the benefit of the extra dollar is not always decreasing.  Specifically, the 
first dollar might be totally useless; there could be a threshold below which extra dollars are more 
and more beneficial and above which the benefit of an extra dollar tapers off.  Then, instead of hav-
ing a concave graph as in Figure 2 (which corresponds to a decreasing marginal graph in Figure 3), 
we would have an S-shaped graph (which would correspond to a hump-shaped marginal graph in 
Figure 4).  See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 483 fig.20.1 (2003); cf. OLSON, supra 
note 28, at 22 (average cost curves have a U shape, which is another way of saying the same thing).  
This would not change the results significantly.  The technical model, see text accompanying note 
296 infra, allows for such a threshold.   However, an assumption of decreasing marginal returns 
everywhere is also common in the literature.  See Pecorino, supra note 178, at 654 (defining the 
level of a tariff as t(S), where S is the sum of lobbying contributions from the industry, and assuming 
t]>0 and t_<0); David P. Baron, Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilib-
rium, 104 Q.J. ECON. 45, 54 (1989) (assuming P(X1,X2), the probability that candidate 1 wins the 
election as a function of campaign expenditures (which equal contributions) X1 by candidate 1 and 
X2 by candidate 2, to be continuously differentiable and strictly increasing and concave in X1 and 
strictly decreasing and convex in X2); David Austen-Smith, Interest Groups, Campaign Contribu-
tions, and Probabilistic Voting, 54 PUB. CHOICE 123, 128, 130, 135 (1987) (defining a function 
r(t,c), the probability that a candidate wins the election given policy announcements t and campaign 
expenditures c=(cA,cB), and noting, in the proof of Lemma 2, that “r(t,c) is strictly concave and in-
creasing in cA, and convex and decreasing in cB”) 
139 That is, optimal to yourself.  I have already assumed for the purpose of this Article that the 
expenditure is not socially optimal.  See text accompanying notes 25, 131 supra.
140 This number and the other thresholds presented in this example are purely illustrative, but 
they happen to be approximately what you get if the effectiveness of advocacy expenditures is de-
termined by a function p(e)—the probability that expenditures of $e get you the desired policy 
change—equal to the square root of e/(e+10,000), and the value of the policy change is $200 million.  
Verifying that this function satisfies the technical assumptions below, see notes 282–285 infra, is left 
as an exercise to the reader.  The numbers in the text are rounded to the nearest $100,000; the more 
exact numbers are $992,509.41 for a monopolist, $699,620.10 for a 50% duopolist, $308,757.73 for 
a 10% duopolist, and $941,193.21 for a 90% duopolist.  Thanks to Scientific WorkPlace for crunch-
ing the numbers for me. 
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cost of advocacy is represented by the straight line below:  Each dollar of 
advocacy costs $1.  Your problem is to maximize the vertical distance 
between the expected benefit curve and the cost line.  In the figure, that 












total benefit of the policy
 
Figure 3 is an equivalent way of seeing the same problem.  The 
curve below represents the marginal expected benefit—that is, the bene-
fit of an extra dollar of spending, which is just equal to the total benefit 
times the extra probability that a dollar buys you.  As noted above, the 
marginal benefit is decreasing.  The straight line is the marginal cost of 
advocacy:  An extra dollar of advocacy always costs $1.  If the marginal 
expected benefit is above $1, you’re not spending enough; if it’s below 
$1, you should cut back.  At a spending level of $1 million, an additional 
dollar of spending gives you exactly $1 of expected benefit. 
 
11/9/2006] PRIVATIZATION & POLITICAL ADVOCACY 31 
DRAFT—DO NOT CITE 
FIGURE 3
total spending$1m




Now suppose the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division comes 
in and splits you up, so that you are now two identical firms, each with 
half the market share.  Your previous optimal amount, $1 million, is no 
longer optimal for you:  The cost of that last dollar was $1, and while the 
benefit of the dollar is $1 for the whole industry, you, who now represent 
only half the industry, only see 50¢ of that benefit.  All your benefits are 
now halved because you have to share them with your competitor; for 
our purposes, the split-up thus has the same effect as a 50% tax on reve-
nues.  Because your spending on advocacy—an investment in the growth 
of your industry—is only half as productive, you do less of it.  You start 
cutting back on your spending, because a dollar saved puts $1 back in 
your pocket and only reduces your benefits by 50¢.  As you cut back 
more, the benefit of the last dollar rises; you stop cutting back as soon as 
the benefit of your last dollar to the industry reaches $2.  Call the new 
amount $700,000. 
 This new situation is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.  In Figure 4, the 
lower curve is your reduced expected benefit, now that you only have 
half the industry.141 The maximum vertical distance between that curve 
and the cost line now occurs at $700,000. 
 
141 The figures are not drawn to scale. 
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On Figure 5, the equivalent graph that shows marginal quantities 
instead of total quantities, we want to find the point where the marginal 
expected benefit to the industry is $2.  This is, of course, equivalent to 
finding the point where half the marginal expected benefit (i.e., the bene-
fit to you) is $1.  That point is again $700,000. 
 This story is incomplete.  You don’t want the amount spent to be 
exactly $700,000; obviously, you would be thrilled if other people hap-
pened to contribute more.  It’s just that you’re not personally willing to 
put any dollar into the pot after the 700,000th.  You want the total 
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amount spent to be at least $700,000, and are willing to contribute money 
until that point is reached, but you stop being willing to personally con-
tribute once you’re holding the 700,001st dollar.  This is because the 
benefit of a dollar only depends on the total amount of money spent, and 
if the 700,000th dollar had a benefit to the industry worth $2 (and thus a 
benefit to you worth $1), then the 700,001st dollar has a benefit worth 
slightly less than $2. 
 Your new competitor, who represents the other half of the industry, 
and who is equally interested in this reform that will increase the size of 
the pie, also wants the total amount spent to be at least $700,000, and 
won’t put a 700,001st dollar into the pot.  Any belief about how the con-
tributions are divided, provided they add up to $700,000, is an equilib-
rium of sorts.142 If you believe that your competitor will spend $350,000 
and your competitor believes you will also spend $350,000, neither of 
you has any incentive to deviate from that shared understanding.  If your 
shared beliefs are that your competitor will spend $100,000 and you’ll 
spend $600,000, there’s likewise no reason to deviate from that plan.  
Any division of contributions adding up to less than $700,000 is unstable 
because someone will want to contribute more; and any division adding 
up to more than $700,000 is likewise unstable because someone will 
want to withdraw an insufficiently productive 700,001st dollar. 
 Suppose, though, that the Antitrust Division split the baby unevenly, 
so that your share is 10% and your competitor’s is 90%.  You are unwill-
ing to spend beyond the point where the marginal dollar has a benefit to 
the industry of $10 (because 10% of that is $1), while your competitor is 
unwilling to spend beyond the point where the marginal dollar has a 
benefit to the industry of $1.11 (because 90% of that is $1).  Recall that 
the returns to spending on advocacy are decreasing, so your threshold is 
fairly small—say $300,000—while his is quite a bit larger—say 
$900,000.  This is illustrated in Figures 6 and 7, where the lowest curve 
is your expected benefit (or marginal expected benefit), 10% of the total, 
and the middle curve is your competitor’s expected benefit (or marginal 
expected benefit), 90% of the total. 
 
142 A Nash equilibrium, to be exact.  See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 246–53; VAR-
IAN, supra note 133, at 265–68. 
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marginal cost of advocacy
marginal expected benefit
$1
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Your competitor is willing to spend up to the $900,000 point.  Since 
this is above $300,000, there’s no reason for you to spend anything:  
You’re unwilling to spend any dollar beyond the 300,000th, since its 
marginal benefit to the industry is under $10, and so its marginal benefit 
to you is under $1. 
 Suppose your shared beliefs were that your competitor would spend 
$600,000 and you would spend $300,000.  These beliefs would not be an 
equilibrium, since you would prefer to keep your $300,000.  Why spend 
any extra dollar beyond your competitor’s $600,000, if the 300,001st 
dollar already isn’t worthwhile to you?  The only equilibrium is where 
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your competitor gives $900,000 and you give $0.  Because you’re the 
smaller actor, you totally free-ride off your competitor.143 The result is 
what Mancur Olson calls the “systematic tendency for ‘exploitation’ of 
the great by the small.”144 
If one accepts the fundamental assumption of this Part—that the 
probability of success only depends on the total amount of money in the 
pot—this simple model is flexible enough to accommodate many institu-
tional details of privatization.  The total free-riding result happens when-
ever one sector has a lower threshold than the other, for whatever reason.  
In this story, you and your competitor are identical except that you’ve 
got 10% of the industry and he’s got 90%.  But you could have a lower 
threshold for other reasons. 
 For instance, you might in addition be subject to a higher tax rate—if 
half your revenues are taxed away, then you will act like your share is 
5% instead of 10%.  Or, to flip the tables, suppose your competitor’s 
revenues are subject to a 90% tax rate.  Then, though his industry share is 
90%, he acts as though his share is 9%.  You, with your 10% share, are 
now the larger actor, and he free-rides off of you.  So your “real” share—
the share of total profits—is a function not just of the nominal industry 
share, but also of the rate of profit. 
 Similarly, you might be better at advocacy.  Perhaps, for whatever 
reason, each dollar of yours is worth twice your competitor’s dollars, and 
twice what a dollar was worth before the breakup.  (Perhaps you are now 
a slicker lobbyist.)  Then, you act as though your share is 20%, and your 
threshold goes up accordingly.  This, too, affects your “real” share for 
purposes of choosing how much to spend on advocacy.  In this example, 
you still won’t do anything because your competitor still has a 90% 
share; but this is an important point that I will return to below.145 
143 See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 361–63; VARIAN, supra note 133, at 420–23; 
Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics, 63 
REV. ECON. STUD. 265, 282, 284 (1996); see also Oakland, supra note 132, at 485, 486–91, 514–15.  
This stark free-riding result occurs when utility is quasi-linear in income—that is, when the public 
good doesn’t affect the marginal utility of income.  See MUELLER, supra note 138, at 23 (explaining 
the “kangaroo problem,” a mathematically equivalent problem where there is not complete free-
riding because utilities are not assumed quasi-linear).  Quasi-linearity is a reasonable assumption 
with business firms, though not with individuals, whose marginal utility of consumption may be 
enhanced by higher levels of, say, environmental protection or national defense.  Quasi-linearity 
certainly seems defensible here, since prison providers are unlikely to enjoy their consumption more 
because of a more beneficial incarceration policy. 
144 See OLSON, supra note 28, at 29 (italics and footnote omitted); TERRY M. MOE, THE OR-
GANIZATION OF INTERESTS 24–26 (1980) (similar diagrammatic exposition). 
145 See text accompanying note 247 infra.
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B. Applying This Model to Prisons 
 That’s the intuition behind the story of lobbying after privatization.  
Consider the main political actors in the private prison industry: the pri-
vate prison firms and the public prison guards’ union.  (On why these are 
the two relevant actors, and on what might motivate them, see below.146)
Before privatization, the public sector is the monopoly provider of 
prison services, and the prison guards’ union enjoys the benefits that 
flow from serving the whole system.  Now suppose that part of the sys-
tem is privatized.  Because the larger sector only controls part of its mar-
ket, it is less willing than the previous monopoly provider to spend 
money on reforms that would increase the size of the prison pie.  The 
effect is the same as that of a tax on revenues:  If its share is 90%, then 
instead of spending until the benefit of the last dollar is $1, it now only 
spends until the benefit of the last dollar is $1.11 (that’s 1 divided by 
0.9). 
 So which is the larger sector?  I argue that it is the public sector.  As 
the next subsection suggest, the public sector has a larger industry share 
and extracts more benefit from the system than does the private sector. 
 
1. Industry Shares 
 In the first place, the private sector has a smaller share of the indus-
try.  Of the 1.5 million prisoners under the jurisdiction of federal or state 
adult correctional authorities at the end of 2004,147 6.6% were held in 
private facilities; this includes 13.7% of federal prisoners and 5.6% of 
state prisoners.148 Of the 34 states with at least some prisoners in private 
facilities, the percentages ranged from near 0.0% (seven states had per-
centages below 1.0%)149 to 42.1% (five states had percentages above 
25.0%).150 Among these 34 states, the median percentage in private fa-
cilities was between 7.9% (Louisiana) and 9.2% (Georgia).151 
So—flipping these percentages—the share of the public sector is 
between 57.9% and 100% in every state, is over 92% in two-thirds of the 
 
146 See text accompanying notes 187–209 infra.
147 See PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note 15, at 1.  The total number of incarcerated people, in-
cluding in federal and state prisons, territorial prisons, local jails, Bureau of Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement facilities, military facilities, jails in Indian country, and juvenile facilities, was 2.3 
million at the end of 2004.  Id. 
148 See PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note 15, at 6 tbl.7. 
149 South Carolina (0.0%), South Dakota (0.2%), Wisconsin (0.4%), Maryland (0.5%), North 
Carolina (0.6%), Alabama (0.9%), and Pennsylvania (0.9%).  See PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note 
147, at 6 tbl.7. 
150 New Mexico (42.1%), Alaska (30.6%), Montana (30.1%), Wyoming (28.1%), Hawaii 
(28.0%), and Oklahoma (25.3%).  See PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note 147, at 6 tbl.7.  
151 See PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note 147, at 6 tbl.7. 
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states (including half of the states with at least some prisoners in private 
facilities), and is 93.4% nationwide. 
 I am assuming here that a 10% share means that the private sector 
gets 10% of all benefits resulting from the reform.  This is of course a 
vast oversimplification.  Imagine, for instance, that “the era of public 
prisons is over,” and all new capacity is built in the private sector.  If 
that’s so, then the private sector knows that it will obtain the entire bene-
fit of any pro-incarceration reform, so it acts as though it has a 100% 
share in the flow of marginal prisoners, even though a snapshot of the 
system might show that it only has a 10% share of the existing stock of 
prisoners.152 The challenge is to determine the private sector’s share of 
marginal prisoners. 
 One first attempt to determine marginal shares would be, instead of 
dividing private prisoners by total prisoners, dividing change in private 
prisoners over some period by change in total prisoners over the same 
period.  Unfortunately, this approach yields widely varying numbers be-
cause of small state-by-state numbers and temporary blips in prison 
populations.153 As my best stab at this problem, I offer the following:  
Over the period from June 30, 2000 to June 30, 2005, the state system 
added 88,500 total prisoners and 5703 private prisoners, for a marginal 
private share of 6.4%.154 Similarly, over this same five-year period, the 
federal system added 41,954 total prisoners and 22,615 private prisoners, 
for a marginal private share of 53.9%.155 Adding this all up, total prison-
 
152 See, e.g., Meredith Kolodner, Private Prisons Smiling over Illegal Immigration, INT’L HER-
ALD TRIB., July 20, 2006, at 12 (“With all the federal centers filled and the U.S. government not 
planning to build more, most of the new money is expected to go to private companies or to county 
governments.  Even some of the money paid to counties, which hold 57 percent of the immigrants in 
detention, will end up in the pockets of the private companies, since they manage a number of the 
county jails.”). 
153 For instance, Wyoming added 4 total prisoners from Dec. 31, 2000 to Dec. 31, 2001, but the 
private prison population increased by 191.  This yields a marginal private share of 4775% for 
Wyoming over that period.  On the other hand, North Dakota’s prison population stayed constant at 
1168 between June 30, 2002 and June 30, 2003, but its private prison population dropped from 40 to 
1 during this period, which seems to yield a negative infinite marginal private share for North Da-
kota over that period.  Taking longer periods doesn’t help much:  Mississippi added 184 total prison-
ers between June 30, 2001 and June 30, 2005, but added 1394 private prisoners, for a marginal pri-
vate share of 758%.  All numbers here and in this portion of the text are taken from the spreadsheets 
associated with the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Prisoners in 2004 report, supra note 147, and its 
predecessors, and the Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2005 report and its predecessors.  The end-
of-year reports and spreadsheets are available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm#
Prisoners (last visited Oct. 18, 2006), and the midyear reports and spreadsheets are available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm#pjmidyear (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).  Where numbers 
differ between reports, I have used the numbers from the latest report. 
154 It makes sense that the marginal private share in state prisoners is about the same as the total 
private share in state prisoners, since the total private share has stayed about constant over the last 
five years. 
155 It likewise makes sense that the marginal private share in federal prisoners is so much larger 
than the total private share in federal prisoners, since the total private share has increased substan-
tially over the last five years, from 2.8% at the end of 1999 to 14.4% in mid-year 2005. 
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ers increased by 130,454, and private prisoners increased by 28,318, for 
a marginal private share of 21.7%. 
 The bottom line is that, if we care about the private sector’s share of 
total prisoners, roughly 6–10% is a reasonable estimate, with 0–42% as 
the outer range.  If we care about the private sector’s share of marginal 
prisoners, my best estimate for the marginal share over the last five years 
would be about 22%, with 0–54% as the outer range. 
 
2. The Benefits to Each Sector 
 In the second place, the profits of the private sector are relatively 
low.156 If the industry is perfectly competitive—like in textbook models 
of perfect competition—every firm makes zero economic profits;157 
therefore, they don’t care whether the market gets bigger or smaller, be-
cause they’re indifferent between running prisons and putting their 
money into the stock market.  This is, of course, an unrealistic view of 
the world—the prison industry is oligopolistic, so the prison firms do 
make some profit.  But not that much:158 CCA’s net profit margin159 is 
 
156 My conventional assumption that firms maximize profits is admittedly sloppy.  “The firm is 
not an individual.  It is a legal fiction that serves as a focus for a complex process in which the con-
flicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may ‘represent’ other organizations) are brought 
into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations.  In this sense the ‘behavior’ of the firm 
is like the behavior of a market: the outcome of a complex equilibrium process.  We seldom fall into 
the trap of characterizing the wheat or stock market as an individual, but we often make this error by 
thinking about organizations as if they were persons with motivations and intentions.”  Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Own-
ership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976), reprinted in MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE 
FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 83, 89 (2000).  Nonethe-
less, in this paper I do not consider any agency costs internal to the firm—with apologies to corpora-
tions scholars—and assume, in accordance with primitive microeconomics, that the firm is a profit-
maximizing “black box.”  My only defense is that, for certain purposes, (managers of) firms often 
act more or less as though they were profit-maximizing individuals, and this is sufficient for my 
purposes here.  More importantly, the lobbying critique that I address here generally rests on the 
ground that firms lobby for incarceration because such lobbying is a profit-maximizing activity, 
which of course assumes that, at least in this instance, firms do act to maximize their utility. 
157 See, e.g., MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 335 (“active firms must earn exactly zero 
profits in any long-run competitive equilibrium”); VARIAN, supra note 133, at 221 (“firms earn zero 
profits in equilibrium”). 
158 JOSEPH L. HALLINAN, GOING UP THE RIVER: TRAVELS IN A PRISON NATION 177–78 (2001) 
(“The [private] prison business is intensely competitive.  Winning bids for prison contracts are often 
separated by pennies per day.  Those pennies mean the difference between a profitable prison and a 
money-loser.”); Dolovich, supra note 17, at 493; Sam Howe Verhovek, Operators Are Not Worried 
by Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1997, at B10 (“Even a small increase in their costs could be enough 
to eliminate the price advantage that many companies can now offer . . . which is almost uniformly 
the factor that leads governments to privatize.”). 
159 Net profit margin is net income after taxes divided by revenue.  See Net Profit Margin: In-
vesting Lesson 4—Analyzing an Income Statement, http://beginnersinvest.about.com/cs/
investinglessons/l/blnetprofitmarg.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).  One may well be interested in 
net income after taxes divided by cost, not revenue; if so, that number is 1 / (1–NPM), where NPM is 
the net profit margin.  This is approximately the same as NPM if NPM is small.  Thus, NPMs of 
7.23%, 1.08%, 2.60%, and 4.66% translate to profit-over-cost of 7.79%, 1.09%, 2.67%, and 4.89%. 
11/9/2006] PRIVATIZATION & POLITICAL ADVOCACY 39 
DRAFT—DO NOT CITE 
7.23%, the GEO Group’s is 1.08%, Cornell’s is 2.60%, and Avalon’s is 
4.66%.  By way of comparison, Microsoft’s net profit margin is 28.45%, 
IBM’s is 9.56%, Coca-Cola’s is 21.85%, Ford’s is –0.66%, and Wal-
Mart’s is 3.61%.160 I will take 0–8% as a reasonable range for industry 
profit. 
 Compare this to the public sector.  I abstract away from any agency 
problems within the union and tentatively assume that a union is a faith-
ful representative of workers’ interests;161 and the benefit of a policy is 
measured by the “union rents,” that is, the difference between public-
sector and private-sector wages times the size of the public sector.162 
This is admittedly an oversimplification of how unions work, but it will 
have to do for a preliminary survey.163 
160 These numbers were obtained by entering the following symbols at MSN Money’s website, 
http://moneycentral.msn.com/investor/invsub/results/hilite.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2006): CXW (for 
CCA), GEO, CRN (for Cornell Companies), CITY (for Avalon Correctional Services), MSFT (for 
Microsoft), IBM, KO (for Coca-Cola), F (for Ford), and WMT (for Wal-Mart). 
161 This is also not exactly true.  The idea that unions faithfully represent their members has 
been forcefully critiqued.  See, e.g., Representative Joe Knollenberg, The Changing of the Guard: 
Republicans Take on Labor and the Use of Mandatory Dues or Fees for Political Purposes, 35 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 347 (1998); Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market 
for Union Control, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367.  But see Alison Booth, A Public Choice Model of 
Trade Union Behaviour and Membership, 94 ECON. J. 883, 883 (1984) (modeling unions as democ-
racies maximizing the welfare of the median union member). 
162 This “rent maximization” approach to unions’ objectives can be found in, e.g., K.C. Fung, 
Rent Shifting and Rent Sharing: A Re-Examination of the Strategic Industrial Policy Problem, 28 
CAN. J. ECON. 450, 452 (1995); Barry T. Hirsch & Kislaya Prasad, Wage-Employment Determina-
tion and a Union Tax on Capital: Can Theory and Evidence Be Reconciled?, 48 ECON. LETTERS 61, 
64 & n.5 (1995); Steve Dowrick & Barbara J. Spencer, Union Attitudes to Labor-Saving Innovation: 
When Are Unions Luddites?, 12 J. LABOR ECON. 316, 329 (1994); Giovanni de Fraja, Unions and 
Wages in Public and Private Firms: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, 45 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 457, 
459–60 (1993); John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and 
Growth: Has the Long Run Arrived?, 7 J. LABOR ECON. 72, 84 (1989); Andrew J. Oswald, The 
Economic Theory of Trade Unions: An Introductory Survey, 87 SCAND. J. ECON. 160, 162 (1985); 
John Pencavel, Wages and Employment Under Trade Unionism: Microeconomic Models and Mac-
roeconomic Applications, 87 SCAND. J. ECON. 197, 201–02 (1985); Guillermo A. Calvo, Urban 
Unemployment and Wage Determination in LDC’s: Trade Unions in the Harris-Todaro Model, 19 
INT’L ECON. REV. 65, 68 (1978); GEORGE DE MENIL, BARGAINING: MONOPOLY POWER VERSUS 
UNION POWER 22 (1971); Sherwin Rosen, Unionism and the Occupational Wage Structure in the 
United States, 11 INT’L ECON. REV. 269, 269–70 (1970); JOHN T. DUNLOP, WAGE DETERMINATION 
UNDER TRADE UNIONS 41 (1950) (calling this objective “analytical[ly] interest[ing]” but questioning 
its empirical relevance).  Pencavel, supra, argues that the rent maximization approach is appropriate 
if the union redistributes income from employed to unemployed workers so as to equalize incomes. 
163 My specification of unions’ benefit is a special case of certain other “utilitarian” or “democ-
ratic” objective functions.  See, e.g., Alan A. Carruth & Andrew J. Oswald, On Union Preferences 
and Labour Market Models: Insiders and Outsiders, 97 ECON. J. 431, 433 (1987) (utilitarian union); 
Oswald, supra note 162, at 163–64 (same); Pencavel, supra note 162, at 200 (same); Andrew J. 
Oswald, The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union, 92 ECON. J. 576, 584 (1982) (same); 
Booth, supra note 161, at 888 (democratic union).  Those specifications reduce to the one I use here 
when the utility of money function is linear.  See HENRY S. FARBER, THE ANALYSIS OF UNION BE-
HAVIOR 31 (NBER Working Paper No. 1502, Nov. 1984); Oswald, supra note 162, at 165. 
My specification is also a special case of ones in Dowrick & Spencer, supra note 162, at 335; 
Alan Manning, How Robust Is the Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union?, 12 J. LABOR. ECON.
430, 436 (1994); Denise J. Doiron, Bargaining Power and Wage-Employment Contracts in a Union-
(continued next page) 
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 Public prison guards’ wages are substantially higher than those of 
their private counterparts.164 The 2000 Corrections Yearbook reported 
that, at private prisons responding to their survey, correctional officers 
faced an average entry-level salary of $17,628 and an average maximum 
salary of $22,082.165 By contrast, correctional officers at public prisons 
faced an average entry-level salary of $23,002 (30% more than at private 
prisons) and an average maximum salary of $36,328 (65% more).166 So 
public-private salary differences span quite a big range, and these na-
tional averages conceal significant state-level variation.  In Pennsylvania, 
the differences were somewhat higher—entry-level salaries were 39% 
higher in public prisons and maximum salaries were 125% higher—
while in Texas, the differences were somewhat lower—entry-level sala-
ries were 9% higher in public prisons and maximum salaries were 21% 
higher.167 
ized Industry, 33 INT’L ECON. REV. 583, 590 (1992); FARBER, supra, at 32; JOHN H. PENCAVEL, THE
TRADE-OFF BETWEEN WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT IN TRADE UNION OBJECTIVES 13 (NBER Work-
ing Paper No. 870, Mar. 1982); Dertouzos & Pencavel, supra, at 1169. 
But see FARBER, supra, at 3 (“While the union members and their leaders may be maximizers, 
it does not necessarily follow that the union, as an organization, has a well defined objective func-
tion.”).  (Farber nonetheless concludes that “it is fruitful to analyze labor unions as maximizing a 
well defined objective function.”  Id.)
164 See Fraja, supra note 162, at 466 (public wages usually higher than those of private coun-
terparts, in part because government employers may be fulfilling social objectives through public 
employment).  I take no view on whether the difference in wages is due to being unionized or being 
in the public sector; all that matters here is that the public and private wages are different empiri-
cally.  Compare Chris Robinson & Nigel Tomes, Union Wage Differentials in the Public and Pri-
vate Sectors: A Simultaneous Equations Specification, 2 J. LABOR ECON. 106, 107–08 (1984) (public 
employment wage premium appears to be due to union status, not public sector status), with Richard 
B. Freeman, Unionism Comes to the Public Sector, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 41, 53 (1986) (unionization 
effects on public sector wages are small). 
Some have claimed that, in particular cases, private wages have been competitive with public 
wages.  See RING, supra note 23, at 29; Dana C. Joel, The Privatization of Secure Adult Prisons: 
Issues and Evidence, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 23, at 51, 65.  But 
this isn’t the rule.  Several sources indicate that private wages are competitive with market wages, 
which makes sense.  See, e.g., Brian David, Firm Offers Savings Running Jail: Beaver County Offi-
cials Hope Success in Ohio Can Be Duplicated, PITTS. POST-GAZ., July 14, 2005, at W6; Robert 
Nelson, Big House Inc., PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Apr. 3, 2003. 
165 THE 2000 CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK: PRIVATE PRISONS 98 (Crim. Just. Inst. 2000). 
166 THE 2000 CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK: ADULT CORRECTIONS 150–51 (Crim. Just. Inst. 
2000).  This is apparently the same data cited in Am. Fed. of State, County & Muni. Employees, 
Jobs We Do: Public and Private Prisons Compared—2000, http://www.afscme.org/workers/6493.
cfm (last visited Sept. 18, 2006); Nelson, supra note 164 (citing hourly salaries). 
167 Compare YEARBOOK: PRIVATE PRISONS, supra note 165, at 98 with YEARBOOK: ADULT 
CORRECTIONS, supra note 166, at 150–51.  Other states are harder to compare:  Three private pris-
ons in California responded to the survey, but the public system didn’t submit its numbers.  Nonethe-
less, we can get an idea for the differences by consulting a different source.  A 2001 survey by the 
Corrections Compendium reports the annual starting salary for correctional officers in California as 
“$33,708/$38,988.”  Staff Hiring/Retention—Part 1: Correctional Officer Recruitment, CORREC-
TIONS COMPENDIUM, Mar. 2001, at 8.  Even the lower one of these numbers is more than twice the 
average starting salary for correctional officers at the three reporting private prisons in California, 
which is $16,310.  (But keep in mind that the numbers may have been gathered differently in the 
Yearbook and in the Compendium surveys.  Promisingly, the two sources overlap for starting salaries 
(continued next page) 
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 One limitation of the Corrections Yearbook numbers is that only 
some private prisons responded to their survey.168 However, we can 
supplement this source with others, which give qualitatively similar re-
sults.  For instance, an AFSCME chart comparing public to private 
hourly salaries in selected cities in the occupational category of “Guard 
I,” using 1993 data, shows that public sector hourly salaries ranged from 
26% higher in Kansas City to 87% higher in San Francisco.  In Chicago, 
the median city included on AFSCME’s chart, salaries were 57% higher 
in the public than in the private sector.169
Based on the Corrections Yearbook numbers, I will take 30–65% as 
a reasonable range for the public wage premium, with (somewhat arbi-
trarily) 9–125% as an outer range. 
 
3. Comparing the Sectors 
 Let’s try to put these numbers in comparable terms.  The model pre-
sented above requires us to determine who is the “largest” actor, and the 
“size” of the industry for that purpose is not its per-prison benefit but the 
absolute total benefit.  This means that the total benefit is the industry 
 
in Arizona and Oklahoma.  They’re different for other states, but then again, salaries may also have 
changed between 2000 and 2001.)  See YEARBOOK: PRIVATE PRISONS, supra, at 98.  Another source 
reports that California public guards’ average base salary was boosted to $65,000 a year in 2002 
from about $50,000.  See Prison Guard Clout Endures, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2002, California Metro 
section, at 10.  This $50,000 number is presumably less than the average maximum salary, but even 
that is more than twice the average maximum salary for correctional officers at the three reporting 
private prisons in California, which is $22,174.  See YEARBOOK: PRIVATE PRISONS, supra, at 98. 
168 For a few states, only one private prison responded to the survey (but the public numbers 
are reported for the entire system).  With this caveat in mind, the corresponding differences in Ari-
zona were 33% and 73%, the differences in Georgia were 16% and 90%, the differences in Okla-
homa were 9% and 110%, the differences in Ohio were 22% and 48%, and the differences in Utah 
were –6% and 43%.  Compare YEARBOOK: PRIVATE PRISONS, supra note 165, at 98 with YEAR-
BOOK: ADULT CORRECTIONS, supra note 166, at 150–51.  Yes, the Utah public average of starting-
level salaries was 6% lower than at the reporting private prison; this probably indicates, more than 
anything else, the pitfalls of relying on a single data point.  The Arizona numbers may also not be 
representative, since one source (admittedly from the popular press) reports that the public-private 
divide in Arizona is on the low side.  See Nelson, supra note 164.  For other impressionistic reports, 
see Kit Miniclier, Trinidad Leery of Prison Plan, DENVER POST, Jan. 28, 1999, at B4 (differences of 
$5000 to $6000 between entry-level state prison guard positions in public and private in Colorado); 
Steven Harmon, New Prison Sparks Privatization Debate, LANSING STATE J., July 13, 1999, at 1A 
(difference of $23,500 at one Michigan private prison vs. $32,000 public average); Schlosser, supra 
note 7, at 58 (average New York State correctional salary is $36,000, about 50% higher than typical 
salary in the North Country; correctional officers have to queue to get a job there). 
169 See Am. Fed. of State, County & Muni. Employees, Getting It Right: Comparing State and 
Local Government Workers’ Salaries with the Private Sector, http://afscme.org/publications/1221.
cfm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).  The chart of “Guard I” salaries is available at http://afscme.org/
publications/1221.cfm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).  The data was collected for the 1993 National 
Summary of Average Pay by Type.  See AFSCME, supra, at http://www.afscme.org/publications/
2382.cfm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) (“Location, Location, Location”). 
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share times the per-unit benefit.  I will express the final numbers as per-
centages of the total cost of the system. 
 First, take the private sector.  Taking 0–8% as a reasonable range of 
industry-wide profits, and a private-sector industry share ranging from 
0% to 54% in each state: 
 






0% to 4.32% 
of the total cost 
of the system. 
 
Now take the public sector.  I’ve expressed public employees’ bene-
fit as a percentage of private sector wages:  To recap, perhaps 30–65% is 
a reasonable range for the public-over-private wage premium, with 9–
125% as an outer range.  We can put this in terms of total cost by observ-
ing that salaries are about 60–80% of most prisons’ operating ex-
penses.170 So an estimate of the wage premium’s reasonable range is: 
 
Total per-prison 
benefit for the 
private sector 
= 30% to 65% ×
60% to 
80% =




(Doing the same for the 9–125% outer range, we get 5.4–100%.) 
 Now, combining this range of per-prison costs with an industry share 
of 46–100% in each state: 
 






8.28% to 52% 
of the total cost 
of the system. 
 
(The same calculation for the outer range yields a range of 2.48% to 
100%.) 
 
170 See SHICHOR, supra note 20, at 149 (citing J.D. DONAHUE, PRISONS FOR PROFIT: PUBLIC 
JUSTICE, PRIVATE INTERESTS (1988); D.C. McDonald, The Costs of Operating Public and Private 
Correctional Facilities, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 179 (D.C. McDonald ed. 
1990)) (60–80%); LOGAN, supra note 23, at 81 (citing GEORGE CAMP & CAMILLE CAMP, THE REAL 
COST OF CORRECTIONS: A RESEARCH REPORT 3 (Crim. Just. Inst., Apr. 1985)) (80%); id. (citing 
Corrections Corp. of Am., Company Report, Apr. 3, 1987) (60%); JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVA-
TIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 163 (1989) (citing BUR. OF JUST. STATS., BUL-
LETIN (July 1986)) (60%); Schlosser, supra note 7, at 65 (labor is 60–80% of prison operating costs); 
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 475 n.134 (citing other sources suggesting 80–90% (including training), 
75%, and 60–70%); see also GA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, FY 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, http://www.
dcor.state.ga.us/pdf/FY04AnnualReport.pdf, at 28 (last visited Oct. 6, 2006) (in Georgia in FY 2004, 
“personal services” were $546 million out of total costs of $944 million, which makes 58%); Va. 
Dep’t of Corrections, Financial/Operating Overview, http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/resources/
statistics/financial/2004/05expendcat.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2006) (in Virginia in FY 2005, “per-
sonal services” were $544 million out of total costs of $859 million, which makes 63%). 
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 Compare this range with the private sector range of 0–4.32%.  
There’s no overlap between these ranges (and not much overlap between 
the private range and the outer public range171).  Moreover, by my rough 
approximation, the public sector’s average benefit from the system ex-
ceeds the private sector’s by perhaps an order of magnitude. 
 
C. The Realism of the Model 
 Thus, because the public sector is the larger actor, the model predicts 
that it does all the advocacy—and privatization reduces this amount be-
cause it acts like a tax on the public sector’s revenues.  And because the 
private sector is the smaller actor, it free-rides off the public sector’s con-
tributions.  The net result is that total pro-incarceration advocacy de-
creases as a result of privatization. 
 This model focused only on the pro-incarceration side’s lobbying, 
taking the anti-incarceration side’s as given.  But clearly anti-
incarceration advocacy exists,172 and some of it is as plausibly self-
interested as the prison providers’ pro-incarceration advocacy.  For in-
stance, Proposition 66, which would have limited California’s Three 
Strikes Law,173 was partly funded by “Sacramento businessman Jerry 
Keenan whose son Richard is serving time for manslaughter after crash-
ing his car while driving drunk and killing two passengers.”174 And 
Proposition 36, the drug treatment diversion initiative,175 was supported 
by dozens of drug treatment providers and 16 medical and public health 
organizations, including the California Association of Alcoholism and 
Drug Abuse Counselors and the County Alcohol and Drug Program Ad-
ministrators Association of California.176 
So, to be more realistic, we should consider the effect of incarcera-
tion on both kinds of advocacy.  It turns out that the effect on pro-
incarceration advocacy is the same as in the simple case:  Privatization, 
under this model, makes it go down.  But the decrease in pro-
incarceration advocacy has an indirect effect on anti-incarceration advo-
 
171 Bear in mind that the low bound of the outer range is derived from a high estimate of private 
profitability, a high value for the private share of marginal prisoners, a very low estimate of the 
public wage premium, and a low estimate of salaries as a percentage of total cost. 
172 See also BERK ET AL., supra note 32, at 200 (ACLU and Friends Committee on Legislation 
were major actors in “civil liberties lobby” in 1955–71). 
173 See text accompanying note 43 supra.
174 See IGS, supra note 43. 
175 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
176 See Nat’l Families in Action, A Guide to Drug-Related State Ballot Initiatives: California 
Proposition 36 Proponents, http://www.nationalfamilies.org/guide/california36-endorsements.html 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2006). 
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cacy, which is ambiguous.177 On the one hand, pro-incarceration advo-
cacy decreases the effectiveness of anti-incarceration advocacy by coun-
teracting it.  So a decrease in pro-incarceration advocacy makes anti-
incarceration advocacy more effective, which would tend to increase it.  
On the other hand, a decrease in pro-incarceration advocacy also makes 
anti-incarceration advocacy less necessary, which would tend to decrease 
it.  There is no a priori way to know how these conflicting effects would 
balance out. 
 The basic result—that, by fragmenting an industry, one can reduce 
that industry’s political advocacy to increase its market—is also consis-
tent with empirical studies on the relationship between industry concen-
tration and lobbying.  In general, industry concentration can have two 
opposing effects on lobbying.  The first effect is the one discussed above:  
A concentrated industry can more easily overcome its collective action 
problems, so we should expect it to lobby more.178 But much lobbying is 
for reforms that would make the market less competitive and allow firms 
to charge above-market prices.  A more concentrated industry can more 
easily cooperate in the product market, so they can raise prices above 
market levels all by themselves by directly using anticompetitive meth-
ods.  So a more concentrated industry would have less need to lobby.179 
Thus, one study found a positive effect of concentration on industry 
contributions,180 while another found that the percentage of firms in an 
industry that had political action committees rises and then falls as con-
centration goes up.181 This model is only about advocacy for increased 
incarceration—that is, for reforms that increase the size of the industry—
not about advocacy for reforms that would squelch competition in the 
prison industry.  So only the first of these forces comes into play here. 
 One may wonder about the realism of any simple, highly stylized 
model.  How believable is it that the private sector engages in zero advo-
 
177 See Appendix A.1.b infra. If one is only against self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy, 
this is an improvement, since pro-incarceration advocacy has declined.  If one is against any self-
interested advocacy, then whether privatization has improved matters also depends on what happens 
to anti-incarceration advocacy, to the extent this comes from self-interested providers of “anti-
incarceration services,” like boot camps, halfway houses, and drug treatment centers.  See text ac-
companying notes 242–244 infra.
178 But see Paul Pecorino, Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, 
Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 652, 657–58 (1998) (the assump-
tion that a more concentrated industry can more easily overcome its collective action problems may 
not always be true). 
179 See Kevin B. Grier et al., The Industrial Organization of Corporate Political Participation,
57 S. ECON. J. 727, 729–30 (1991). 
180 See Kevin B. Grier et al., The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978–1986, 88 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 911, 918 & tbl.3, 919 (1994). 
181 See Grier et al., supra note 179, at 735 tbl.III, 735–36 (finding that an industry concentra-
tion level of 43.85 maximizes the percentage of firms with PACs). 
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cacy?  Whatever the merits of such skepticism generally, in this case the 
simple model may be close to the truth. 
 As noted above,182 there is little hard evidence that private firms ad-
vocate stricter criminal law at all.  Perhaps they do so secretly, in which 
case this simple model may be entirely unrealistic.  Or perhaps this sim-
ple model is basically right, and the private firms are actually spending 
their money on a form of advocacy where the public good aspect isn’t 
important—pro-privatization advocacy.
Pro-privatization advocacy is an area where, obviously, the private 
sector can’t free-ride off the public sector, since the public sector is their 
enemy on that issue.  If the private firms cooperate with each other, they 
reap all the benefits of their pro-privatization advocacy; and even if they 
don’t cooperate with each other, an individual firm’s pro-privatization 
contribution may benefit it directly to the extent that it (improperly) in-
creases the likelihood that that firm will obtain a particular contract. 
 In real life, of course, money may be multi-purpose.  I have treated 
“mute” campaign expenditures as though they were for some purpose—
either privatization or incarceration—that was known to the donor but 
unknown to us.  In fact they could be for both—to implement the donor’s 
agenda in a general way.  But the model is general enough to accommo-
date this framework.  During campaign time, money may indeed be gen-
eral.  It buys generalized “access” to the candidate, which can be used at 
any time after the candidate prevails, if he prevails.  But how do donors 
use their access?  At some point, they must call in a favor, and favors 
cost something in terms of “political capital,” and political capital is 
scarce.  Calling in one favor makes it more difficult to call in some other 
favor.  At the point where donors have to determine what to ask for, we 
are back in the previous model.183 
The “access” framework has thus only postponed the applicability of 
the model until after the election.  One would still predict, under this 
model, that the smaller donors would prefer to spend their capital sup-
porting something with more of a private-good component, like privati-
zation, and leave the pro-incarceration advocacy to the largest actor.  
And this may in fact be what happens. 
 
182 See text accompanying notes 87–121 supra.
183 The same goes for participation in ALEC.  One pays to be on the Task Force, but when the 
time comes to influence the content of model legislation, one of two things might happen.  The legis-
lation might have the desired form anyway—in which case one’s participation would have no effect.  
(This is fairly likely in a conservative group like ALEC.)  Or it wouldn’t have the desired form—in 
which case, even if one were participating in the process, which CCA denies, see text accompanying 
note 112, one would need to spend some political capital to bring the change about.  It is reasonable 
to think that a firm would rather spend its political capital on advocating privatization, which has 
less of a public-good component. 
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 In any event, what is important here is not whether the model is real-
istic in a literal sense.  Advocacy needn’t be an entirely public good, and 
the actors in the industry needn’t totally free-ride.  The point is merely 
that these assumptions are plausible, perhaps even likely.  We know that 
advocacy has some public-good aspects, and we know that free riding 
happens to some extent in the world.  If people act enough like this 
model, total pro-incarceration advocacy will still decline. 
 The existence of this plausible scenario is a sufficient rebuttal to the 
simple anti-privatization claim that privatization does increase pro-
incarceration advocacy.  (The “anything goes” models presented later 
on,184 in which the effect of privatization on advocacy is ambiguous, fur-
ther rebut the claim.)  This possible scenario also points up a potential 
irony in the position of some incarceration opponents who, so as to avoid 
“reinforc[ing] the incarceration boom by introducing the profit motive 
into incarceration,”185 would make common cause with public prison 
guard unions, who concededly are active lobbyists for incarceration.186 
D. Why Focus on Public Sector Unions and Private Firms? 
This and the next few sections elaborate on some curlicues of the 
theory.  They are important, but the reader who is only interested in the 
broad view may skip this and the following section and go to the next 
Part. 
 One might ask, at this point, why I have focused primarily on two 
apparently asymmetrical groups:  The firms in the private sector and the 
employees in the public sector.  What about the employees of those 
firms, or the employers of those public guards? 
 In principle, it’s unclear a priori who would want to lobby; a case-
by-case analysis of the incentives of the various parties is necessary.  In 
this case, my choice of actors was inspired by the state of the evidence 
and the debate:  Public prison guard unions, especially in California, are 
known to engage in pro-incarceration advocacy; and private prison firms 
are alleged to do so.  But let us think about this theoretically anyway. 
 
1. Employee Advocacy 
 First, the workers.  If workers are acting independently, the collec-
tive action problem is especially acute.  No single worker has enough of 
a stake in the system to benefit from spending resources on advocacy to 
 
184 See text accompanying notes 242–255, 292–293 infra.
185 See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 21. 
186 See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 21. 
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help his industry.  We should only expect workers to be a significant po-
litical force if they can enforce some sort of collective action.  Industrial 
organization theorists and game theorists surmise that businesses, when 
they are in it for the long haul,187 cooperate by threatening to punish any-
one who deviates from the desired cooperative action.  (I explain this at 
greater length below in the section on cooperation.188) Workers can do 
the same thing through a system of social ostracism or informal sanctions 
for non-cooperative behavior,189 or by rewarding cooperative behavior 
with non-public benefits.190 But they can more easily enforce coopera-
tive behavior by requiring membership in or contribution to a union, 
which would lobby out of union dues.191 
This is a sufficient explanation for why private prison guards, who 
aren’t unionized in most states,192 haven’t been observed lobbying.193 
Note, though, that when a strong union does exist, it is not surprising to 
see it lobbying for the welfare of its industry; this is probably what hap-
pened when the United Mine Workers of America joined the coalition 
challenging EPA’s ozone and particulate matter standards in Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass’ns.194 
187 What, in the biz, is called an “infinitely repeated game.” 
188 See text accompanying notes 215–235 infra.
189 See, e.g., NEWSIES (Walt Disney Pictures et al. 1992) (combination of shame and violence); 
MATEWAN (Cinecom Entertainment Group et al. 1987); ÉMILE ZOLA, GERMINAL, pt.5, chh.3–4, at 
317–336 (Garnier-Flammarion 1968) (1885); E.P. THOMPSON, Rough Music, in CUSTOMS IN COM-
MON 467, 519–21 (1991). 
190 See OLSON, supra note 28, at 72–73 (unions offer selective incentives like insurance, senior-
ity privileges, or preferential treatment in handling grievances). 
191 See OLSON, supra note 28, at 71 (“Compulsory membership and picket lines are . . . of the 
essence of unionism.”); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 511 (1991) (“Michigan’s 
Public Employment Relations Act . . . which applies to faculty members of a public educational 
institution in Michigan, permits a union and a government employer to enter into an ‘agency-shop’ 
arrangement under which employees within the bargaining unit who decline to become members of 
the union are compelled to pay a ‘service fee’ to the union.”); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 
U.S. 209, 211 (1977) (similar); CAL. GOV’T CODE §3502.5 (authorizing agency shop agreements); 
Memo. of Understanding, Bargaining Unit 6, Agreement Between State of California and California 
Correctional Peace Officers Association, effective 7/1/99 through 7/2/01, §3.02, http://www.dpa.ca.
gov/collbarg/contract/Unit06contract99.htm (establishing agency shop); see also Robert G. Gregory 
& Jeff Borland, Recent Developments in Public Sector Labor Markets, in 3C HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
ECONOMICS 3573, 3586–87 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (discussing why unioniza-
tion may be more widespread in the public than in the private sector). 
192 See SHICHOR, supra note 20, at 198; Dolovich, supra note 17, at 501. 
193 There are two related effects at work here.  Non-unionized workers probably (1) find it hard 
to organize for lobbying purposes and (2) find it hard to organize for wage purposes (which means 
they’re probably making market wages).  If they could organize, they would be able to lobby effec-
tively, and moreover, their wages would be higher, which would make them want to lobby.  Mere 
effectiveness at lobbying doesn’t create the will to lobby:  You need to have some benefit to lobby 
for.  If a worker could (if unemployed) quickly find another job paying the same, he wouldn’t care as 
much about lobbying for job security as a worker who (because he is making above-market wages) 
would have a hard time finding another job as good. 
194 See Pet. for a Writ of Cert., Browner v. Am. Trucking Assn’s, 519 U.S. 457 (2000), at ii, 
2000 WL 33979605; see also Br. of the Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, 
Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, & the Elec. Reliability Coordinating Council as Amici Curiae in 
(continued next page) 
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 As I have explained above,195 I follow a good chunk of the economic 
literature on unions in assuming that unions represent their members and 
seek to maximize total union rents—the difference between union and 
non-union wages, times the size of the public sector.  The prediction that 
such unions would seek to increase the size of their sector is straightfor-
ward:  A larger sector may mean a more powerful union and therefore 
potentially higher wages, benefits, or job security down the road (and 
perhaps—to introduce agency costs for a moment—perks for union offi-
cials196). 
 On the other hand, what if the extra prisoners make workers worse 
off because they’re not accompanied by compensating wage increases or 
more staff?  This could be why some unions argue against incarcera-
tion,197 but it doesn’t appear to be a significant concern. 
 Nationwide, entry-level corrections officers’ real wages held roughly 
constant over 2001–04.198 This entry-level data may not tell us the whole 
story about the full range of corrections officers’ wages, but the idea that 
corrections officers’ unions are strong enough in many states to get com-
pensating wage hikes for their members is also plausible from anecdotal 
evidence199 and imperfect statistics.200 
Support of Resp., Envt’l Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 05-848, 2006 WL 2689786 (U.S. filed 
Sept. 15, 2006). 
195 See text accompanying notes 161–163 supra.
196 See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 161, at 380–81 (“Some commentators criticize union leaders 
for organizing new workers rather than attending to the needs of current members.  Prestige accrues 
to the fastest growing or largest unions, not always the most effective.”  (footnote omitted)). 
197 See text accompanying notes 62–65 supra.
198 The American Correctional Association’s Corrections Compendium surveys corrections of-
ficers’ salaries every few years.  Entry-level corrections officers’ yearly salaries went up, on aver-
age, by 6% to 8% from 2001 to 2004, which—given a roughly 6.7% increase in the consumer price 
index over that same period—translates into between a 1% drop and a 1% rise.  (The range given 
contains both the average and the median over states.)  The salary numbers are taken from Staff 
Hiring and Retention, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, Mar. 2001, at 6, 8–11; Wages and Benefits—
Table 1: Salary Ranges and Options, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, Jan. 2003, at 10–15; Correc-
tional Officers—Table 2: Wages, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, July/Aug. 2004, at 16–17.  The 
averages and medians were only calculated over states that reported salaries for both 2001 and 2004.  
To make the salary figures comparable, I assumed 40 hours per week, 26 biweekly periods per year, 
and 12 months per year.  Where a range was given, I took the lower number in the range. 
199 See, e.g., WYNNE, supra note 33, at 201–07 (prison guards’ effective use of strikes and 
other job actions, such as “sick-outs, lock-ins, slowdowns, and speed-ups” to achieve their goals); 
Falk, supra note 54, at 32 (California prison guards’ union used its clout to prevent all budget cuts, 
“except in prison education and vocational training programs”); Prison Guard Clout Endures, supra 
note 167, at 10 (“State agencies and employees are sharing the pain of Gov. Gray Davis’ attempt to 
reduce a numbing $17-billion deficit.  No, wait.  That doesn’t include prison guards.  In his new 
budget Davis not only spares them from belt-tightening, he hikes their pay 33.76% over the next five 
years.  This shower of riches came four years after the guards union helped raise $2.3 million for 
Davis’ first gubernatorial campaign . . . .”). 
200 For instance, in Ohio, the inmate population has increased from 33,353 in 1991 to 44,270 
from FY 1991 to FY 2005.  See Ohio Dep’t of Rehabilitation & Correction, Fiscal Year Intake and 
Population on July 1 (1972–2005), available at http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/Reports/reports18.
asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (explaining a slight change in definitions in 1994).  Meanwhile, staff-
(continued next page) 
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 As for corrections officer-to-inmate ratios, these did increase na-
tionwide over 1996–2004, but only slightly,201 and in certain states the 
ratios went down.  In California, for instance, the ratio went down by 
26%,202 so California guards don’t seem to have been hurt by increased 
incarceration.  The ratios went down by 22% in Delaware, 23% in New 
Jersey, and 13% in New York. 
 
2. Employer Advocacy 
 Now, let’s consider the employers.  Some firms also run alternatives 
to incarceration,203 so it is not obvious that they would advocate an in-
creased emphasis on imprisonment.204 Still, they may benefit from the 
other elements I have included in the term “incarceration”: increased il-
legalization, increased law enforcement, and longer sentences (once the 
imprisonment decision has already been made). 
 Could increased incarceration, which also increases costs, harm pri-
vate prison firms?  Perhaps, but private firms have a built-in protection 
against too much deterioration in their position:  They don’t have to bid 
 
ing levels increased from over 8739 in FY 1991 to 16,186 in FY 2001, and then dropped somewhat 
to 14,282 in FY 2005, and the average annual wage at the DRC (this is more than just prison guards) 
increased from $38,944 in FY 1994 to $60,482 in FY 2005.  See OHIO DEP’T OF REHABILITATION &
CORRECTION, FISCAL YEAR 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 27, 29; OHIO DEP’T OF REHABILITATION &
CORRECTION, BRIDGING THE GAP: REHABILITATION TO REALITY, FISCAL YEAR 2005 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 34.  The Ohio annual reports are available at http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/Reports/reports2.
asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2006). 
201 These numbers, and the numbers reported in the next sentence, are taken from the charts in 
front of AM. CORRECTIONAL ASS’N, 2005 DIRECTORY (67th ed.), and its predecessor volumes.  
Nationwide, the average increase in the corrections officer-to-inmate ratio was 18%, and the median 
over reporting states was 10%. 
202 The range for California is actually 1996–2003; California didn’t report its number of cor-
rections officers in 2004. 
203 See, e.g., Cornell Cos., Inc., Adult Services: Community-Based Corrections Services, http://
www.cornellcompanies.com/page.cfm?ctid=1#community (last visited Oct. 20, 2006); GEO Group, 
Inc., Fort Worth Community Corrections Facility, http://www.thegeogroupinc.com/northamerica.asp
?fid=100 (last visited Nov. 6, 2006); YEARBOOK: ADULT CORRECTIONS, supra note 166, at 91–92 
(listing privately run community correctional facilities in Arizona, D.C., Florida, Maine, and North 
Carolina); AN OVERVIEW OF THE COLORADO ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, http://www.state.
co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/lcsstaff/2001/research/01CriminalCorrections.htm, ch. 11, at 137 (Colo. Legis. 
Council, Research Pub. No. 487) (26 of 32 community correctional facilities privately operated); 
Private Options, in BEYOND BARS: CORRECTIONAL REFORMS TO LOWER PRISON COSTS AND RE-
DUCE CRIME, http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/144/Private.html (Little Hoover Comm’n, Report No. 
144, Jan. 1998) (listing privately run community correctional facilities in California). 
204 See also LOGAN, supra note 23, at 160–61 (“Because commercial enterprises survive and 
prosper by accurately anticipating and responding to shifts in demand, we should not assume that 
correctional corporations will always be motivated to lobby for expansion of high-security facilities.  
Such corporations can be expected to diversify both within and outside of corrections. . . . Right 
now, there is a genuine unmet demand for imprisonment.  However, if the demand for alternatives to 
prison increases, commercial companies should be able to respond rapidly to such a shift.  One INS 
detention contractor, for example, also provides (and aggressively markets) electronic monitoring 
services as an alternative to jail.”). 
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on a contract unless they anticipate making enough profit.  Still, the ex-
tent of private firms’ benefit from increasing the market depends on how 
profitable they are.  In the extreme textbook perfect competition case, all 
firms make zero economic profit and are indifferent between expanding 
their presence in their industry and any other use of their funds.  The less 
competitive an industry is, the more profit it makes and the more it 
would want to increase the pie. 
 What about the public employers, the Departments of Corrections?  
As noted above,205 with some exceptions,206 Departments of Corrections 
generally favor alternatives to incarceration.  This makes some sense:  
While it is commonly thought that agencies want to aggrandize them-
selves,207 that intuition is only a special case of a more general belief that 
agency officials act in their own self-interest208 and that their self-interest 
tends to be aligned with the size and power of their agencies.  And in-
creasing prisoners without corresponding budget increases to match the 
increasing cost of incarceration (a cost that of course includes corrections 
officers’ salaries, as well as health care and other factors) can easily 
make prison officials worse off.209 
Moreover, DOCs run both prisons and many alternative programs, so 
even if more inmates means more power for the DOC, it makes sense 
that the DOC would want to handle those inmates in cheaper ways than 
incarceration.  Thus, it is not surprising to find prison systems arguing 
for alternatives to incarceration in a time of tight budgets. 
 
205 See text accompanying notes 68–78 supra.
206 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
207 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
36–42 (1971). 
208 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 916, 932–34 (2005) (“empire-building” hypothesis is doubtful, and agency officials’ well-
being isn’t systematically aligned with their department’s power). 
209 We are past the days when county sherrifs were paid according to their jail counts.  Wray, 
supra note 23, at 6; see also LOGAN, supra note 23, at 217 (“In some counties today, the sheriffs are 
allowed to keep for themselves any money not spent on food for prisoners. . . . [A 1945 article by 
E.R. Cass described] the exploitation and corruption of jails run for profit on the fee system[, under 
which the sheriff’s] ‘chief interest is to increase the population of the jail . . . .’”  (quoting E.R. Cass, 
Jails for Profit, 50 CORRECTIONS TODAY 84, 86 (1988) (originally published in 1945))); Schlosser, 
supra note 7, at 64 (“New York State’s experience with the ‘fee system’ during the nineteenth cen-
tury suggests that the temptation to [keep an inmate longer than necessary] is hard to resist.”).  More 
prisoners without more funding can also lead to political grief when combined with early-release 
requirements imposed by court orders as a result of overcrowding.  Cf. Sue Doyle, Proposal: In-
mates to Serve 25% of Sentence, DAILY BREEZE (Torrance, Cal.), Aug. 21, 2006, at A1 (L.A. County 
Sheriff had this problem with overcrowded county jails). 
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E. Who Cooperates with Whom? 
1. The Importance of Alternative Assumptions 
 All this talk of how the 10% firm acts and the profits of “the indus-
try” assumes that the private sector, in deciding how much to spend on 
advocacy, acts as a collective bloc and doesn’t cooperate210 with the pub-
lic sector.  This is possible, but it’s not the only possible story.  I could 
have made either of two other, more extreme assumptions.  First, there 
could be no cooperation at all—all the firms could be acting independ-
ently.  Second, there could be total cooperation—all the firms could be 
cooperating with each other and with the public sector.  This section ex-
plores the implications of these alternative assumptions and tentatively 
defends my decision to adopt the intermediate assumption of cooperation 
within the private sector but not with the public sector; but in the end, the 
different assumptions don’t significantly alter the bottom line. 
 If all firms act independently, the relevant shares are even less than 
indicated above.  In 1999, CCA had a bit over half the market, Wacken-
hut (now the GEO Group211) had about a quarter, Management & Train-
ing Corp. had about 5–8%, Cornell Corrections Inc. and Correctional 
Services Corp. each had about 5–6%, CiviGenics, Inc. had about 2–3%, 
and a handful of other firms had under 1%.212 
So, while the average private sector share in State X may be 10%, 
this number is irrelevant if all firms act independently.  The relevant 
shares may be, for instance, 6% for CCA, 2% for the GEO Group, 1% 
for Management & Training Corp., and 1% for Cornell Corrections . . . 
and 90% for the public sector.  The assumption of independent firms 
would make it even more likely that the public sector is the dominant 
sector. 
 Now consider the opposite assumption—that everyone cooperates.  
A single prison industry bloc would choose an optimal total amount to 
 
210 “Cooperation,” I word I use here throughout, is what economists mean when they use the 
uglier word “collusion.” 
211 See note 102 supra.
212 These numbers are taken from two sources from 1999 (which is why the shares are ex-
pressed as ranges).  See James R. Macdonald & Jaimi Goodfriend, FASC Industry Outlook: Offender 
Management: 1999, http://www.lib.uwo.ca/business/prison1999.pdf, at 10 (First Analysis Securities 
Corp., May 27, 1999); Stephen McFarland, Christ McGowan & Tom O’Toole, Prisons, Privatiza-
tion, and Public Values, http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/PrisonsPrivatization.pdf, at 6 
(Dec. 2002) (reprinting a table of market shares from Charles Thomas that is apparently otherwise 
unavailable).  Cornell has apparently grown since then.  See Michael Brush, Company Focus: 3 
Prison Stocks Poised to Break Out, http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/P105034.asp (Jan. 5, 2005) 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (reporting a 12% market share for Cornell).  GEO has grown slightly.  
See The GEO Group, Inc., Fast Facts About GEO, http://www.thegeogroupinc.com/facts.asp (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2006) (28% share of U.S. market). 
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maximize total industry benefit.  Because the actors are still formally 
separate, they would also choose some way to allocate the contributions 
among themselves. 
 If the private industry had the same benefit per prison as the public 
sector, then total cooperation would be indistinguishable from monopoly:  
Because total industry benefit would be the same before and after priva-
tization, the strategy that chooses contribution amounts to maximize that 
benefit would likewise be the same. 
 However, as I argued above,213 private firms aren’t terribly profit-
able, while public sector unions have significant public sector wage pre-
miums to protect.  By replacing part of the public sector with a relatively 
unprofitable private sector, privatization actually decreases the industry’s 
total benefit.  Therefore, even under total cooperation, there is less to 
maximize; expenditures on pro-incarceration advocacy are thus less pro-
ductive (just as if there were a tax rate on industry revenues); and so ex-
penditures on advocacy still go down under privatization.214 
2. The Empirical Path? 
How can we tell which form of cooperation is most likely?  Unfortu-
nately, direct observation of the world is of limited use here.  For in-
stance, suppose we can’t find any explicit cooperation on advocacy.  
This doesn’t matter:  The cooperation at issue here may just be tacit.  If 
cooperation is beneficial, then firms may independently understand the 
“game” they’re playing with other firms and figure out their optimal 
strategy.  The outcome may then appear as if it were the result of explicit 
coordination; but in fact, this “cooperative” behavior would have just 
 
213 See text accompanying notes 157–169 supra.
214 Note an important difference between the total cooperation case and the other two cases (no 
cooperation or private-sector cooperation).  In the other cases, the “largest” actor does all the advo-
cacy, and “largest” is determined by both per-prison benefits and industry shares.  For example, even 
if per-prison profits were identical between the public and private sectors, a 10% actor would free-
ride off a 90% actor because the absolute amount of the benefits differ.  (This implies that there is an 
“optimal” amount of privatization if you want to minimize pro-incarceration advocacy.  In this ex-
ample, where per-prison profits are identical between sectors, that level is 50%; and even if per-
prison benefits differed, like if the private benefit were only one-half the public benefit, that optimal 
level would be 67%.)  But in the total cooperation case, it is only per-prison benefits that matter.  For 
example, suppose per-prison benefits are the same—say $100—and there are 100 prisons.  Then, 
under monopoly public provision, total benefit is 100 × $100 = $10,000.  Under a 10%–90% split, 
total benefit is (10 × $100) + (90 × $100), which is exactly the same.  Likewise, under a 20%–80% 
split, total benefit is (20 × $100) + (80 × $100)—again exactly the same.  On the other hand, if pri-
vate sector benefits are, say, $50, then a 10%–90% split reduces total benefit to (10 × $50) + (90 ×
$100) = $9500; a 20%–80% split reduces it still further to (20 × $50) + (80 × $100) = $9000; and so 
forth.  (This has a quite different implication for the “optimal” amount of privatization if you want to 
minimize pro-incarceration advocacy:  It is either 0% or 100%—all the weight should go on the 
sector with the lowest per-prison benefits.  Or, if the sectors have equal per-prison benefits, any split 
is equivalent.) 
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resulted from their correct expectations about their rivals’ behavior.215 
(Recall the earlier discussion of “shared understandings” about who 
would contribute what.216)
Conversely, suppose we observe the existence of the private prison 
firms’ trade association, the Association of Private Correctional and 
Treatment Organizations.217 This also doesn’t answer the question.  It’s 
true that trade associations may provide a forum for discussing common 
lobbying strategies,218 but talk is cheap:  Why should companies give 
money to a coordinated advocacy campaign when it’s in their personal 
interest to free-ride off each other?  The primary question is still whether 
cooperation is worthwhile for these prison industry actors.  (This is why 
many organizations exist but are ineffective.219) The trade association 
may make it worthwhile for its member firms by offering “selective in-
centives” to those who pay sufficient dues to support cooperative levels 
of lobbying.220 APCTO, for instance, has different tiers of membership, 
and offers full members—who pay between $2000 and $30,000, depend-
ing on their revenues—voting rights.221 But APCTO does not seem to 
fulfill much of a lobbying or advocacy coordination function, since firms 
do all their own lobbying and most of their own advocacy.222 
But if observing the presence or absence of explicit cooperation 
doesn’t answer the question, what about observing lobbying behavior?  
All the major firms do some advocacy;223 doesn’t the previous model 
predict that, absent some cooperation, they would all free-ride off of the 
 
215 “Legal scholars have traditionally distinguished between explicit and tacit collusion. The 
law punishes the former, so that the act of communication is of central importance.  For economists, 
however, this distinction has no meaning.  In game theory models of collusion, the term ‘agreement’ 
does not imply a formal communication—all that is needed is for the cartel members to have an 
‘understanding’ of how others will react to their behavior.  Such shared beliefs—whether acquired 
tacitly or not—can support a self-enforcing, collusive equilibrium.”  Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: 
A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295, 296–27 (1987) (footnotes 
omitted). 
216 See text accompanying note 142 supra.
217 See Ass’n of Private Correctional & Treatment Orgs., APCTO, http://www.apcto.org/ (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
218 Coordinating industry lobbying strategies doesn’t violate antitrust law.  See, e.g., E. R.R. 
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).  
219 Cf. OLSON, supra note 28, at 36 & n.54 (collective action theory would “tend to explain the 
continual complaints that international organizations and alliances are not given adequate (optimal) 
amounts of resources”). 
220 See OLSON, supra note 28, at 132–39; MOE, supra note 144, at 28–29. 
221 APCTO, Become a Member of APCTO, http://apcto.org/membership/join.html (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2006). 
222 See text accompanying notes 93, 102–104 supra, note 223 infra.
223 See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 9 (in 1998, CCA, with 56% of the private prison 
market, gave $353,106; Cornell Corrections, Inc., with 6% of the market, gave $110,575; Correc-
tional Services Corp., with 5% of the market, gave $34,378; and Wackenhut Corrections Corp., with 
22% of the market, gave $33,325); PRICE, supra note 23, at 74 (both CCA and Wackenhut involved 
with ALEC). 
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public sector, or off of CCA, the largest firm?  Alas, no.  True, we don’t 
observe everyone totally free-riding.  But as I noted above,224 they may 
all be lobbying for privatization, which has a strong private-good com-
ponent, since a firm’s contributions may increase the probability that it 
gets a project in the future.225
3. The Theoretical Path 
 To answer the question of how cooperation works (if at all) in pro-
incarceration lobbying, I return to theory.  I have already mentioned the 
possibility that a trade association could offer selective incentives to 
members to overcome the private firms’ collective action problem.  If 
this happens, that would support the theory that private firms cooperate 
with each other but don’t cooperate with the public sector; but as I noted 
above, this doesn’t seem to be empirically relevant in the prison case.226 
But sticks may be more important than carrots here.  Game theorists 
have long theorized that, even if the only equilibrium of a game is non-
cooperative—say, the well known Prisoners’ Dilemma—repetition of the 
game can lead to cooperative behavior.227 In particular, when a game is 
infinitely repeated (or when the number of periods is unknown), the 
players can maintain cooperative behavior by threatening to punish non-
cooperative players in future periods.  This can explain why firms in an 
oligopolistic industry may cooperate (i.e., collude) to charge high 
prices.228 The industrial organization literature mostly discusses coop-
eration between actors who sell products in markets, rather than auctions, 
which is how private prison firms compete; but there is also a literature 
on how cooperation can be maintained in auctions.229 
224 See text accompanying note 182 supra.
225 This wouldn’t happen if auctions were nondiscretionary, for instance if they were required 
to accept the lowest bid.  But because governments have the flexibility to reject a low bid where a 
higher bid proposes more and better services, or where they have their doubts as to the trustworthi-
ness of the bidder, see HARDING, supra note 88, at 75–79, there are enough “soft factors” that a 
firm’s contributions may make a difference in whether it wins a bid. 
226 See text accompanying notes 217–222 supra.
227 See, e.g., James W. Friedman, A Non-Cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames, 38 REV.
ECON. STUD. 1, 4–8 (1971). 
228 Such a strategy can work as long as anyone’s gain from deviating is less than the loss from 
the future punishment.  See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 245–61 
(1988) (also discussing other ways of supporting collusion, for instance the presence of price rigidi-
ties or the desire to maintain a reputation for friendly behavior).  For a discussion of threats other 
than the simple (and expensive for the punisher) “trigger” strategy of reverting to competitive behav-
ior forever, see Ayres, supra note 215, at 306–12. 
229 See PAUL KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 28–29 & nn.75–77 (2004); Mar-
tin Pesendorfer, A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions, 67 REV. ECON. STUD. 381, 384–88 
(2000); Jean-Jacques Laffont, Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data,
41 EUR. ECON. REV. 1, 25–26 (1997); Paul Klemperer, Bidding Markets 16–22 & 18 n.61, http://
papers.ssrn.com/soL3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=776524 (June 2005); Andreas Blume & Paul Heid-
(continued next page) 
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 Cooperation-forcing threats can take many forms.  For instance, 
firms in an industry can tell each other, “Charge monopoly prices, and 
reduce your output to the monopoly level, and I’ll do the same.  But if 
anyone tries to undercut me, we’ll revert to competitive pricing and out-
put decisions forever, where no one will make a profit.”  Or, even with-
out saying it, they can follow this strategy as a matter of shared under-
standings.  This will work if the threatened loss from future competitive 
pricing is greater than the one-period benefit from undercutting.230 
If some firm is extremely impatient—so it discounts future losses 
very heavily and puts a lot of weight on the present—then it may not be 
deterred.  The same may happen if the punishment stage is far in the fu-
ture; for instance, if competition only happens once every 10 years, it 
will take a lot of future pain to outweigh the benefit of cheating on one’s 
partners today.  But if competition happens often, people aren’t too im-
patient, and the potential losses to defectors are large, the threat can be 
effective. 
 This particular threat is painful to everyone in the industry—carrying 
through with it means that even the punisher is punished—but its very 
painfulness is what makes it effective and decreases the chance that it 
will ever be used.231 But there are other threats that are less painful but 
might still work in particular circumstances.  For instance, the punish-
ment period may last for only a set number of periods.  Or the punish-
ment may be limited in scope—“Let’s behave monopolistically, or else 
I’ll start advertising at competitive levels.”232 “Or else I’ll cut you out of 
the market by executing exclusive dealing contracts with your suppli-
ers.”233 “Or else I’ll start undercutting you in some other market.”234 
“Or else I’ll blow up your store.”  The number of possible forms of pun-
ishment is limited only by firms’ ingenuity—and other firms’ ability to 
converge on this shared understanding. 
 
hues, Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions, http://www.pitt.edu/~ablume/images/tacit17.pdf (work-
ing paper, Sept. 2002) (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).  On specific collusive mechanisms, see Daniel A. 
Graham & Robert C. Marshall, Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and Eng-
lish Auctions, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1217, 1221 (1987); see also R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 
Bidding Rings, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 579 (1992). 
230 See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 400–05 (oligopoly behavior in an infinitely re-
peated game); TIROLE, supra note 228, at 245–46 (same); see also MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra, at 
417–23 (more general “Folk theorem” for infinitely repeated games); TIROLE, supra, at 268–69 
(same). 
231 Such threats may also be more common in the price collusion case, where successful collu-
sion requires 100% participation, than in the lobbying case, where the public good can be produced 
(though not necessary at the optimal level) even if not everyone participates.  See OLSON, supra note 
28, at 42–43 (distinction between “exclusive” and “inclusive” collective goods).  
232 See Ayres, supra note 215, at 306–07. 
233 See Ayres, supra note 215, at 308–09. 
234 See Ayres, supra note 215, at 311–12. 
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 Crucially, the punishment doesn’t need to be in the same form as the 
defection.  So how can prison firms enforce cooperative levels of cam-
paign spending?  They could threaten never to cooperate on campaign 
spending anymore.  This is a plausible threat, but whether it is effective 
depends on how often political campaigns come around and how painful 
non-cooperation is for the defecting firm.  Another possibility—
assuming the firms were cooperating on the underlying prison bids be-
fore, for instance by segmenting the market among themselves—is to 
threaten never to cooperate on prison bids again.  This seems like a much 
more painful threat, though as discussed before, it is also painful for the 
punishers.  Fortunately for private prison firms, there is any number of 
intermediate conceivable punishments. 
 By contrast, public prison guard unions seem to have fewer ways of 
punishing private firms.  They don’t bid against each other in the under-
lying auctions, so they can’t threaten to end any cooperative behavior 
there.  They’re bitter political adversaries in the privatization advocacy 
world, so again there seems to be no preexisting cooperation that can be 
terminated.  They can threaten to not cooperate any more in pro-
incarceration advocacy, but this may not be a highly effective threat.235 
For these reasons, I believe that cooperation among private prison 
firms is more likely than either, on the one hand, totally non-cooperative 
behavior or, on the other hand, totally cooperative behavior between the 
public and private sectors.  However, because the ultimate results under 
any of the assumptions don’t differ that much, which assumption we 
choose isn’t terribly important. 
 
F. Allowing Money to Change Candidates’ Positions  
So far, I have taken the political agenda as given:  I didn’t explain 
where the proposed reform came from.  Thus, I’ve assumed that money 
is important because it buys victory—for instance, by persuading voters 
of the benefits of the policy or the merit of the candidate.236 But money 
can also affect the agenda—by inducing candidates to change their 
views, by inducing the sponsors of voter initiatives to propose a different 
initiative than they otherwise would, and so on. 
 When money can affect the agenda (but the other assumptions are 
unchanged), the analysis is essentially the same.  Suppose you are con-
sidering whether to contribute to place a voter initiative on the ballot.  
 
235 In this model, new contracts come up to bid every period, while lobbying only happens 
once, at the beginning of the game; so this model rules out threats based on future lobbying behavior 
by construction.  But even if I were to include recurring opportunities for lobbying in the model, 
they’d probably come up less often than opportunities to bid on contracts. 
236 See MUELLER, supra note 138, at 478–79. 
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The initiative is supported by some group or other, but for specificity, 
let’s say it’s being sponsored by a politician.237 This politician may be 
fairly pro-incarceration himself, but he is limited in how strict an initia-
tive he can propose:  He won’t prevail unless the median voter, whose 
views control the outcome of the election,238 prefers his proposal over the 
status quo.  However, before the substance of the initiative is set in stone, 
you can move him in a more pro-incarceration direction if—by offering 
him money to pay for persuasive advertising—you offer him the possi-
bility to also move the median voter.239
A monetary contribution has the following effects: 
1. Electoral influence. As before, you benefit because your contri-
bution directly increases the probability that the initiative pre-
vails. 
2. The contribution moves the substance of the initiative in a more 
pro-incarceration direction.  This has two effects, which cut in 
opposite directions: 
a. Substantive influence. You benefit if it prevails because the 
policy is better for you.  But: 
b. Extremism. The initiative is somewhat less likely to prevail 
because it may now be too harsh for the median voter. 
As a prison provider thinking about how much to contribute, you follow 
the same framework as before:  You contribute until the benefit of an 
extra dollar is worth $1 to you.  The benefit of an extra dollar is more 
complicated than it was in the earlier model—in addition to encompass-
ing electoral influence, it now adds the benefit of substantive influence 
and subtracts the cost of extremism—but the basic idea is the same. 
 Now suppose, again, that the industry is split up into a 90% sector 
(them) and a 10% sector (you).  As before, your competitor’s benefits go 
down to 90% of their previous level, so he now wants to contribute until 
the benefit of an extra dollar to the industry is worth $1.11.240 As before, 
 
237 See, e.g., Michael Finnegan & Robert Salladay, Voters Reject Schwarzenegger’s Bid to Re-
make State Government, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at 1 (Gov. Schwarzenegger aggressively (but 
unsuccessfully) pushed 4 initiatives “central to his larger vision” for reforming California politics); 
Michael Finnegan, Props. 57, 58 Big Items in Homestretch, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at 1 (Gov. 
Schwarzenegger aggressively (and successfully) pushed 2 budget initiatives). 
238 See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 138, at 85–86.  In assuming a stable identity of the median 
voter, I’m abstracting away from voter participation issues.  See id. at 232–34 (discussing how voter 
indifference and alienation may or may not affect outcomes). 
239 See MUELLER, supra note 138, at 479; Richard Ball, Opposition Backlash and Platform 
Convergence in a Spatial Voting Model with Campaign Contributions, 98 PUB. CHOICE 269, 273–
74, 279 (1999); Grossman & Helpman, supra note 143, at 273–74, 279. 
240 This is not as obvious as it was in the previous models.  It turns out that the electoral influ-
ence and extremism effects both tend to make the benefit of each additional dollar decrease.  But the 
substantive influence effect is ambiguous.  Thus, the marginal benefit of advocacy expenditures is no 
longer guaranteed to be downward-sloping over its whole range, so Figure 3 is not accurate for this 
(continued next page) 
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your competitor contributes less, because having only 90% of the indus-
try is like facing a 10% tax on revenues.  And as before, you free-ride off 
of your competitor, because when you take his contribution level into 
account, an extra dollar in the pot is no longer worthwhile to you.241 
IV. SOME “ANYTHING GOES” MODELS 
I have already hinted at a way in which privatization can have an 
ambiguous effect.  If we take both pro- and anti-incarceration advocacy 
into account in the model of the previous Part, privatization decreases 
pro-incarceration advocacy but has an ambiguous effect on anti-
incarceration advocacy.  What this means normatively depends on one’s 
attitude toward anti-incarceration advocacy.  If one opposes pro-
incarceration advocacy because the U.S. already has too much incarcera-
tion,242 then there’s nothing wrong, and perhaps everything right, with 
advocacy in the other direction. 
 
case.  Nonetheless, for reasons explained below, see text accompanying note 291 infra, it turns out 
that the largest actor’s contributions still fall. 
241 This expanded model is still fairly easy because the opponent of the initiative is the status 
quo, which, being the status quo, doesn’t act strategically.  Things get more difficult if we instead 
make this a race between two candidates.  The substantive influence effect—your desire to make the 
ultimate policy favor you, whoever wins—could make you contribute to both candidates simultane-
ously.  Moreover, your contributions to one candidate can influence not only that candidate’s posi-
tion but also that of his opponent.  As a result, the marginal benefit of advocacy expenditures be-
comes quite a bit more complicated.  See MUELLER, supra note 138, at 479–80.  Nonetheless, the 
qualitative result should be the same. 
242 See, e.g., SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at v. 
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 On the other hand, if one opposes pro-incarceration advocacy be-
cause it is assumed243 to be self-interested, then perhaps anti-
incarceration advocacy is just as bad if it comes from boot camps, half-
way houses, drug treatment providers, and other presumptively self-
interested parties.244
In this Part, I present two other models in which the effect of privati-
zation is ambiguous.  In section A, I relax the assumption that money is 
fungible.  In section B, I relax the assumption that privatization is exoge-
nous.  In both models, the effect of privatization cannot be determined a 
priori; whether advocacy goes up or down depends on the facts. 
 
A. Relaxing the Assumption of Fungible Money 
Recall the main model presented in section III.A, in particular Fig-
ures 6 and 7.  A monopoly provider would have spent $1 million on ad-
vocacy, but under a 90–10 split, the 90% provider is unwilling to spend 
beyond the 900,000th dollar and the 10% provider is unwilling to spend 
beyond the 300,000th dollar; and so total advocacy falls to $900,000, 
with the larger provider spending everything and the smaller one spend-
ing nothing. 
 That model’s results—chiefly the result that the smaller-total-profit 
sector totally free-rides off the efforts of the larger-total-profit sector—
were driven by the assumption that the probability of getting the change 
in policy only depended on the total amount of money in the pot.  All 
advocacy was fungible.  A dollar from a public actor had the same effect 
as a dollar from a private firm.  This is not an implausible assumption.  
For instance, dollars are fungible in buying advertising, which increases 
the probability of a change.  A politician may adopt the view of whatever 
“policy position” contributed the most to his war chest. 
 
243 But see text accompanying notes 122–131 supra.
244 In Dolovich’s framework, punishment, which burdens one’s “urgent interests,” can only be 
justified when “interests of equal or greater urgency” (such as, presumably, potential victims’ inter-
ests in safety) are served, and this balance must be struck “under fair deliberative conditions.”  
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 515.  Pro-incarceration advocacy violates this condition because it bur-
dens people’s urgent interests (their interest in liberty) merely “in order that others might benefit 
financially.”  Id. at 515–16.  Dolovich doesn’t make this point, but it seems that under her frame-
work, self-interested anti-incarceration advocacy is equally problematic:  The interests of potential 
victims are sacrificed so that some (drug treatment providers) may benefit financially.  Those vic-
tims’ interests would have been protected (through incarceration) under fair deliberative conditions, 
so by hypothesis, they are of equal or greater urgency than the liberty interests of the people who are 
no longer being incarcerated.  The level of incarceration is thus unjustly low. 
(One might argue that incarceration is currently too high, so self-interested anti-incarceration 
advocacy at least pushes the system in the right direction; but Dolovich’s theory does not seem to 
allow for using self-interested advocacy instrumentally in that way, nor does her discussion of the 
parsimony principle take a position on whether incarceration is too high or too low.) 
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 On the other hand, some alternate assumptions may also be plausi-
ble.  For example, one group might be attractive only to Democrats, 
while another might be attractive only to Republicans.245 More gener-
ally, perhaps politicians are just sensitive to the variety of voices in a 
coalition, feeling (rightly or wrongly) that having a wide variety of 
groups shows that a policy has wide support.  Then neither group’s con-
tributions totally “crowd out” the other’s.  Your 500,001st dollar still has 
less benefit than your 500,000th dollar—there are still decreasing mar-
ginal returns—but (unlike in the previous model) it does not have the 
same benefit as your first dollar added on to your competitor’s 
500,000th. 
 As before, let us adopt an extreme assumption, though this assump-
tion is the opposite of the previous one:  The effectiveness of your dol-
lars is entirely unrelated to how much money your competitor has spent.  
This corresponds to the case where (for whatever reason) you are only 
effective in lobbying for one sort of beneficial reform—say, Three 
Strikes laws—while your competitor is only effective in lobbying for 
another—say, decreasing diversion to drug treatment programs.  Advo-
cacy is still a public good, as before.  But the results are not as stark as in 
the previous model. 
 When you were a monopolist and both reforms—Proposition X and 
Proposition Y—were on the agenda, you were willing to spend $1 mil-
lion on each, for a total of $2 million.  You divided your money opti-
mally between them, so a dollar spent on either one returned a benefit of 
$1. 
 Now, having been split up by the Antitrust Division, you have 10% 
of the industry, and can only lobby effectively on Proposition X.  Be-
cause your competitor captures 90% of the benefit of Proposition X if it 
passes, you spend money on Proposition X until an extra dollar returns a 
benefit of $5.  Call this amount $300,000. 
 Meanwhile, your competitor, with 90% of the industry, is busy lob-
bying for Proposition Y.  Because you capture 10% of that benefit, he 
spends money on Proposition Y until an extra dollar returns a benefit of 
$1.11.  Call this amount $900,000. 
 The split-up of the industry, and the resulting (partial) free riding, is 
responsible for reducing the previous amount of lobbying—$2 million—
down to a total of $1.2 million (just like, in the previous model, the 90-
10 split was responsible for bringing $1 million of lobbying down to 
 
245 This is a made-up example; it doesn’t apply to prison advocacy, where both the California 
prison guards union and private prison firms give to both Republicans and Democrats.  See SARABI 
& BENDER, supra note 22, at 13; Talvi, supra note 101; CJCJ, supra note 37; Pollak, supra note 58 
(the New Jersey State PBA tends to give to incumbents, including Democratic Gov. Florio and Re-
publican Gov. Whitman). 
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$900,000).  In this example, the larger actor gives more, but that needn’t 
be the case, since there’s no reason to believe that both actors are equally 
effective in their advocacy.  What if either private firms or public unions 
are particularly incompetent lobbyists or political strategists?  All we can 
say is that increasing an actor’s industry share tends to increase his con-
tribution. 
 In this context, privatization has two effects.  First, it increases the 
share of the private sector, so private sector advocacy goes up.  Second, 
it decreases the share of the public sector, so public sector advocacy goes 
down.  We can’t say anything a priori about whether the first effect out-
weighs the second.  If we know some facts about public- or private-
sector advocacy—for instance, if one sector is just completely unpersua-
sive, while the other sector is slick and sympathetic246—then we can haz-
ard some predictions, but we can’t say anything without such empirical 
facts. 
 As noted above, this was an extreme assumption—and I pulled the 
assumption of two separable reforms out of a hat—but there are interme-
diate assumptions that yield the same result—that privatization makes 
private lobbying go up and public lobbying go down.  Unless we can be 
specific about how different groups’ advocacy has different effects and 
how effective the groups are, it is impossible to say whether prison priva-
tization increases or decreases self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy. 
 
B. Strong and Weak Unions and Industries 
Let us return to the point I made above that an industry’s effective-
ness at advocacy is relevant to its “real” share for purposes of this analy-
sis.247 For instance, if you, with a 10% share, are twice as slick a lobby-
ist than your competitor—and than the industry before the breakup—
meaning that your marginal dollars produce twice the benefit, you will 
act as though your share was 20%. 
 We can’t say a priori which way this cuts:  It’s not clear which sector 
is more effective at lobbying in favor of incarceration.  The CCPOA, as 
we’ve seen,248 is highly effective, but corrections officers’ unions are 
much less active outside of California, and perhaps this is because they 
are less effective.  It’s hard to say how effective private prison firms 
would be at lobbying in favor of incarceration, since, as we’ve seen, 
there’s little evidence that they do this at all.249 
246 See text accompanying note 247 infra.
247 See text accompanying note 145 supra.
248 See text accompanying notes 34–44 supra.
249 See text accompanying notes 87–121 supra.
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 But let us suppose that one’s effectiveness at lobbying for incarcera-
tion is correlated with one’s effectiveness at lobbying for (or against) 
privatization.  For simplicity’s sake, let us suppose that they are perfectly 
correlated.  Consider the states with high levels of privatization.  By sim-
ple observation, we may conclude that, obviously, those states’ correc-
tional officers’ unions were not effective at opposing privatization; the 
industry was just too strong for them.  When that relatively “weak” pub-
lic sector was partly displaced by a relatively “strong” private sector, a 
weak pro-incarceration voice was similarly displaced by a strong pro-
incarceration voice.  Pro-incarceration advocacy, then, may plausibly 
have increased.250 
Similarly, consider the states with low levels of privatization, like 
California (1.8% private in 2004), or no privatization at all, like New 
York or Rhode Island.251 The unions in those states, on this view, must 
have been stronger than the industry, or else we would see privatization 
there now.  If privatization were introduced, total advocacy would go 
down; but privatization is unlikely to be introduced there, so we won’t 
see that happen. 
 This is a story where—contrary to my implicit assumption so far—
privatization is endogenous:  The states where privatization has gained a 
foothold aren’t randomly chosen; rather, privatization emerges where 
prison guard unions are weak.  Thus, past privatization may have, on 
balance, increased pro-incarceration advocacy.  Eliminate prison privati-
zation, and you reestablish the rule of the ineffective prison guard un-
ions—to the benefit of those who oppose pro-incarceration advocacy. 
 It’s a powerful story, but it requires more fleshing out.  For one 
thing, low-privatization states need not be high-union-strength states.  
While antipathy to privatization and the strength of public sector unions 
are probably correlated, a very Blue state may plausibly oppose privati-
zation even if, for whatever reason, its unions were weak. 
 Moreover, it’s not clear that this argument counsels against privatiza-
tion generally.  It may, instead, tell us to oppose privatization where it’s 
widespread252 but to endorse it where it’s low or non-existent,253 on the 
“balance of power” theory that the private sector should be strengthened 
where unions are strong but weakened where unions are weak. 
 Or, perhaps, the policy recommendation may be indeterminate:  
Suppose the equilibrium we observe today already reflects the victory of 
the stronger party in each state.  Then—under the assumption that the 
 
250 I am grateful to Margo Schlanger and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci for this point. 
251 See PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note 147, at 6 tbl.7. 
252 For instance, in the high-privatization states listed in note 150 supra.
253 For instance, in the low-privatization states listed in note 149 supra, or in the no-
privatization states listed in PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note 147, at 6 tbl.7. 
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effectiveness of pro-incarceration advocacy is perfectly correlated with 
the effectiveness of pro- or anti-privatization advocacy—pro-
incarceration advocacy is already as high as it can get.  Adding a thumb 
to the privatization scales in either direction would tend to support the 
victory of an otherwise weaker party and would therefore reduce the total 
amount of pro-incarceration advocacy. 
 Most importantly, though, this line of argument depends on the em-
pirical—and contestable—assertion that actors in the prison industry are 
similarly effective in the privatization debate as in the incarceration de-
bate. 
 Perhaps this is true—one’s effectiveness at advocacy probably de-
pends on one’s general characteristics, like goodwill, persuasiveness, and 
slickness.  But perhaps the correlation is weak.  The incarceration debate 
is peopled by different interest groups than the privatization debate.  For 
instance, prosecutors, police officers, victims’ rights groups, and rural 
communities are interested in incarceration policy254 but not so much in 
privatization policy.  Conversely, prison privatization is a matter of inter-
est even to interest groups without a direct interest in prisons, like gener-
alized public employee unions or small-government advocates, who as-
sume (probably sensibly enough) that a victory for privatization any-
where is a victory for the general privatization movement.  Moreover, the 
appeal of incarceration arguments, which connect to fears of drugs and 
crime and concerns over civil liberties, seems to have a very different 
source than the appeal of privatization arguments, which relate to taxes, 
spending, and the effectiveness of government services. 
 We are back, then, to a general state-by-state analysis.  In the first set 
of models—where the effectiveness of advocacy only depended on the 
total amount of money in the pot—everything was driven by the “larg-
est” actor, where “largest” also takes effectiveness into account.  I have 
given arguments above as to why the private sector is currently probably 
the smaller actor.255 The “slickness adjustment” described here might 
change that in some places, but it is an empirical question.  Similarly, in 
the terms of the “anything goes” model, privatization will still have the 
effect of increasing the private sector’s advocacy but decreasing that of 
the public sector.  The slickness adjustment may change the de facto 
shares of the different sectors, but it doesn’t change the qualitative result.  
Anything still goes. 
 
254 See note 26 supra.
255 See text accompanying notes 146–171 supra.
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Article is not a brief for or against privatization, in prisons or 
elsewhere.  It takes no position on whether private providers are suffi-
ciently accountable, whether privatization decreases cost or increases 
quality,256 whether lower costs (if real) are even desirable,257 whether 
privatizing certain functions like imprisonment is invalid because these 
functions are inherently public,258 or any of the other arguments in the 
literature.259 (Nor do I explore whether the advocacy problem could be 
addressed in other ways, for instance by direct controls on advocacy260—
though I have, I suppose, tacitly assumed that such controls will not be 
effective.261) This Article’s only goal is to point out the inadequacies in 
the current formulation of the political influence argument against priva-
tization. 
 My opinion, based on the above models, is that privatization will 
probably not worsen the political influence problem, and may alleviate it.  
The public goods model seems to describe many situations of political 
advocacy fairly well.  The assumption of the first model—that the prob-
ability of getting a policy change only depends on the total amount 
spent—likewise seems to describe many situations, like initiative or elec-
tion campaigns. 
 There’s always room for more realistic theories—for instance, my 
analysis of what motivated the public-sector union was somewhat specu-
lative; in assuming that private prison firms were profit-maximizing, I 
suppressed any analysis of agency costs within the firm; and my back-of-
 
256 See note 16 supra.
257 See White, supra note 87, at 145 (“in a society that claims a basis in rule of law norms, it is 
probably always a good thing for the state to wage its . . . wars against its citizens . . . in an obvious 
and maximally costly way”). 
258 See, e.g., John J. DiIulio, What’s Wrong with Private Prisons, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 
1988, at 66, 82 (“‘employing the force of the community’ via private penal management undermines 
the moral writ of the community itself”). 
259 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 17, at 518–23 (prison officials can affect time served through 
disciplinary procedures and recommendations to parole boards). 
260 See Rosky, supra note 6, at 955–56 (whether privatization or political influence is easier to 
control is an uncertain empirical question). 
261 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (corporations have 
First Amendment rights); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), et sua progenies (First Amendment 
rights include political advocacy); LOGAN, supra note 23, at 159 (“We cannot prevent ‘lobbying’ 
(though it may not always be called that) by nonprofit organizations, government agencies, public 
employee unions, or commercial companies, any of whose agenda may or may not coincide with the 
public interest.”); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House Passes Limit on Cash for Groups in Campaigns, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, at A21 (quoting a Republican opponent of a campaign finance bill comparing 
campaign finance restrictions to “whack-a-mole”).  But see Paul Guppy, Private Prisons and the 
Public Interest: Improving Quality and Reducing Cost Through Competition, http://www.
washingtonpolicy.org/ConOutPrivatization/PBGuppyPrisonsPublicInterest.html (Wash. Pol’y Ctr., 
Pol’y Br., Feb. 2003) (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (campaign finance laws are an “obvious,” “simple 
and effective way[] to prevent corruption of the law-making process). 
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the-envelope estimate of the benefit of incarceration to the different sec-
tors was just that—a back-of-the-envelope estimate.  Nor have I enter-
tained the possibility that, when privatization is on the agenda, prison 
system actors spend more resources fighting over that, which might 
crowd out pro-incarceration advocacy.262 So my specific conclusions 
here are tentative. 
 But what is not tentative is that this sort of analysis is necessary if 
one is to make the political influence argument properly.  General as-
sumptions will not do.  As Mancur Olson (somewhat hyperbolically) ob-
served over 40 years ago—in a seminal work, The Logic of Collective 
Action, that rewards reading even today—“the customary view that 
groups of individuals with common interests tend to further those com-
mon interests appears to have little if any merit.”263 Critics of privatiza-
tion who have charged that privatization has increased (or will increase, 
or runs a substantial risk of increasing) pro-incarceration advocacy have 
not explained what it is about the lobbying world that would make this 
happen. 
 More important than any specific model in this paper is the negative 
point264 that even if the privatization critics are right, it is unclear why 
they are right, for their point is not obvious.  The proof that their point is 
not obvious is that under one set of plausible assumptions about human 
behavior and the effectiveness of advocacy, privatization decreases such 
advocacy, and under another set of plausible assumptions, privatization 
has an ambiguous effect. 
 There are a few ways for the critics to support their view.  There is 
the empirical route:  If one can observe hard evidence of private sector 
pro-incarceration advocacy, and if one can observe that total advocacy, 
or the effectiveness of total advocacy, has increased as privatization has 
increased, then one can argue strongly for a presumptive causal relation 
between privatization and pro-incarceration advocacy. 
 The better routes—available even without hard evidence—wed the 
empirical with the theoretical:  One can argue that privatization increases 
pro-incarceration advocacy by spelling out a set of assumptions under 
which this would happen and then arguing that those assumptions are 
more plausible than alternative assumptions.  When there is hard empiri-
cal evidence, that evidence is itself the best argument for the plausibility 
 
262 There were no resource constraints in the models above—the effectiveness of advocacy 
wasn’t assumed to depend on whether there was any other advocacy out there (the public or politi-
cians didn’t have limited attention spans), and prison system actors were assumed to be able to make 
any positive-net-expected-value investment (capital markets were liquid). 
263 See OLSON, supra note 28, at 2. 
264 Cf. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81–86 (3d ed. 
1950) (“The Process of Creative Destruction”). 
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of the supporting assumptions.  When the evidence is of the “maybe, 
maybe not” variety, then the argument must proceed more circumstan-
tially. 
 In any event, because theoretically privatization may have an am-
biguous effect on pro-incarceration advocacy—and under some assump-
tions may decrease it—those whose argument hinges on the view that 
privatization will increase it must do the theoretical work, empirical 
work, or both to convince the rest of us. 
 The same sort of analysis that I have conducted here on the prison 
industry can also be used to evaluate the claim that, say, defense contrac-
tors will exacerbate pro-war lobbying.  Since governmental providers of 
defense services—i.e., armies—have, on some accounts, been notorious 
pro-war lobbyists throughout history,265 such a claim is not credible 
unless one can tell a plausible story about why any defense contractor 
lobbying won’t crowd out some lobbying by the military itself, and doing 
this requires taking a position on what motivates the people at the Penta-
gon.266 The same goes for private attorneys general, private redevelop-
ment corporations, and the like.  The result won’t always be the same, 
and the political influence argument may turn out to be correct in some 
of these cases.267 But this should be the structure of the argument. 
 
265 See JAMES CARROLL, HOUSE OF WAR: THE PENTAGON AND THE DISASTROUS RISE OF 
AMERICAN POWER 499 (2006) (“[A]rguments for preventive war had defined the culture of the 
Pentagon since right after World War II, with Leslie Groves being the first to make them.  Over the 
years, not even the Soviet nuclear arsenal inhibited many senior American military officials from 
making the case for first attack—even in the teeth of the Cuban Missile Crisis.”); JAMES F. SCHNA-
BEL, POLICY AND DIRECTION: THE FIRST YEAR 370–74 (U.S. Army in the Korean War, Maurice 
Matloff gen. ed., 1972) (Douglas MacArthur made public statements adopting a more hawkish line 
with respect to China and Korea than the Truman Administration); SAMUEL E. FINER, THE MAN ON 
HORSEBACK: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS 74 (1962) (British military helped push Brit-
ain into World War I); id. at 107 (“In 1955, the [Soviet] military opposed Malenkov on two impor-
tant counts: his apparent intention to turn from heavy industry to consumer goods and his pessimism 
about the effects of nuclear war.”).  But see CARROLL, supra, at 501–03 (dissenting voices in the 
Pentagon); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 69 (1957) (“The military man 
normally opposes reckless, aggressive, belligerent action.  If war with a particular power is inevita-
ble at a later date with decreased chances of success, the military man may favor ‘preventive war’ in 
order to safeguard national security. . . . [But] generally war should not be resorted to except as a 
final recourse, and only when the outcome is a virtual certainty. . . . Thus, the military man rarely 
favors war. . . . Accordingly, the professional military man contributes a cautious, conservative, 
restraining voice to the formulation of state policy.”). 
266 See, e.g., SEYMOUR MELMAN, PENTAGON CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR 
8 (1970) (“[T]he operation of Vietnam war policies by the federal government [does not benefit an 
important segment of U.S. industrial corporations, but] is quite consistent with the maintenance and 
extension of decision-power by the new industrial management centered in the Department of De-
fense—for the management of the Vietnam war has been the occasion of major enlargement of 
budgets, facilities, manpower, capital investment and control over an additional million Americans 
in the labor force and more than one-half million additional Americans in the armed forces.”). 
267 In particular, I suspect that privatization that displaces public provision will likely displace 
public lobbying, while privatization that supplements public provision will likely supplement public 
lobbying.  Private attorneys general seem to fit more easily into the latter case, while private military 
contractors or prison firms seem to fit more easily into the former case (despite the possibility that 
(continued next page) 
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* * *
One may object at this point that I have not exonerated private pris-
ons with my economistic legerdemain.268 Rather, I have only shown that 
the entire system is corrupt,269 and perhaps I have unwittingly demon-
strated that the only way out of this mess is to reject the “interest group 
model of politics” entirely as it applies to criminal justice policy.270 
Fair enough.  If I have been correct in assuming in this Article that 
self-interested pro-incarceration lobbying is undesirable, then perhaps the 
system is corrupt.271 But how does this observation translate into an ar-
gument against prison privatization?  It’s not enough to show that private 
prisons are part of the problem:  Removing one problem isn’t guaranteed 
to make things better when there are other problems around.  As the 
models above have suggested, even if all this political advocacy is ille-
gitimate, the existence of the private sector reduces the activity of the 
public sector and may reduce total activity; eliminating the private sector 
would thus exacerbate the problems of the public sector.272 
Nor is it just economists who oppose making the best the enemy of 
the good:  As Rawls (no economist he) teaches, the analyst who makes 
specific policy recommendations in our fallen world—not in the ideal-
ized world of “strict compliance” with the principles of justice that char-
acterizes a “well-ordered society”273—is acting in the realm of “nonideal 
 
reduced costs also increase incarceration, see White, supra note 87, at 137; note 257 supra and ac-
companying text, that reduced costs increase incarceration). 
268 Cf. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 956 F.2d 321, 324 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (“statistical legerdemain”); id. at 327 (“bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo”); STAR WARS:
EPISODE I—THE PHANTOM MENACE (Lucasfilm Ltd. 1999) (“You think you’re some kind of Jedi, 
waving your hand around like that? . . . [M]ind tricks don’t work on me.”). 
269 See Dolovich, supra note 17, at 532 (“the problem is more widespread than previously rec-
ognized”). 
270 Dolovich, supra note 17, at 543. 
271 Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, III.i.89, 97–98, 104, in WILLIAM SHAKE-
SPEARE: THE COMPLETE WORKS 855, 876 (Alfred Harbage gen. ed., Viking 1969) (“A plague a both 
your houses!”); STEPHEN SONDHEIM, SWEENEY TODD: THE DEMON BARBER OF FLEET STREET 94 
(1979) (“They all deserve to die!”). 
272 Economists know this as the theory of the second best.  See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, FUN-
DAMENTALS OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 167 (John P. Bonin & Hélène Bonin trans., rev. ed. 1988) (“If n
distortions (where n  2) exist, we cannot claim that the competitive equilibrium with n–1 distortions 
is preferable to the competitive equilibrium with n distortions . . . .  The results obtained in second-
best analysis may contradict the economist’s intuition developed in the first-best analysis.”); R.G. 
Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956–57) 
(“in a situation in which there exist many constraints which prevent the fulfillment of the [Paretian] 
optimum conditions, the removal of any one constraint may affect welfare or efficiency either by 
raising it, by lowering it, or by leaving it unchanged”); see also Barenaked Ladies, Second Best, on 
EVERYTHING TO EVERYONE (Reprise 2003); SECOND BEST (Keep Your Head et al. 2004) (starring 
Joe Pantoliano); SECOND BEST (Regency Enters. et al. 1994) (starring William Hurt). 
273 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8 (1971); see also Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate 
Punishment in Liberal Democracy 307, 324 (2004) (discussing “partial compliance”). 
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theory,” which asks how the “long-term goal” dictated by ideal theory 
“might be achieved, or worked toward, usually in gradual steps.  It looks 
for policies and courses of action that are morally permissible and politi-
cally possible as well as likely to be effective.”274 
Because nonideal theory requires that we ask about the real-world 
effectiveness of any reform, merely observing undesirable lobbying by 
the private sector will not support an argument against prison privatiza-
tion unless, say, privatization actually increases “the danger of . . . cor-
rupting influence”275 or “compromise[s] further the possibility of legiti-
mate punishment.”276 
If it turns out that privatization actually reduces pro-incarceration 
lobbying—if, with privatization, prisoners’ sentences are less influenced 
by improper factors than they otherwise would be—it is unclear that 
there is any “tension between the state’s use of private prisons and the 
demands of” liberal legitimacy.277 If “private prisons are by no means 
unique,”278 and if any prison provider, public or private, will lobby for 
incarceration, any “tension” has nothing to do with private prisons and 
everything to do with the crooked timber of humanity.279 
* * *
At least with respect to prisons, the surprising moral of this story 
should not be that surprising.  From their inception, the antitrust laws 
were justified in part as a means to reduce the political influence of cor-
porations:  William Howard Taft wrote, shortly after their enactment, 
that “business methods and plans . . . directed to . . . suppressing compe-
tition . . . had resulted in the building of great and powerful corporations 
which had, many of them, intervened in politics and through use of cor-
 
274 See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 89–90 (1999) (“To this point we have been con-
cerned with ideal theory. . . . Nonideal theory asks how this long-term goal might be achieved, or 
worked toward, usually in gradual steps.  It looks for policies and courses of action that are morally 
permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be effective.  So conceived, nonideal theory 
presupposes that ideal theory is already on hand.  For until the ideal is identified . . . nonideal theory 
lacks an objective, an aim, by which its queries can be answered.”); see also RAWLS, supra note 273, 
at 245–48 (even “slavery and serfdom . . . are tolerable . . . when they relieve even worse injus-
tices”). 
275 Dolovich, supra note 17, at 532. 
276 Dolovich, supra note 17, at 542–43. 
277 Dolovich, supra note 17, at 529. 
278 Dolovich, supra note 17, at 530. 
279 Cf. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF 
IDEAS xi, 19, 48 (1991); id. at vii & n.2 (“cross-grained” timber in R.G. Collingwood’s 1929 lec-
ture); Isaiah Berlin, Montesquieu, 41 PROC. BR. ACAD. 267, 284 (1955), reprinted in AGAINST THE 
CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 130, 148 (1980); IMMANUEL KANT, Idee zu einer 
allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, in WAS IST AUFKLÄRUNG?: AUSGEWÄHLTE 
KLEINE SCHRIFTEN 3, 10 (Philosophische Bibliothek Bd. 512, 1999) (1784) (“aus so krummem 
Holze, als woraus der Mensch gemacht ist, kann nichts ganz Gerades gezimmert werden”). 
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rupt machines and bosses threatened us with a plutocracy.”280 The argu-
ment is plausible, and it is likewise plausible that prison privatization, by 
fragmenting the prison industry into at least two chunks (and more if pri-
vate firms don’t cooperate on advocacy), has similarly made the industry 
less powerful. 
 In a roundabout way, then, privatization is a form of antitrust, and 
antitrust is a form of campaign finance regulation.  It may not be worth-
while to privatize industries—or break up large corporations—merely to 
reduce their political advocacy, but at the very least this may count as a 
happy, unintended side effect of privatization that, if real, should be 
taken into account in future analysis. 
 
280 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 4 (photo. re-
print 1993) (1914); see also Arthur P. Dudden, Men Against Monopoly: The Prelude to Trust-
Busting, 18 J. HIST. IDEAS 587, 590 (1957); Lester M. Salamon & John J. Siegfried, Economic 
Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy, 71 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1026, 1039 (1977) (suggesting “an empirical base for the argument that antitrust policy is 
necessary to avoid not just undue concentrations of economic power but also threatening concentra-
tions of political power”).  But cf. DeNeen L. Brown, Rejected as a Planet, Pluto Has a Space in 
People’s Hearts, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2006, at C1. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
Note to Law Review editors: I am flexible on inclusion of this section.281 
A. A More Technical View 
Let us recap the central question:  If self-interested pro-incarceration 
advocacy is wrong, does privatization lead to more or less of it?  The 
following models show technically how adding more voices can lead to 
less pro-incarceration advocacy.  The intuition, again, is mainly that 
more competitive industries, or industries with more scattered voices, 
may advocate less because advocacy is a public good and more scattered 
industries have more trouble overcoming their collective action problem.  
The largest actor does all the lobbying, and the smaller actors free-ride.  
And because the largest actor, under current conditions, is still the public 
sector, privatization reduces the public sector’s advocacy while keeping 
the private sector’s advocacy at zero.  Another model, also plausible, 
shows that privatization has no predictable effect on pro-incarceration 
advocacy a priori; thus, showing that it will increase pro-incarceration 
advocacy requires a precise explanation of how advocacy by different 
sectors works. 
 
1. Privatization May Reduce Pro-Incarceration Advocacy 
a. A One-Sided Model 
The model has the following assumptions.  The prison system, 
whose size is normalized to 1, is divided into small, separate projects that 
can be run by either the public sector or a private firm.  Prisons operate 
for infinitely many periods, and because private contracts run out peri-
odically, many projects are put out to bid to the private sector each pe-
riod.  Actors in both the public and private sectors are rational, risk neu-
tral expected utility maximizers whose utility depends only on their fi-
nancial well-being, as described below.  All workers have reservation 
wage Wm.
The public sector wage is Wg per unit, which is higher than the equi-
librium market wage Wm.282 The public sector runs a proportion ig of the 
 
281 If you are unwilling to print this section, I could release it separately as ALEXANDER VO-
LOKH, PRIVATIZATION AND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POLITICAL ADVOCACY: TECHNICAL AP-
PENDIX (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Working Paper No. xx, 2007), and simply refer to that work-
ing paper in this Article. 
282 See text accompanying notes 164–169 supra. I treat Wg as a constant—not dependent on 
ig—for simplicity.  More properly, it is probable that Wg decreases with privatization, since the 
public sector union will then have less bargaining power.  I leave the complications this would add 
to the analysis for further research, perhaps along the lines of Fraja, supra note 162, at 461–66, who 
(continued next page) 
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projects.  The benefit of prison provision to the public sector employees 
is W = Wg–Wm per unit.283 The public sector employees are presumed 
to act collectively through their union, membership in which is manda-
tory. 
 In the private sector, there is a fixed number of firms n, all equally 
efficient and able to produce at unit cost C.  Each firm i  runs a propor-
tion ii of the system.284 The contract price per unit is P, so the benefit of 
prison provision to the private sector is  = P–C per unit.285 
Wages, prices, and costs in this model should be understood as the 
present value of the flow of wages, prices, and costs over the whole 
game.  As a purely technical matter, they are also normalized to be “per 
unit,” meaning (in this system of size 1) that they represent wages, 
prices, or costs scaled up to the level of the entire system. 
 Before prisons operate, actors in the industry can advocate.  This is a 
one-sided model, where the advocacy of the opposing side is taken as 
given.  By spending an amount ei on pro-incarceration advocacy, actor i 
can affect the probability that the size of the prison system is increased 
by a proportion  (that is, from 1 to 1+).  (This assumes that “pro-
incarceration” policy, as I have defined it,286 actually increases the extent 
of incarceration, rather than decreasing it through deterrence or, say, 
more lenient behavior by other actors not covered in the reform.) 
 The assumptions I make about the probability of this increase and 
about firm shares under privatization are listed in Appendix B1.  The 
main assumptions are that only the total amount of advocacy matters to 
the probability of the policy change; more advocacy increases the prob-
 
explicitly considers wage determination in a “mixed duopoly” consisting of a public firm and a 
private firm with unions. 
283 The foundation for this assumption is either risk neutrality of workers or—more likely—
income redistribution within the union.  See Pencavel, supra note 162, at 201–02, and text accompa-
nying notes 161–163 supra.
284 This share or proportion is different from “market share” as it is used in antitrust.  For in-
stance, if a single large firm is broken up into two identically sized firms, under my framework each 
firm has a 50% share of the industry, because its total benefits are 50% of what they were before.  In 
antitrust analysis, if the two firms compete for the same market, they each have a 50% market share, 
whereas if the two firms don’t compete with each other because they’re limited to separate geo-
graphical areas, they each have a 100% share of a smaller market.  I am grateful to Steven C. Salop 
for this point. 
285 I treat P as a constant—not dependent on {ii}—because it’s not clear what effect different 
industry shares will have on P.  In the first place, as I explain in note 284 supra, these industry 
shares are not “market shares”; that is, the companies may not be competing against each other.  In 
the second place, even if they were competing against each other, it’s not clear whether privatization 
would lead to the entry of more firms, the growth of all existing firms, or the consolidation of exist-
ing firms into fewer firms.  Finally, suppose privatization led to the entry of more firms.  Our intui-
tions suggest that collusion would be more difficult in this case, and so P should drop; but Pecorino 
points out that, under standard models, this intuition may not necessarily be true (which might either 
rebut our intuitions or indict the standard models).  See Pecorino, supra note 178. 
286 See text accompanying notes 29–30 supra.
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ability but (after a certain threshold) at a decreasing rate; and I rule out 
uninteresting cases where advocacy is so unproductive that some actors 
wouldn’t even be willing to spend the first dollar. 
 Denote all the assumptions listed above as A1.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions A1:
• No collusion. If the public sector and all private firms act 
separately:  If ig W > maxi{ii} , increasing privatization 
decreases pro-incarceration advocacy.  Otherwise, increasing 
privatization increases pro-incarceration advocacy. 
• Private sector collusion. If all private firms collude with 
each other:  If ig W > im , where im = ii over all pri-
vate firms, increasing privatization decreases pro-
incarceration advocacy.  Otherwise, increasing privatization 
decreases pro-incarceration advocacy. 
• Full collusion. If the public sector and all private firms col-
lude with each other:  If W > , increased privatization de-
creases pro-incarceration advocacy.  If W < , increased 
privatization increases pro-incarceration advocacy.  If W =
, increased privatization has no effect. 
• Sometimes, the local can be the global. In the no-collusion 
case when ig W > maxi{ii} ; in the private sector case 
when ig W > im ; or in the full collusion case:  Decreas-
ing privatization slightly and eliminating it entirely have ef-
fects on advocacy that go in the same direction. 
Proof. See Appendix B.3. 
 This general result is familiar from the literature on public goods:  
Any degree of fragmentation in the industry reduces expenditures on 
public goods that benefit the whole industry, because each actor receives 
only a portion of the benefit from advocacy attributable to his contribu-
tion to the public good.287 As explained above,288 ig W is likely greater 
than maxi{ii}  and than im  (and, for the full-collusion case, W is 
likely greater than 289). 
 
b. A Two-Sided Model 
 Suppose that the assumptions of A1 apply, except the following.  The 
probability of getting a “tougher” policy change is p(e,y), where e is the 
 
287 See sources cited supra note 143. 
288 See text accompanying notes 147–151 supra.
289 See text accompanying notes 157–169 supra.
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expenditure of prison providers and y is the expenditure of anti-
incarceration forces to prevent the increase . The disutility of these 
forces from incarceration is B < 0.  Denote these assumptions, and those 
listed in Appendix C1, as A2.
Proposition 2. Under assumptions A2 and if all private firms collude 
with each other:  If ig W > im , increasing privatization de-
creases pro-incarceration advocacy.  Otherwise, increasing priva-
tization increases pro-incarceration advocacy.  In either case, in-
creased privatization has an ambiguous effect on anti-
incarceration advocacy. 
Proof. See Appendix C.2. 
 It is easy to show that the results are analogous using the other collu-
sion assumptions from above.  If, as argued before, ig W is larger, then, 
as in the previous model, the amount of pro-incarceration advocacy goes 
down, because em remains zero and eg falls with privatization (because of 
the same public goods problem).  The “total amount” of advocacy (e+y) 
is not meaningful in this model; the more relevant quantity is the prob-
ability p(e,y) – p(0,0), which is the total effect of all advocacy.  (We can 
interpret p(0,0) as the probability that the policy change happens anyway 
under “fair deliberative conditions.”290) In any event, the effect of priva-
tization on p(e,y) is indeterminate without further information. 
 
c. Expenditures and Substantive Influence on Policy 
Suppose that l is not exogenous but can be influenced by expendi-
tures.  Then the probability of success (in a one-sided model) can be ex-
pressed not as p(e) but as p(l(e),e), where pl < 0, pe > 0, and l > 0.
The public employees choose eg to maximize: 
 mg(eg) = ig (1 + p(l(e),e) ) W – eg.
The first-order condition of this problem (omitting the arguments of p 
and l for clarity) is: 
 (pl l + pe) l + p l 	 1 / ig W (with equality if eg* > 0).291 
(Similarly, the first-order condition of the private sector is the same ex-
pression, with eg replaced by em and ig W replaced by ii n.)  Suppose 
that ig W > ii n. For reasons explained in the proof of Proposition 1, 
only the public sector gives anything: eg* > 0 and em* = 0. If the left-
hand side of the above expression—call it L(e)—is decreasing in e, then 
it is clear that decreasing ig will decrease e—that is, privatization will 
 
290 See Dolovich, supra note 17, at 515. 
291 This is similar to equation (20.9) in MUELLER, supra note 138, at 480. 
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decrease total advocacy.  However, it is unclear that L(e) is decreasing in 
e: 
 dL/de = (ple l + pl l
 + pee) l + (pl l + pe) l + pe l + p l
.
Consider the expression (pl l + pe) contained in the second term; pl l is 
negative while pe is positive.  So just from that term alone, we can see 
that L(e) is not necessarily decreasing in e. 
 Fortunately, the previous comparative static result still goes through, 
for reasons stated in Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1. Suppose f is differentiable, argmaxx (f(x) – x) = x* > 0, 
f() = 0, and i  (0,1).  Then argmaxx (if(x) – x) = x < x*.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
 By Lemma 1, decreasing ig decreases total advocacy.  Thus, even in 
a model where advocacy not only alters the probability that a pro-
incarceration reform will succeed, but also alters the substantive content 
of that reform, privatization still decreases advocacy. 
 
2. Privatization May Have an Indeterminate Effect 
 Instead of assuming that the probability of getting the change in pol-
icy was p(e), where e = ei, let us assume that the probability of the pol-
icy change is p(eg) + q(em), where eg and em are the respective contribu-
tions of the public and private sectors.  The assumptions of this model 
(which I label A3) are the same as A1, with q behaving like p.  The only 
exception is that, so that the probabilities make sense, we also have 
p() + q() 	 1. As before, p(0) + q(0), the world without self-
interested advocacy, can be interpreted as the probability that the reform 
occurs under conditions of “fair deliberation.”292 
If the public and private sectors were colluding with each other, they 
would, given any total advocacy amount, allocate eg and em optimally, 
and would then choose an optimal total advocacy amount.293 But let us 
continue supposing that the two sectors are not colluding, and each has a 
share ig and im.
Proposition 3. Under assumptions A3 and if all private firms collude 
with each other, increasing privatization has an ambiguous effect 
on pro-incarceration advocacy. 
Proof. See Appendix E. 
 
292 See text accompanying note 290 supra.
293 See Appendix B.2 infra.
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 In this model, both sectors can advocate, and no sector totally free 
rides off the other, as the smaller sector did in the previous model. 
 The result of this proposition makes sense:  Privatization increases 
the advocacy of the private sector but decreases the advocacy of the pub-
lic sector.  Of course, these models are all polar cases; in principle, there 
can be other intermediate advocacy effectiveness functions p(eg,em) or
p(eg,em,y) (or, more generally, p(enon-prisons,eg,em,y)).  But they do show 
that concerns that privatization will increase the amount or effect of ad-
vocacy, or even that they run of risk of doing so, are unfounded unless 
one is more specific about the effectiveness and interaction of advocacy 
by the different sectors. 
 Obviously, if the effect of privatization is ambiguous in this one-
sided model, it remains ambiguous if we add anti-incarceration advo-
cacy.  Thus, there is no need to look into the two-sided model. 
 
B. Details of Proposition 1 
1. Technical Assumptions of A1
I make the following assumptions about the probability of the policy 
change: 
• the probability p(e) is a continuous and twice differentiable func-
tion294 of e = ei, i.e., only the total amount of advocacy mat-
ters;295 
• p  [0,1] (this is part of the definition of a probability); 
• p] > 0, i.e., more advocacy increases the probability; 
• Decreasing returns to advocacy kick in eventually: p < 0;  et
such that p_(e) < 0  e > et;296 
•  e such that (p(e)–p(0)) g  W > e, and  e
 such that 
(p(e
)–p(0)) i*   > e
 for i* = argmaxi{i}; i.e., for both the 
public sector and the largest private firm, I require that there be 
some level of advocacy that makes him better off than no advo-
cacy at all, thus ruling out the uninteresting case where some 
sector would be satisfied even if there were no advocacy at all. 
 I make two assumptions about firm shares under privatization. 
 First, I assume that individual firm shares are continuous and differ-
entiable functions of ig; this implies that when privatization increases (in 
 
294 The continuity condition merely states that the probability of getting a policy change is a 
smooth function of total lobbying effort.  Twice differentiability is a purely technical constraint. 
295 The assumption that there is only a single form of advocacy and a single type of benefit is 
harmless.  See Appendix B.2 infra.
296 See note 138 supra and accompanying text. 
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other words, when ig falls) by a small amount, the individual ii do not 
jump discontinuously. 
 Second, I interpret privatization as taking certain projects away from 
the government and awarding them to the private sector according to 
some allocation method.  When privatization increases, I assume that 
each private firm keeps its original projects, and at least the largest firm 
acquires some of the formerly government projects.  This implies that as 
ig falls, the largest ii increases.297 Similarly, when privatization de-
creases (ig rises), at least the largest ii falls. 
 
2. The Harmlessness of Homogeneous Advocacy 
This appendix shows that it is harmless to assume that there is a sin-
gle type of advocacy expenditure that goes to obtain a single type of 
benefit. 
 Suppose, instead, there were two types of expenditure, e and i, used 
to obtain two types of benefit, X and Y.  Instead of merely having a 
benefit B(e) = ii p(e) X, one would then have a benefit: 
 B+(e, i) = ii [p(e) X + q(i) Y], 
where both p and q satisfy the technical assumptions of A1, and one 
would choose e and i to maximize: 
 U(e, i) = B+(e, i) – e – i. 
But this is equivalent to defining M  e + i, and then choosing e and M to 
maximize: 
 V(e, M) = B+(e, M–e) – M. 
And this, in turn, is equivalent to the two-step problem of: 
• first choosing e* to maximize V(e, M), denoting the solution 
e*(M) and the maximized value V*(M)  V(e*(M), M) 
B+(e*(M), M–e*(M)) – M  B*(M) – M; 
• then choosing M to maximize V*(M). 
 Consider the “new” benefit function B*(M), which is a function of 
total advocacy expenditures M.  Taking derivatives, we have (by the En-
velope Theorem298): 
 dB*/dM = B+2 (e*(M), M–e*(M)) = ii q(M–e*(M)) Y > 0, 
 d2B*/dM2 = B+22 (e*(M), M–e*(M)) = ii q
(M–e*(M)) Y, 
 d3B*/dM3 = B+222 (e*(M), M–e*(M)) = ii q(M–e*(M)) Y < 0. 
 
297 If we interpret ii as the probability that a private firm i gets any project, then ii/im is the 
conditional probability that it gets the project given that the project goes to the private sector.  So, as 
ig falls (and thus im rises) by , ii rises to (ii/im) (im+) = ii + ii  / im  i.  But I do not need such 
a strong assumption. 
298 See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 964–66; VARIAN, supra note 133, at 490–91. 
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So the first and third derivatives of B* behave like the first and third de-
rivatives of B.  As for the second derivative, we need to check whether it 
eventually becomes negative, for which a sufficient condition is that 
limM M–e*(M) = , for which in turn a sufficient condition is that 
de*(M)/dM < 1. 
 Note that at the first stage of choosing e* to maximize V(e,M), the 
first-order condition was ii [p(e*) X – q(M–e*) Y] = 1, and the second-
order condition was p
(e*) X + q
(M–e*) Y < 0.  Differentiating the 
first-order condition with respect to M (and assuming, for simplicity, an 
interior solution), we obtain: 
 [p
(e*) X + q
(M–e*) Y] de*/dM = q
(M–e*) Y, 
or: 
 de*/dM = q
(M–e*) Y / [p
(e*) X + q
(M–e*) Y]. 
We know from the second-order condition that the denominator of this 
expression is negative, and we know by assumption that the first term of 
the denominator, p
(e*) X, is negative.  If q
(M–e*) Y < 0, it is easy to 
see that de*/dM < 1.  If q
(M–e*) Y > 0, then the numerator is positive 
and the denominator is negative, so again de*/dM < 1. 
 Therefore, the second derivative of B* likewise acts like the second 
derivative of B.  So U(e) = B(e) – e can thus be interpreted as though it 
were a more generalized value function V*(M) = B*(M) – M, where the 
actor chooses a total amount of advocacy and allocates it optimally 
among both types of advocacy.  This is straightforward to generalize to a 
larger number of types of advocacy. 
 
3. Proof 
 a. No collusion 
The public employees choose eg to maximize: 
 mg(eg) = ig (1 + p(e)) W – eg.
The first-order condition of this problem is: 
 p](e*) ig  W o 1 (with equality if eg* > 0), 
or: 
 e* p (p])-1(1 / ig  W) (with equality if eg* > 0). 
Consider the function f(e) = [p(e)–p(0)] ig  W – e.  It is clear that 
f(0) = 0; by assumption,  e > 0 such that f(e) > 0; and it is likewise 
clear that f() = –. Therefore, f(e) has an interior maximum, and at 
that maximum we must have f(e) = p(e) ig  W – 1 = 0. The second 
derivative is p
(e) ig  W, which is negative  e > et; thus, the maxi-
mum of f(e) occurs at some e > et. These are the same derivatives as 
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those of the public sector’s objective function, so the public sector’s first-
order condition (with equality) also has a solution, which is a maximum. 
 Each private sector firm i chooses ei to maximize: 
 mi(ei) = ii (1 + p(e))  – ei.
The first-order condition of this problem (analogously to the public sec-
tor case) is: 
 p](e*) ii   o 1 (with equality if ei* > 0)  i, 
or: 
 e* p (p])-1(1 / im  ) (with equality if em* > 0). 
By an analogous argument, the first-order condition with equality has a 
unique solution greater than et, which is a maximum. 
 Case 1. If ig W > maxi{ii} , then: 
 p](e*) ig  W = 1 and 
 p](e*) ii   < 1  i. 
The public sector does all the advocacy, and ei* = 0  i.  Denote the 
amount of public sector advocacy, as a function of the public sector 
share, by: 
 e*(ig) = (p])–1(1 / ig  W). 
Public sector advocacy is increasing in ig, since: 
 de*/dig = –1 / ig2  W p
((p])–1(1 / ig  W)) > 0. 
Thus, increased privatization (i.e., decreasing ig) decreases total advo-
cacy. 
 Case 2. If ig W < ii  for some i:  Let I denote the set of i such 
that i = argmaxi{ii}.  Then all firms i  I, as the “largest” actor(s), does 
(do) all the advocacy, and eg* = ei* = 0  i  I.  (If there is more than 
one i  I, those firms advocate as much as they would if they were a sin-
gle firm; the division of advocacy among those firms is arbitrary.  Case 3 
below explains the mechanism.)  Denote ii* = max{ii}.  Total private 
sector advocacy, e*(ii*) = (p])–1(1 / ii*  ), is increasing in ii*, by an 
analogous argument to Case 1.  By assumption, as privatization in-
creases, the largest ii increases, so the private sector’s advocacy in-
creases, and thus total advocacy increases. 
 Case 3. If ig W = ii  = K for some i  I, then the first-order con-
ditions of the public sector and of the firms in I hold with equality simul-
taneously, and p](e*) = 1/K. 
 Any division of advocacy expenses between the public sector and the 
firms in I can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium.  Let (eg,e1,…,en) be any 
division of advocacy expenses such that,  i, ei = 0 if ii  < K, and 
eg + Iei = (p)–1(1/K).  Then the first-order conditions of the public sec-
tor and of the firms in I are satisfied, and all other first-order conditions 
hold with strict inequality.  Therefore, this division is individually ra-
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tional for each firm, so no firm would benefit from deviating.  This divi-
sion is thus a Nash equilibrium. 
 If ig decreases, by assumption, all the ii increase.  Then we are back 
in Case 2, and total advocacy increases.  If ig increases, the largest ii
falls; then we are in Case 1, and advocacy also increases. 
 
b. Private sector collusion 
As before, the public sector’s first-order condition is: 
 p](e*) ig  W o 1 (with equality if eg* > 0), or 
 e* p (p])–1(1 / ig  W) (with equality if eg* > 0). 
For the same reasons as in subsection a above, the first-order condition 
with equality has a unique solution eg*  (et,r) for any ii, which is a 
maximum. 
 The private sector chooses em to maximize: 
 mm(em) = im (1 + p(e))  – em,
where im = ii over all private firms.  The first-order condition of this 
problem is: 
 p](e*) im   o 1 (with equality if em* > 0), or 
 e* p (p])-1(1 / im  ) (with equality if em* > 0). 
For the same reasons as above, the first-order condition with equality has 
a unique solution em*  (et,r) for any ii, which is a maximum. 
 Case 1. If ig W > im , as before, we have: 
 p](e*) ig  W = 1 and 
 p](e*) im   < 1.
The public sector does all the advocacy, and em* = 0. The amount of 
public sector advocacy, (p])–1(1 / ig  W), is increasing in ig; thus, in-
creased privatization decreases total advocacy. 
 Case 2. If ig W < im , then the private sector, as the “larger” sec-
tor, does all the advocacy, and eg* = 0. The private sector’s advocacy, 
(p])–1(1 / im  ), is increasing in im; thus, increased privatization in-
creases advocacy. 
 Case 3. If ig W = im  = K, then both first-order conditions hold 
with equality simultaneously, p](e*) = 1/K, and again any division of ad-
vocacy expenses between the public and private sectors can be sustained 
as a Nash equilibrium.  If im increases, then we are back in Case 2; the 
private sector takes over all the advocacy, which increases, and the pub-
lic sector falls to 0, so the total amount of advocacy increases. 
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 c. Full collusion 
The colluding public and private sectors choose e (and divide that 
contribution among themselves in some way) to maximize: 
 (e) = (1 + p(e)) (g W + m ) – e. 
This has an interior maximum, by a reasoning analogous to that given 
above.  The first-order condition is: 
 p(e*) = 1 /  (g W + m ). 
Differentiating, we obtain: 
 p
(e*) de*/dm = –  (–W) / (g W + m )2,
or: 
 de*/dm = –  (–W) / p
(e*) (g W + m )2,
which is negative if  < W, positive if  > W, and 0 if  = W. 
 
d. Sometimes, the local can be the global 
The previous sections of the proof all proceeded by showing that, in 
each case, increasing m (or, equivalently, decreasing g) would have a 
particular effect because de*(m)/dm (or de*(g)/dg) was either posi-
tive, negative, or zero.  But in all the cases above, de*(m)/dm has the 
same sign for all values of m. Thus, suppose one of the results above 
was that privatization decreases advocacy, or de*(m)/dm < 0; thus, the 
function e*(m) is decreasing in m. This means that e* is decreasing at 
a particular value of m (this is a local effect, or what happens if you in-
crease privatization by a small amount), or e*(m–h) > e*(m) for a small 
value of h.  But, because de*(m)/dm < 0  m, this also means that 
e*(0) > e*(m)  m:
e*(0) = e*(m) – 0m [de*(m)/dm] dm > e*(m). 
So the effect of decreasing privatization by a small amount goes in the 
same direction (but, naturally, may have a different magnitude) as the 
effect of eliminating privatization entirely, as long as we remain in the 
same case.  This happens in Case 1 of the no-collusion case, Case 1 of 
the private sector collusion case, and the full collusion case. 
C. Details of Proposition 2 
 1. Technical Assumptions of A2
The assumptions about p are the same as in A1, except as amended 
by the following: 
• p is a continuous and twice differentiable function of e = ei and 
y, i.e., only the total amount of advocacy by each side matters; 
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• p1 > 0 and p2 < 0, i.e., more advocacy by the pro-incarceration 
side increases the probability and more advocacy by the anti-
incarceration side decreases it, other things being equal; 
• Decreasing returns to each type of advocacy kick in eventually: 
p111 < 0; p222 > 0;  y,  et(y) such that p11(e) < 0  e > et(y); and 
 e,  yt(e) such that p22(e,y) > 0  y > yt(e); 
•  y,  e such that (p(e,y)–p(0,y)) g  W > e, and  e
 such 
that (p(e
)–p(0)) m   > e
. Similarly,  e,  y such that 
(p(e,y)–p(e,0)) B > y; i.e., for the public sector, private sector, 
and anti-incarceration forces, I require that there be some level of 
advocacy that makes them better off than no advocacy at all, thus 
ruling out the uninteresting case where some actor would be sat-
isfied even if there were no advocacy at all. 
 The private and public sectors’ objective functions remain the same, 
with p(e) replaced by p(e,y).  The objective of the anti-incarceration 
forces (assumed to be a unitary black box), taking advocacy into account, 
is my(y) = (1 + p(e,y) ) B – y. 
 
2. Proof 
The private sector chooses em to maximize mm(em), and the public 
sector chooses eg to maximize: 
 mg(eg) = ig (1 + p(e,y)) W – eg.
The anti-incarceration forces choose y to minimize: 
 my(y) = (1 + p(e,y)) B – y. 
The first-order conditions are: 
 im p1(e*,y*)   	 1,
ig p1(e*,y*)  W 	 1, and 
 –p2(e*,y*) B  1. 
For the same reasons as above, it’s likely that one of em or eg is zero (and 
that variable’s first-order condition holds with inequality).  Because of 
the technical assumptions, the other two first-order conditions hold with 
equality and imply single unique maxima.  (By a reasoning analogous to 
that in Proposition 1, e* > et(y*) and y* > yt(e*), and since p11 < 0 and 
p22 > 0 for those values, the second-order conditions are satisfied.) 
For simplicity, consider the case that ig W > im . Differentiating 
the first-order conditions, we obtain: 
 deg/dim = –p1 p22 / (1–im) (–p11p22 + p12p21) < 0, and 
 dy/dim = p1 p21 / (1–im) (–p11p22 + p12p21). 
The sign of dy/dim depends on that of p21, that is, on the interaction be-
tween the effectiveness of pro- and anti-incarceration advocacy.  Thus, 
total pro-incarceration advocacy declines with increased privatization 
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(since eg declines and em is zero), while the effect of increased privatiza-
tion on anti-incarceration advocacy is ambiguous. 
 It is straightforward to show that if ig W 	 im , total pro-
incarceration advocacy increases with increased privatization, while the 
effect of increased privatization on anti-incarceration advocacy is am-
biguous. 
 
D. Proof of Lemma 1 
Because argmaxx (f(x) – x) = x* > 0 and f is differentiable, we know 
that f(x*) = 1 and f
(x) < 0.  Moreover (assuming for simplicity that x* 
is a unique maximum),  x  x*, f(x*) – x* > f(x) – x. 
 Now suppose that argmaxx (if(x) – x) = x
 > x* (and suppose this is 
a unique maximum).  Then we have f(x
) = 1/i and f
(x
) < 0. But, be-
cause f() = 0,  x** > x
 such that f(x**) = 1.  (This is the “next” x 
such that f = 1 “after” x
.)  Because x* was a maximum for f(x) – x, we 
know that f(x**) – x** < f(x*) – x*. 
 Now define x as the “previous” x such that f = 1/i “before” x*: 
x = max{x | f(x) = 1/i, x < x*}, or (if there is no such x) x = 0. Because 
x
 was a maximum for if(x) – x, we know that if(x
) – x
 > if(x) – x,
which implies that f(x
) – x
/i > f(x) – x/i.
Because f(x**) – x** < f(x*) – x*, we have x*x** (f(x) – 1) dx < 0.  
And, since f(x
) – x
/i > f(x) – x/i, we have xx
 (f(x) – 1/i) dx > 0.  
Therefore, if we subtract these two integrals from each other, we must 
have: 
 x*x** (f(x) – 1) dx – xx
 (f(x) – 1/i) dx < 0. 
But if we actually evaluate that difference, we get: 
 x*x** (f(x) – 1) dx – xx
 (f(x) – 1/i) dx = 
 = x*x** [(f(x) – 1/i) + (1/i – 1)] dx – xx
 (f(x) – 1/i) dx =
= –xx* (f(x) – 1/i)dx + x*x
 (1/i – 1)dx + x
x** (f(x) – 1)dx. 
By construction of x and x*, f(x)  [1,1/i] when x  [x,x*], so the first 
term above is the negative of a negative expression, i.e., positive.  The 
second term is clearly positive because 1/i > 1. The third term is posi-
tive because, again by construction of x
 and x**, f(x)  [1,1/i] when 
x  [x
,x**].  Thus, x*x** (f(x) – 1) dx – xx
 (f(x) – 1/i) dx > 0, which 
contradicts the result that x*x** (f(x) – 1) dx – xx
 (f(x) – 1/i) dx < 0.
By contradiction, we must have argmaxx (if(x) – x) = x
 < x*. 
 
E. Details of Proposition 3 
The public sector chooses eg to maximize: 
 mg(eg) = ig (1 + (p(eg)+q(em))) W – eg,
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so it sets: 
 p(eg*) 	 1 / ig  W (with equality if eg* > 0). 
This first-order condition and the next one have unique solutions for any 
ii for analogous reasons to those stated above.  Similarly, the private sec-
tor chooses em to maximize: 
 mm(em) = im (1 + (p(eg)+q(em)))  – em,
so it sets: 
 q(em*) 	 1 / im   (with equality if em* > 0). 
The assumptions here guarantee an interior solution.  However, if the 
relevant assumption is weakened and we have ig  W < 1 / p(et) or 
im   < 1 / p(et) for some parameter values, one or both of the first-
order conditions cannot be solved with equality, in which case it would 
not be profitable for the relevant sector or sectors to advocate at all.  
(This could also explain why the private sector might not advocate—
im is not high, and neither is .) 
 The total effect of advocacy, at the optimum, is: 
 E = p(eg*) + q(em*), 
which we can express in terms of im:
E(im) = p(eg*(im)) + q(em*(im)). 
(For convenience, I’ll drop the im argument.)  To gauge the effect of in-
creased privatization, we examine: 
 dE/dim = p(eg*) deg*/dim + q(em*) dem*/dim
= p(eg*) / p
(eg*) ig2  W – q(em*) / q
(em*) im2  
= 1 / p
(eg*) ig3 2 W2 – 1 / q
(em*) im3 2 2.
This expression is of indeterminate sign.  (Again, if the relevant assump-
tion is weakened, see above, then there might be a corner solution; in that 
case, it is clear that moving a little bit in the direction of that sector will 
not increase that sector’s investment, while it will decrease the invest-
ment of the other sector, so the total effect of pro-incarceration advocacy 
will drop.  But for a big enough discrete movement in im—for instance, 
an increase from an im < 1 /   p(et) to im = 1 /   p(et)—then there 
will be a discrete jump in advocacy—in this example, from em = 0 to em
= et.)  Intuition:  The first term, which is negative, represents the decrease 
in the advocacy effectiveness of the public sector when privatization in-
creases, since the public sector gets less of the benefit of its advocacy.  
The second term, which is positive, represents the increase in the advo-
cacy effectiveness of the private sector when privatization increases (for 
analogous reasons). 
